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Abstract 
Behavioural and neuroimaging evidence suggests that autism is characterised, in part, 
by deficits in social intelligence. Impairments in face and eye gaze processing and 
facial expression recognition are often used to explain this deficit. Although the 
general consensus is that children with autism are impaired in face and facial 
expression processing the actual seat of impairment is unknown. Furthermore, face 
recognition using only inner face information and facial expression production 
without any visual cues has never been investigated in children with autism. 
Research on the development of face recognition abilities provided mixed results with 
regard to how children identify unfamiliar faces both in typical and atypical 
populations. Recognising an unfamiliar face from only inner face has not been 
investigated during development or in children with autism. This thesis investigated 
unfamiliar face recognition from inner face only information firstly, during 
developmental period of 5-10 years of age; and secondly, with children with autism 
and individually matched controls. 5-l0-year-olds were exceptionally good at face 
recognition from only inner face information. Children with autism were as good as 
the matched controls in recognising unfamiliar faces from only inner face 
information. These findings are discussed with reference to holistic face processing 
ability and perceptual sameness of the stimuli. 
Research on the development of facial expression recognition indicates a differential 
pathway for different expressions both in typical and atypical populations. This thesis 
investigated facial expression production ability with and without context in children 
with autism and individually matched controls. Children with autism were atypical in 
fear facial expression production and failed to use context to enhance performance. 
These findings are discussed with reference to social intelligence and the role of 
experience in early childhood in development of face expertise. 
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Chapter 1 
Thesis aims and advance organiser 
Abstract 
This chapter states the primary aim of the thesis. Also as an advance organiser it lists 
what each chapter includes and why. I also explain the layout of the literature review 
and justify why each area is covered in the review. 
1.1. Primary aims 
The main aims of this thesis are three fold: Firstly, to investigate if children with 
autism, specifically the high functioning autism (HF A) children, are able to produce 
facial expressions (FEs) with and without context and label the six basic emotions in 
stories. To then compare this finding with a sample matched on a one to one basis for 
IQ and chronological age in order to investigate the group difference. 
Secondly, to establish if children with autism use the inner face for identity 
recognition tasks thus demonstrating holistic processing. To compare this finding with 
a sample matched on a one to one basis for IQ and chronological age in order to 
investigate the group difference. 
Thirdly, to determine the developmental pathway of holistic processing in typically 
developing children aged 5 to 9 using the inner face in the learning phase. 
1.2 Advance organiser 
Chapter 2 covers the literature on face recognition starting with brief synopsis of adult 
i 
expertise in face processing followed by developmental pathway right from birth. 
This is to set the scene of face processing as the research reported here was 
investigating face recognition (FR). 
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Chapters 3 and 5 cover the literature on neural mechanisms known so far for face 
recognition and facial expression (FE) recognition. This is because the findings of this 
thesis fit in with both behavioural and neural models of face processing. Furthermore 
the research reported here was specifically investigating FE processing in autism 
population. Autism has benefited from considerable attention from neuroscientists and 
the findings of this research are explored within the neuroscience models of autism as 
well. Hence reviews of typical neural system for face processing and FE processing 
are included in this thesis. 
Chapter 4 covers the literature on development of facial expression recognition along 
with factors influencing FE perception. This is because the main purpose of this thesis 
was to investigate FE and the factors stated in literature so far were taken into 
consideration when designing experiments. 
Chapter 6 covers diagnosis of autism from clinical and research perspectives. For the 
purpose of this research I acquired training in diagnosing autism for research 
purposes. Diagnosis of autism from clinical and research perspective is very varied 
and has implications on the findings of research. Taking this into account diagnosis of 
autism is explored especially from research perspective. Literature on face processing 
and FE processing in the autism population is covered here 
Chapter 7 covers literature on inner outer face recognition because this paradigm is 
used to investigate FR in children aged 5 to 10 years of age in this thesis. 
Chapter 8 states the primary and secondary aims of thesis in detail and how the aims 
are achieved before embarking on the experiments of the thesis. 
Chapter 9 reports the experiments on inner outer face recognition and discusses the 
findings. 
Chapter 10 reports the experiments on FE recognition and discusses the findings. 
Chapter 11 covers general discussion where by the main findings of this thesis are 
stated and considered thus bringing the FR and FE findings together. 
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1.3 Layout and justification of literature review 
It is vital that this research is set in context within the existing literature of face and 
facial expression (FE) processing for typical individuals as well as the autism 
population. A backdrop of FR and FE recognition in the typical population is first 
presented in the review in order to set the developmental pathway. The general 
consensus among scientists working in the field of face research is that adults are 
experts in processing face stimuli. Scientists have then investigated when does this 
special ability emerge in infancy. The literature review included in this thesis follows 
this path in order to highlight the developmental pathway. This is essential because it 
is only when I fully explore and understand what the developmental pathway is for 
the typical population, that I can evaluate the developmental pathway for the autism 
population. Also for this evaluation to be effective it is essential to have a good 
understanding of the pervasive developmental disorder from diagnostic and 
theoretical points of view. Hence the second part of literature review covers autism 
diagnosis and theories followed by behavioural evidence ofFR and FE recognition. 
Autism is considered a neuro-developmental disorder and has benefited from research 
within the field of neurophysiology. Scientists investigating expertise in face 
processing have also extensively used neurophysiological technology in order to 
answer if face processing is domain specific or domain general. Although the research 
reported in this thesis has not employed neurophysiological techniques for 
investigation the findings of this research links in very well with the neural system 
model. Therefore, when reviewing FR and FE recognition evidence from 
neuroscience is presented demonstrating that face processing and FE processing is 





In this chapter I take the following route: firstly, I demonstrate that, adults are face 
experts, then consider two of the processing concepts, namely the holistic and 
configural. I then explore the notion that individuals use different processing 
strategies at different stages of life. The final section summarises three theories on the 
development of face recognition (FR). In this chapter and throughout this thesis 
information on adult literature is presented to draw home the point that typical adults 
are 'face experts'. Information on the infant literature is also presented in order to 
chart the developmental pathway for face processing from birth to adolescence. 
2.1 Faces are special, adults are experts 
Infants right from birth, encounter other human faces more often than any other visual 
object, and of a wider range. Faces are by far the most complicated visual stimuli that 
any newborn will encounter and are undoubtedly the most important stimuli category 
for survival. Newborn infant with very limited visual acuity finally gets to the stage 
where, as an adult, he has to extract information in a matter of milliseconds, and 
effectively infer gender, identity, mood, emotion, age and mental states of the face he 
comes across. Faces are highly salient and biologically significant visual stimuli that 
provide information critical for successful negotiation of the social world (de Haan et 
aI.,2002). 
Faces are a remarkably homogeneous class of visual stimuli; they share a highly 
similar structure, always consisting of the same set of parts (eyes, nose, mouth, ears) 
in the same basic configuration (nose below the eyes and above the mouth etc.). 
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Despite thi s adul ts can typically recognise faces more quickly and more acc urate ly 
than other types of visual stimuli (Yin, 1969) and are classed as 'face experts'. Having 
drawn the conclusion that adu lts are 'face experts' the big questi on has been, how we 
become expert in process ing faces? In order to answer this question to any 
satisfaction, research in thi s fie ld has approached the scrutiny of expertise fro m 
numerous angles. Some researchers have made the compari son of faces as stimuli 
with other classes of stimuli such as houses, cars, dogs etc .; others have manipulated 
the face stimuli into a variety of atypical formats such as inversion, changi ng the 
locati on of features, chang ing the di stance between the fea tures etc. Comparison of 
adul t data has a lso been consistently and relentl essly made to developmenta l data to 
demonstrate the experti se . N umerous behavioura l, biologica l, evolutionary, and 
neurological theories and processing concepts have been proposed in order to explain 
the expertise. As a result, the literature of face recogn ition is awash w ith endless small 
claims of significant di ffe rences between children and adult face processing ability, 
between diffe rent processing mechanisms, all resulting in a fi nal single main claim '-
face processing is unique and we as adults are 'experts' in it. 
2.2 Faces are not special 
Gauthier and Tarr, (1 997) designed novel objects ca ll ed 'Greebles', a homogenolls 
class of stimuli created to share the properties of a human face (see F igure 2. 1). Using 
these stimuli the authors first trained novices to become ' Greeble experts' and then 
tested them for holi sti c processing. It was reported that Greebles were processed more 
holi stically by experts than novices and an inversion effect was observed when 
inverted Greebles were presented to Greeble experts. 
(a) 
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Figure 2.1: Example ofgreebles designed to test the e((ect of expertise. Reproduced 
(rom Gauthier, Behrmann and Tarr, (2004). 
It is asserted that holistic processing and an inversion effect relates to expertise with a 
stimulus category and that faces are not necessarily 'special' in the way they are 
processed (Gauthier et aI., 2004; Carey and Diamond, 1986). 
An alternative explanation for the 'Greeble effect' has been that the configuration of 
Greebles is so similar to the human face that it inadvertently triggers face-selective 
visual processes (Kanwisher, 2000). 
2.3 Familiar and unfamiliar face 
Everyone processes familiar faces differently to unfamiliar faces. Adults, as face 
experts, generally rely more on the internal and hence stable features in identity 
recognition tasks; whereas children tend to rely more on the external features for 
processing face stimuli (Ellis, Shepherd and Davies, 1979). 
For the purposes of this thesis the term 'familiar face' has been used to describe faces 
that are learnt as part of everyday life and the term 'unfamiliar face' has been used to 
describe faces that are otherwise not known to individuals but have been familiarised 
only for the purpose of research. Since my main work and investigation involves 
unfamiliar faces, I restrict my review to unfamiliar faces throughout. 
2.4 Evidence of face expertise in adults 
Carey, Diamond and Woods, (1980) state that an adult's capacity to recognise faces 
has two aspects: 'encoding an unfamiliar face', which involves forming a 
representation of the face, then 'recognition', referring to the matching of the 
representation previously formed. Both encoding and recognition are done extremely 
effectively and rapidly. Moreover, once a representation is formed and stored it stays 
in the memory for a long period of time (Bahrick et aI., 1975). 
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Another way to demonstrate the existence of expertise has been to test the 'inversion 
effect' . FR is adversely affected in terms of both accuracy and reaction time when 
faces are inverted through 180°; known as the inversion effect. Importantly, the 
reduced level of accuracy observed for inverted faces is not seen for other mono-
oriented objects, such as cars or houses etc. (e.g. Yin, 1969). These early findings led 
authors to speculate that there might be something 'special' about faces: "the inverted 
face is espec ially difficult to remember because of two factors: a general factor of 
familiarity with mono-oriented objects and a special factor involving only faces" 
(Yin, 1969; p. 145). This inversion effect was also verified by Diamond and Carey 
(1986), with adult participants, who were presented with inverted faces, landscapes 
and dog shapes. Adults succumbed to inversion effects as far as faces are concerned 
but not so much for landscapes, however, participants who were experts in dogs, 
succumbed to inversion effect with dog shapes as well as human faces (see figure 
2.2). This study emphasised that adults definitely have expertise in faces and as a 
result are affected by the inversion of faces. Furthermore, if adults are experts in any 
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Figure 2.2: Taken from Diamond and Carey, (J 986) which highlights that individuals 
who are dog experts are a(fected by an inversion effect for dog shapes. 
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2.4.1 Dual processing hypothesis 
Diamond and Carey, (1986) tried to explain the inversion effect by suggesting that we 
should distinguish between first-order and second-order relational information. First-
order relational information describes the basic configuration of a stimulus, and is 
used to classify a face as a face (e.g. eyes above nose above mouth). Second-order 
relational information reflects variations of this basic configuration in terms of the 
distance between the features (e.g. eyes wide set for a narrow face). Diamond and 
Carey, suggest that when faces are inverted, people are unable to efficiently extract 
second-order relational information and revert to a less accurate featural processing 
strategy. It should be noted here that second-order relation as described by Diamond 
and Carey, (1986) is now more popularly known as configural processing as later 
described by Maurer, Le Grand and Mondloch, (2002). 
2.4.2 Single Processing Strategy 
An alternative account to the dual-processing hypothesis, to explain the 'inversion 
effect' is that faces are processed using a single strategy. According to this account, 
because faces are typically seen in an upright orientation, they can only be processed 
in the canonical view; therefore the image being viewed must be mentally rotated 
back to its canonical angle. However, as the degree of rotation increases, it becomes 
harder to accurately form a mental representation of the face using configural cues 
(Rock, 1973). Consequently, a linear relationship should be found between the degree 
of rotation and overall performance. However, stimuli from categories that are not 
processed configurally (e.g. tables, fruit etc.) shouldn't be adversely affected by 
rotation as they can be recognised accurately regardless of angle (e.g. Yin, 1969). 
Valentine and Bruce, (1988) found support for this account using faces that were 
rotated 0°, 45°, 90°, 135° or 180° away from the canonical orientation (See Figure 
2.3). They found a significant linear relationship between the angle of rotation and 
reaction times. Importantly, they did not find such a relationship when subjects were 
required to perform the same task with objects. 
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Figure 2.3: Examples o(human (ace stimuli rotated at 0°, 45°, 90°, 135° and J 80°, 
constructed using samples o((ace stimuli [rom our lab at Sheffield University . 
Expertise in FR in adults has been demonstrated uS1l1g the 'inversion effect' 
paradigm. The reason performance is affected in terms of accuracy and reaction times 
could be interference in configural processing or it could be "speed trade off' because 
of time taken in rotation of the canonical view. The reasons for such poor 
performance here is not as important as noting that FR in adults is at expert level and 
inversion affects such expert level perfom1ance. 
2.5 Configura) and holistic processing 
The first process in FR is to recognise a face as being a face and this is essentially 
called first-order processing. Once we have identified a stimulus as a face then we 
endeavour to identify the face. This entails processing more information, such as the 
salient features, as well as the distance between these features. These are called 
leatural and configural processing respectively. Maurer et aI., (2002) describe 
configural processing as sensitivity to second-order relations i.e. perceiving distances 
between features. The inversion effect paradigm is qne of the ways to test configural 
processing strategies in operation. Later in the chapter other paradigms used to 
investigate configural processing will be presented and discussed. 
Another type of processing that has been described in face processing is holistic 
processing which means glueing together the features (and the distance between 
them) of the face into a gestalt. Galton, (1879) proposed the idea of holistic 
processing in FR, noting that we do not perceive and analyse facial features 
separately; instead the face is processed as a whole unit. The whole idea of a gestalt is 
that the 'whole' is more than merely the sum of its parts, so the face gestalt perception 
is more than perceiving the individual features and the distance between them and. 
20 
The terms con figural and holistic processing were previously used interchangeably by 
some authors (and are still at times used loosely by some researchers), but it is 
generally acknowledged that they are two subtly different processing strategies. For 
the purpose of this thesis I have attempted to keep the distinction between configural 
and holistic as is in holistic face processing literature, and review the literature, 
bearing this difference in mind. So for the purpose of this thesis configural processing 
refers to a face processing strategy that perceives spatial distance among features 
including changes in these distances and not the salience of the individual features 
such as big eyes or crooked mouth etc. Holistic processing refers to a face processing 
strategy that glues together the features into a gestalt resulting in the face being 
perceived as a whole not just perceiving the individual features or just distance 
between the features and changes in such distances. Maurer et al., (2002) uses a 
similar definition of configural and holistic face processing whereas; Tanaka and 
Farah, (1993); De Heering, Houthuys and Rossion, (2007), Campbell et al., (1995, 
1999) all use the terms configural and holistic and· salience of features 
interchangeably. In several situations it is difficult to distinguish whether an 
individual uses configural or holistic processing, which explains some of the 
inconsistencies in the literature. Operationally, I consider that the use of inner outer 
manipulation is a particularly clear method, and this is the one I focus on in this 
thesis. 
2.6 Adults' research 
2.6.1 Holistic face processing in adults 
When any claims are made about holistic face processing, it is clear that holistic and 
featural processing is not a strict dichotomy, more a case of which one is used more 
than the other. Adults will recognise a face as long as at least one type of information 
is available, when faces are blurred, inverted, scrambled or inverted and scrambled 
adult performance in FR does not fall below chance (Collishaw and Hole, 2000; 
Mondloch, Dobson, Parsons and Maurer, 2004). Thus, in holistic face processing 
studies, the objective is to demonstrate merely that holistic processing is used by 
adults more than featural processing. 
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The experimental paradigms used to test holistic face processing are the whole-part 
paradigm (Tanaka and Farah, 1993) and the composite face paradigm (Mondloch et 
aI., 2007; De Reering et aI., 2007). 
2.6.2 The Whole-part paradigm 
In the whole-pati paradigm, participants are familiarised with a group of faces and 
then asked to recognise individual facial features that are either embedded in a whole 
face or displayed independently (Tanaka and Farah, 1993). For instance, participants 
are presented with a face identified by a name, say 'Larry' . After an interstimulus 
'interval participants are either presented with the same whole face along with a foil 
which differs by only one feature (and the question would be 'which one is Larry?'). 
Alternatively, participants are presented with one feature of the original face along 
with one foil feature in isolation (and the question would be 'which one is Larry's 
nose?') (See figure 2.4). If the participant processes the face holistically then a feature 
presented in the context of the whole face would be recognised more readily than 
when presented in isolation. This prediction was borne out in three experiments 
reported by Tanaka and Farah, (1993): participants were more accurate in identifying 
the parts of faces, presented in the whole face, than they were at identifying the same 
part presented in isolation, even though both parts and wholes were tested in forced-
choice format and the whole face differed by only one part. In contrast, scrambled 








Figure 2.4: Example or whole-part (ace stimuli. The nose is presented within the 
context or the race or in isolation during the recognition phase. Reproduced from 
Tanaka and Farah. (1993). 
2.6.3 The Composite face effect 
In the composite face paradigm, the top and bottom of two different but familiar faces 
are presented; either aligned or misaligned. The participant's task would be to make 
judgements upon whether the resulting face is the same or different. It is well 
established that when the top and bottom half of two different but familiarised faces 
are aligned, participants view it as a new face and struggle to see it as parts of two 
familiar but different faces. Participants are less accurate and have slower reaction 
times when the composite faces are upright and fused than when they are misaligned 
or inverted (Young, Hellawell and Hay, 1987). 
The composite face effect has been considered as the most convincing evidence of 
holistic processing (Maurer et aI., 2002) because it clearly demonstrates that 
individuals glue together separate face components for holding in their memory, and 
that faces are remembered as a whole, not as individual features. Carey and Diamond, 
(1994) presented adults with experimentally familiarised composite and non-
composite faces in upright and inverted orientation. It was found that composite 
upright faces were more difficult to identify than the non-composites as reflected both 
in accuracy and reaction times and this difference disappeared for inverted faces. The 
composite face effect certainly reflects holistic encoding of faces when upright, the 
parts of a face are less accessible than are the whole faces (Carey and Diamond, 
1994). This phenomenon demonstrates that when upright faces are processed, the 
internal features are so strongly integrated that it becomes difficult to parse a face into 
isolated features, especially when faces are presented for a very short interval, 
preventing a feature by feature comparison (Hole, 1994). 
Suzuki and Cavanagh, (1995) claimed that the strength of holistic processing was 
evident even a line drawing of face was used when instead of an actual face stimulus. 
This experiment brought to light that adults have a strong tendency to glue the internal 
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features of the face together so meaningless stimuli may stand at risk, to be classified 
as a face because of our ability to process the face holistically. 
It is not just the internal features that get glued and processed as a whole. The internal 
features get holistically processed along with the external contour (Young et al., 
1987). If the internal features are presented in two different face contours then adults 
tend to see the faces as two different faces and fail to see that the internal features are 
exactly the same. This phenomenon of glueing inner features to an external contour 
and perceiving it as a novel face is a result of holistic processing (Maurer et al., 2002; 
Sinha and Poggio, 1996), and will be covered extensively within chapter 7. 
Composite faces that use only the inner face to align and misalign perhaps do not 
explore holistic face processing completely. Another paradigm, namely 'switch face', 
if used in conjunction with composite face effect, will enable researchers to explore 
holistic face processing in its entirety. 
Both the whole-part paradigm and the composite face paradigm lay bare the fact that 
adults have an overwhelming tendency to process faces holistically. 
2.6.4 Configural processing 
Adults can detect the variation in the distances between facial features very efficiently 
and are able to perceive a person's emotions, facial expression, mood and intentions. 
To evaluate configural processing, face stimuli are created that vary only in the 
spacing of individual features or face stimuli that have exactly the same spacing 
distance, but the individual features vary. These manipulated faces are then presented 
in upright and inverted orientation for discrimination or recognition tasks. 
Freire, Lee and Symons, (2000) tested adults with versions of a single face that either 
differed in the shape of individual features or the spacing between features. Inverting 
these faces disrupted adults' ability to discriminate faces in the spacing set, but not in 
the featural set. Similarly, Leder and Bruce, (2000) tested adults FR by using 
configural face stimuli; inversion disrupted adults' ability to correctly identify faces 
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from a study set when faces differed in the spacing set but not when the 
characteristics of local features were different. As a consequence of results such as 
these it has been inferred with confidence that adults rely on configural information in 
a face and are able to process this information instantly and anything that hampers the 
perception of spatial information affects performance. 
Another technique for investigating configural face processing is blurring the stimuli 
to remove the fine detail featural information. Adults are able to recognise the identity 
of blurred face with reasonable accuracy (Maurer et aI., 2002). Collishaw and Hole, 
(200 I) presented adults with a blurred faces at various angles of orientation. When the 
blurred faces were in an upright position, accuracy was well above chance. The 
further the face was oriented away from upright, the lower the accuracy, meaning 
greater difficulty in extracting configural information. 
The configural processing paradigm uses atypical faces in order to draw home the 
point that when adults process face stimuli for identification, recognition and 
perception of facial expressions, mood, intentions etc., they use configural processing 
strategies, and inversion hampers use of this strategy effectively. 
So far I have focussed on adult expertise and the processing strategies availed by 
them, now I turn my focus to developmental research in the field of FR. 
2.7 Infants research 
Seminal work by Fantz, (1963) successfully indicated that faces are highly attractive 
stimuli for newborns. Babies as young as four days old show great interest to a 
schematic human face as opposed to a scrambled face. Goren, Sarty, and Wu, (1975) 
were the first researchers to directly test face preference behaviour in newborn 
infants. In their experiment, they looked at newborns' interest in three types of 
stimuli: a face, a scrambled face and a blank image, all of which were mounted on 
paddles (See figure 2.5). They found that both eye and head movements were greater 
for the face stimuli, exhibiting newborns interest in face-like patterns over and above 
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other stimuli. Johnson, Dziurawiec, Ellis and Morton, (1991) replicated the findings 
of Goren et aI., (1975) with a few refinements and reported that a moving face like 
pattern elicits greater tracking behaviour than a non-face like pattern or a blank head 
shape. 
F~ Blank 
Figure 2.5: Stimuli used by Goren. Sarty and Wu. (1975). Reproduced from Johnson 
et al .. (1991). 
Further studies by John Morton and Mark Johnson which led to one of the most 
popular models on infant face processing will be presented in detail under the 
proposed model for FR. 
In the first few days oflife, initial recognition of the mother's face is dependent on the 
external parts of the face as reported by Pascalis, de Schonen, Morton, Deruelle, and 
Fabre-Grenet, (1995). By 4 months, infants show processing of their mother's face 
from both internal and external face parts in isolation to each other (Bartrip, Morton, 
& de Schonen, 2001). By 7 months infants show signs of utilising configural 
information with the finding that they respond to a 'switched' face (Cohen & Cashon, 
200 I). This 'switched face' and the findings of Cohen and Cashon, (2001) are 
discussed in detail in chapter 7 under inner outer face processing. The purpose of 
mentioning it here is merely to consolidate the idea that infants have the ability to 
discriminate faces at a very young age. 
In addition to investigating face preferences of newborns using their mother's face, a 
handful of studies have investigated the ability of newborns to recognise unfamiliar 
faces. The novelty preference task used for testing recognition of unfamiliar faces 
involves habituating the newborn to a single face and then presenting two faces; the 
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familiar face paired with a novel face. Infants prefer novel stimuli and it is this 
preference that the habituation task exploits. If infants discriminate between the 
images and shows greater interest in the novel face then the novelty preference is 
taken as evidence of recognition. Pascalis and de Schonen, (1994) were the first to 
directly investigate recognition abilities in newborns. They found that recognition, as 
indexed by a novelty preference, was observed following familiarisation to an 
unfamiliar face. Recognition was demonstrated after no delay and also after a 2-
minute delay. This is an impressive finding as it demonstrates that infants can 
recognise faces which do not hold special significance. 
On the whole it can be claimed with conviction that newborns have the ability to 
perceive face stimuli and discriminate the mother's face from other faces (Pascalis et 
aI., 1995; Bartrip et aI., 2001). By the age of 7 months infants can do configural 
processing (Cashon and Cohen, 2001) to a limited extent and finally infants can 
recognise unfamiliar faces (Pascalis and de Schonen, 1994). 
2.8 Childhood research 
In spite of impressive beginnings, FR undergoes protracted development (Carey, 
1992) FR has been reported to improve with age from five to adulthood with some 
studies reporting a dip during adolescence (Chung and Thomson, 1995). The 
development ofFR research has clearly shown that older children (12 years) are better 
than younger children (6 years old), (Carey, Diamond and Woods, 1980) and while 
there is no doubt that this ability improves with age there has been much debate as to 
the underlying processes that cause such a difference. Empirical evidence shows that 
there are fundamental differences the way younger and older children perceive and 
remember faces. 
Carey and Diamond, (1977) showed to 6, 8 and 10 year olds upright and inverted 
faces. Immediately after seeing the faces they were asked to identify the previously 
seen face, classed as an 'old face', alongside a novel face, classed as a 'new face'. 
They found that 8 and 10 year olds, like adults, recognised the 'old face' better when 
they were upright than when they were inverted. However, accuracy for 6-year-olds 
for both upright and inverted faces was similar. This finding led them to hypothesise 
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that younger children use featural processing and then at around the age of 10 they 
switch to holistic processing. They called this the 'encoding switch hypothesis'. Carey 
and Diamond, (1977) verified their own hypothesis by testing again 6, 8 and 10 year 
olds for 'FR task across faces that changed in paraphernalia (e.g. hairstyle, hat, 
glasses) and facial expressions. They found that 6-year-olds were more often misled 
by paraphernalia and facial expressions than 8 and 10 year olds. This finding enabled 
them to reinforce their encoding switch hypothesis which claimed that younger 
children are not as efficient in executing configural processing. 
The encoding switch hypothesis has been since challenged by numerous researchers 
(Flin, 1985; Valentine, 1988) and the final conclusion has been it is not so much that 
featural and holistic processing is an absolute dichotomy it is more a case of which 
strategy is used more (Tanaka and Farah, 1993). 
2.8.1 Whole-part paradigm 
Tanaka, Kay, Grinnell, Stansfield and Szechter, (1998) tested 6, 8 and 1 ° year olds 
using a whole-part paradigm both with upright and inverted faces. The authors 
reported that 6-years-olds were able to better recognise face parts when presented in 
the context of a face rather than in isolation. Also, the holistic advantage remained 
stable from the age of 6 to 10, and while older children were better in general 
compared to younger children this relative difference was stable for both conditions. 
It was concluded that children process faces holistically and the holistic advantage is 
maintained through adulthood. When the faces were inverted the holistic processing 
of all age groups was disrupted. Taken together these results indicated that contrary to 
the encoding switch hypothesis children as young as 6 years of age process faces 
holistically. 
2.8.2 Inner outer face effect 
Another paradigm to test the developmental trend of greater reliance on holistic 
processing with increasing age has been inner outer face processing. Here the 
hypothesis has been that younger children because they depend more on facial 
features (Carey and Diamond, 1977) will tend to focus on outer facial features such as 
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striking hairline, ears, chin etc.; whereas older children and adults will rely on the 
information provided by the inner face i.e. eyes, mouth and nose area. . Thus a 
younger child processes faces more from the outer face and as the person gets older 
this switches to inner face processing and a perceptual shift. Thus when younger 
children are presented only with an inner face, performance in face identity is worse 
in comparison to older children and adults. The inner outer face paradigm has been 
us cd not only to demonstrate holistic processing but also to show a qualitative shift 
from fcatural processing of outer face to holistic processing using the inner face. 
Inner outer face processing paradigm is covered in detail in chapter 7. 
2.8.3 Composite face paradigm 
Carey and Diamond, (1994) used composite faces to test 6, 8 and 10 year olds and 
found that a holistic face processing strategy was operating in 6 year olds as much as 
in adults. This resulted in the conclusion that 6 year olds succumb to the composite 
face effect as much as adults. The reaction time data was also recorded for this study 
which confirmed that 6 year olds like 10-year-olds, and adults were slower to 
recognise composite faces. However, when the composite faces were inverted, 
younger children demonstrated no inversion effect and took the same amount of time 
processing upright faces. Consequently, the conclusion drawn was that although the 
accuracy performance of 6-year-olds tells us that they are as efficient as adults in 
holistic processing it is the speed of processing that differentiates the performance of 
children from adults. I will return to reaction times in face processing and speed of 
processing later in this chapter. 
Mondloch, Pathman, Maurer, Le Grand and de Schonen, (2007) tested 6-year-olds for 
a composite face effect and reported a strong effect for unfamiliar faces was found, as 
children perceived the faces as a new face in the aligned condition, even though the 
top halves were identical and only the bottom halves differed. When the faces were 
misaligned accuracy improved remarkably and reaction times came down showing 
that 6 year olds could do holistic face processing. The conclusion was that by the age 
of 6 years holistic face processing is mature to adult level, but early development of 
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holistic face processing is not sufficient to achieve adult level of expertise, may be a 
necessary prerequisite. Mondloch et aI., (2007) referred to configural processing and 
claimed that perhaps for sensitivity to spatial relationship to develop and mature, 
holistic processing maturation is necessary; holistic processing may facilitate 
perception of configural information. Furthermore, De Heering, Houthuys, and 
Rossion, (2007) claimed that children as young as four are able to processes faces 
holistically which essentially means that additionally to holistic processing ability, 
something else is needed in order to achieve expertise. 
So far it has been established that adults are face experts and this is so because they 
use holistic face processing (Tanaka and Farah, 1993) as well as configural face 
processing strategies (Friere et aI., 2000) to perceive faces faster and more accurately. 
Infants on the other are able to discriminate their mother's face from strangers 
(Pascalis et aI., 1995) from birth and in a matter of months they are able to 
discriminate between unfamiliar faces (Pascalis and de Schonen, 1994). At the age of 
seven months they posses certain ability to holistically process faces (Cashon and 
Cohen, 2001). In contrast, children have a very protracted development of FR where 
by they are better than infants but do not reach adult level till late adolescence (Chung 
and Thomson, 1995). However, children are able to use a holistic face processing 
strategy as well as adults from the age of 6. Holistic processing may be a necessary 
prerequisite for configural processing to mature to adult level but on its own it is not a 
sufficient strategy for face expertise to be at the same level as typical adult's ability to 
process unfamiliar faces (Mondloch et aI., 2007). 
2.8.4 Configural face processing 
Another processing strategy mentioned in the adult face processing section that adults 
appear to have mastered configural processing. 
Freire and Lee, (2001) demonstrated that children 4 to 7 years of age were better at 
recognising a face that differed from a distractor face in the shape of individual 
features than faces that differed in spacing between the features. 
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Mondloch et aI., (2002) modified a single female face (called 'Jane') to create new 
versions (called 'sisters') - four that differed in the shape of internal features, four 
that differed in the spacing of the features and four that differed in the shape of the 
external contour of the face; and tested 6, 8 and 10 year olds. Six year olds were able 
to demonstrate a certain level of configural processing as their accuracy was above 
chance for the spacing set, which is in line with the rest of the literature as infants 7 
months of age have limited ability to use configural processing (Cashon and Cohen, 
2001). Nevertheless, development of configural processing lags behind featural and 
holistic face processing. The authors claimed that it is this delayed and prolonged 
development of configural processing that contributes to such a protracted 
development of face processing. 
Mondloch, Geldart, Maurer and Le Grand, (2003) tested children on a battery of five 
tasks of matching faces for identity in order to investigate configural processing. 
Compared to adults 6 year olds made more errors on all the five tasks where as 10 
year olds made more errors in only one of the tasks and this difference from adults 
was not due to a speed/accuracy trade off. Overall, the results of this study showed 
that development of configural processing is slow and perhaps causes poor 
performance. It should be noted that in Carey and Diamond, (1994) a reaction time 
difference was noted for the composite face effect, just as in Mondloch et aI., (2003). 
Lastly, blurred faces differing only in spatial information was presented to 8 year olds 
along side stimuli used in Mondloch et aI., (2002) where stimuli were presented 
simultaneously for unlimited time (Mondloch, Dobson, Parsons, and Maurer, 2004). 
Participants were more accurate than when stimuli were presented sequentially and 
showed a larger inversion effect on the spacing set. This pattern of results indicates 
configural face processing, a pattern shown by lO-years-olds and adults in the 
previous study. One of the reasons for better configural face processing ability in this 
task was reasoned to be due to elimination of memory demands. Therefore, it appears 
that the actual paradigm used to test FR does have an impact on the results. 
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Configural face processing assumes that for FR to be as efficient as adult's perception 
of the spatial distance between features quickly and accurately is vital. Having 
ascertained that children as young as 4 can process faces holistically, and children as 
young as 6 can achieve adult levels of holistic processing, the assumption was that 
children may be poor at configural processing. On the whole studies have 
demonstrated that performance of children as young as 6 suffers because of poor 
perception of spatial distance between features and that lO-year-olds, although better 
than younger ones are not at the same level as adults. Once the featural information is 
removed by blurring, and memory demands lowered considerably, performance of 8 
year olds improves considerably. The final inference being that perhaps poorer 
encoding efficiency and limited memory can partially account for young children's 
performance. 
2.9 l\fodels of face recognition 
Models of face recognition and face processing have been proposed so as to explain 
the nature of the data in FR research, which in essence is that infants have the ability 
to discriminate face stimuli from birth, and that children as young as 4 to 6 have 
holistic and configural face processing ability nearly as good as that of an adult (De 
Heering et aI., 2007; Mondloch et aI., 2007; Mondloch et aI., 2004). Adult level of 
expertise, however, is not achieved till late adolescence. I am going to briefly discuss 
three models proposed, but will not present evidence justifying anyone of them. 
2.9.1 Bruce and Young model (1986) 
Bruce and Young, (1986) developed a classic model of FR in terms of processing 
pathways and modules for recognition of faces familiar to the individual. Seven types 
of information are apparently derived from face stimuli: pictorial, structural, visually 
derived information such as age and sex and identity information such as name, 
expression and facial speech. 
The pictorial code corresponds to the 2nd information of the face and captures 
information about the light, grain and possible imperfections of a face as well as pose 
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and facial expression. This module appears to facilitate FR in the studies where 
unfamiliar faces are presented first for learning and then same face along with a foil 
for recognition. 
The structural code corresponds to the 3rd information of the face and captures 
information about the configuration of a specific face. This module discriminates 
familiar and unfamiliar faces i.e. faces that have not been previously viewed from 
various angles and with numerous facial expressions. 
Bruce and Young's (1986) model treats facial expressions as an independent entity 
not essential for FR; a more abstract, and expression independent description of the 
face is then input to Face Recognition Units (FRU). So according to this model when 
a face stimulus is presented facial expression information is parsed out and a 
'normalised' face is forwarded to FRU for FR. There is an assumption that identity 
and expression as independent processing whereby one is not dependent on another 
and that familiar and unfamiliar faces are processed differently. 
This model made predictions such as processing of familiar faces should be automatic 
and rapid, while processing of unfamiliar faces should be effortful and time 
consuming. A second major prediction was that facial expression processing is 
independent of FR processing. 
These predictions were tested and initially supported because recognition of familiar 
faces are quick and has been experimentally proved to be so; at the same time 
recognition of unfamiliar faces takes more time and again experimentally proved to be 
so (Posamentier and Abdi, 2003). However, since the proposal of the model numerous 
researchers have challenged both the predictions. I will not be covering the critical 
evaluation of the model in this thesis but use just one of the studies to demonstrate the 
type of challenge the model has since faced. For instance, Herba, Landau, Russell, 
Ecker and Phillips, (2006) demonstrated that facial expression has a significant impact 
on FR. 
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2.9.2 CONSPEC/CONLERN: A two process theory for infant FR 
Morton and 10hnson, (1991) proposed a two-process face process ing mechanism to 
account for the di screpant data of newborns to 4 month old infants. This model has 
been highly influential and as such warrants a more detailed description than the 
previous one. 
The discrepancy in question was that Maurer and Barrera, (1981) reported that 1-
month-olds do not demonstrate preference for faces. Johnson, Dziurawiec, Bartrip and 
Morton , (1991) presented four stimuli (see figure 2.6) to 5, 10 and 19 week old 
infants. 
Face Config Linear Scrambled 
Figure2.6: Stimuli used bv Johnson et at., (199 J ) in experiment 2. Reproduced (rom 
Morton and Johnson, (199 J ). 
This time there was no significant difference in terms of head tracking to the four 
different stimuli, but mean looking time was significantly greater for schematic faces 
over linear and scrambled faces. In addition the mean looking ti'me for schematic 
faces was greater than configurally matched faces, but failed to reach significance. 
For this reason, a final experiment was done and reported by Johnson, Dziurawiec, 
Bartrip and Morton, (1991). 
The pilot studies found that I-month-old infants tended to track most stimuli through 
900 reaching a ceiling effect; hence, instead of moving the stimuli around, the infant 
was moved around the stimuli in a motorised chair. The study revealed that the mean 
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angle at which 3- & 5-month-old infants disengaged from four stimuli did not differ 
significantly. In contrast, I-month-old infants tracked schematic faces significantly 
further than any other stimulus. The authors provisionally concluded that a decline in 
preferential looking for schematic faces occurs sometime between 1 and 3 months of 
age. In order to ascertain this point of decline more precisely, further analysis was 
carried out, dividing the I-month-old infants' data into two age groups: 'younger' 
(below 31 days) & 'older' (above 31 days). This revealed that only 'younger' infants 
demonstrated significantly greater tracking of schematic faces, now suggesting that 
the decline occurs between 4 and 6 weeks of age. It was concluded that the failure to 
find a face preference in previous studies (Maurer & Barrera, 1981) is likely to be a 
consequence of differing techniques. 
Based on the findings of the three studies Johnson and Morton, (1991) proposed the 
structural hypothesis which in effect was the two process model. Firstly, there exists a 
device called 'CONSPEC' which contains innate structural information concerning 
visual characteristics of faces. This means information is available without requiring 
exposure to specific stimuli and it guides the newborns' preference for face like 
stimuli and is believed to be a sub-cortical structure. 
Secondly, CONLERN function which is independent of CONSPEC acqUIres 
knowledge of human faces over the first two months and is a cortical structure. By the 
end of the first month CONSPEC has a weakened influence and the information about 
faces enters the cortical circuits more and more. 
It has been suggested that the CONLERN system is 'set' by the CONSPEC 
mechanism which means it creates a bias towards faces which activates the cortical 
mechanisms thereby accounting for the ability at birth to track faces and the 
remarkable improvement in face discrimination observed at 2-3 months of age. 
This model again has faced criticism on the grounds that it assumes that CON.SPEC 
tracks face like stimuli and that faces are presented immediately after birth to trigger 
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this system. Once again critical evaluation of the model is not considered in this 
thesis. 
2.9.3 Experience- expectant and activity-dependent process of FR 
Charles Nelson, (2001) proposed this model which is similar to the CONLERN 
system. However, what is assumed is that evolutionary pressures have led to a cortex 
that is flexible to learning during development so there are domain-relevant 
mechanisms that become domain-specific. In terms of FR all one needed to posit is 
a. As species we experience regular exposure to face stimuli from birth onwards 
b. Regions within the inferior temporal cortex have the potential to become 
specialised for face recognition 
c. The face perception apparatus becomes tuned with exposure to faces which in 
tum leads to even more specialisation of those cortical areas and specification 
of neural tissue 
d. This specification includes' many types of information conveyed by faces such 
as facial expression, gender, age, eye gaze etc. 
The crucial difference from Johnson and Morton model is this model assumes that 
like language there is a critical period within which experience is vital otherwise the 
impairment in FR development will occur. The role of experience in the development 
of expertise level face processing ability was also emphasised by Pascal is, de Haan 
and Nelson, (2002). The study presented 6 and 9 month-old-infants with human and 
monkey faces and reported that 6-month-old infants were better at discriminating 
monkey faces than 9-month-old infants. The conclusion was that human infants loose 
the ability to discriminate monkey faces due to lack of experience. Furthermore, 
Pascalis et aI., (2005) sent infants home with monkey face pictures in order to 
familiarise the infants with these faces. The study reported that experience can 
influence the specificity of the face processing system. The results of this study 
indicated that infants who are given experience with monkey faces sustain the ability 
to discriminate monkey faces at 9-months of age. The other evidence comes from 
infants born with bilateral congenital cataract who were deprived of visual input for 
the first 7 weeks of life. These individuals, when tested as adults for a variety of face 
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processing tasks, demonstrate the importance of visual experience for the normal 
development of specific aspects of face processing (Geldart, Mondloch, Maurer, de 
Schonen and Brent, 2002). In conclusion for the face processing mechanism to 
develop and finally reach adult level of expertise experience is essential at the critical 
period. 
2. to Conclusion 
Adults are face 'experts' and can remember faces seen 35 years ago (Bahrick et aI., 
1975). Changing the orientation of a face impacts accuracy and reaction time 
performance, which has been explained using the 'encoding switch hypothesis' as 
well as 'single processing strategy'. Adults succumb to perceiving the face as a whole 
(Tanaka and Farah, 1993; Young et aI., 1987; Carey and Diamond, 1994) and this 
facilitates performance. They also perceive distance between features very effectively 
and efficiently. 
Infants can discriminate faces from a very early age especially the mother's face from 
outer face information (Pascalis et aI., 1995). Although infants are adorned with such 
skills the development of FR is protracted and does not reach an adult level of 
efficiency until late adolescence (Chung and Thomson, 1995). Children as young as 4 
years of age can use holistic face processing strategy and children 6 years of age 
acquire an adult level of expertise in holistic processing (Mondloch et aI., 2007). In 
comparison, even children aged 8 years are not as good as adults in configural 
processing especially for speed (Mondloch et aI., 2004). Thus, it has been speculated 
that holistic processing may have to fully develop and mature before configural 
processing matures. 
The methodology used in FR research has an impact on the findings as has been 
demonstrated time and again (Mondloch et aI., 2004; De Heering et aI., 2007; Johnson 
eta!.,1991). 
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Lastly, models of FR try to account the existing data and the experience-expectant 
theory along with CONSPEC and CONLERN hypothesis signifies the importance of 
learning in the critical period just like language development. 
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Chapter 3 
Neural mechanisms underlying face recognition 
Abstract 
In this chapter I am going to first present evidence from neurophysiological research 
in favour of face specificity hypothesis. Then I present the human neural system 
model for the face perception and substantiate the development and existence of 
specialised neural systems for face processing with developmental data. 
3.1 Introduction 
Behavioural data presented in chapter 1 infers that adults are 'experts' in FR. The 
development of this expertise is protracted however, most typical adults gain the 
ability to perceive faces very efficiently and extract a variety of information from 
faces instantly. Does this reflect a specialised neural mechanism devoted exclusively 
to face processing (Johnson and Morton, 1991) popularly known as the face 
specificity hypothesis? Or, does it reflect acquired visual expertise that, which is no 
different from expertise that can be acquired for other categories of complex stimuli 
(Gauthier, Skudlarski, Gore and Anderson, 2000), popularly known as expertise 
hypothesis? 
Two of the three FR models presented in chapter! emphasises the existence of 
specialised neural mechanism involved in face perception (Johnson and Morton, 
1991; Nelson, 2001). The CONSPEC-CONLERN model (Johnson and Morton, 1991) 
makes a case for existence of innate face detecting system essentially subcortical 
circuits present from birth and the cortical neural system emerging gradually due to 
experience with the face stimuli (Johnson and Morton, 1991). The Experience-
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expectant activity-dependent model on the other hand underscores existence of 
domain-general neural circuits at birth. These get specialised over a long period of 
time into domain-specific circuits processing upright faces efficiently merely because 
of the prolonged experience and perceptual narrowing (Nelson, 2001). This particular 
view is supported by the finding that 6-month-old infants can discriminate human and 
monkey faces at an individual level while 9-month-old infants lose the ability to 
discriminate monkey faces at an individual level (Pascal is, de Haan and Nelson, 
2002). This shows that discrimination ability of non-human face declines with time. 
Neuroscientists have endeavoured to find concrete evidence supporting or challenging 
the above models of FR. In the process not only have they found such evidences, but 
they have also proposed neural system models in order to explain the 
neurophysiological data (Haxby, Hoffman and Gobbini, 2000) 
3.2 Evidence of specialised face processing region from brain damage 
patients 
Bodamer (1947), first proposed existence of specialised neural mechanisms uniquely 
devoted to face processing, based on the findings that some patients were more 
impaired in face processing than object processing following brain damage. More 
recently Farah, Rabinowitz, Quinn and Liu (2000) reported a case study of 'Adam' 
who suffered brain damage as newborn and was tested at the age of 14 with a whole 
gamut of tests both for object and FR. It was reported that although his object 
recognition was far from perfect, it was considerably better than FR. The fact that FR 
ability in this individual was not supported by intact parts of the brain was direct 
evidence of localised FR area in the brain. Specifically, it suggested that even prior to 
any visual experience, humans are destined to carry out face and object recognition 
with differential neural substrates. This implied that anatomical localisation of the FR 
pathway is explicitly specified in the genome (Farah et aI., 2000). Whatever role 
'experience' played in the neural specialisation for FR the separate anatomical 
localisation for faces and objects do not require experience with the stimuli. This 
finding supports the CONSPEC system which claims that newborn infants have an 
innate subcortical neural pathway which predisposes them to detect face like stimuli 
in their visual field and naturally orient towards them. The experience-expectant 
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model proposed by Nelson (2001), also gains support from this evidence to their 
claim of existence of a predisposition to naturally orient to faces. 
Furthermore, Johnson (2005) asserts that research from blindsight or visual extinction 
due to brain damage demonstrated existence of separate routes for face detection and 
face identification. Face detection being supported by a subcortical route implicating 
superior colliculus, pulvinar and amygdala as the structures on this route and face 
identification, facial expression processing etc. being dealt with parvocellular channel 
to the cortical ventral visual stream. Secondly, anatomically neural pathway for lower 
spatial frequency (LSF) visual information is distinct from neural pathway for high 
spatial frequency (HSF) visual information. The subcortical pathway deals with LSF 
so LSF information from face stimulus is carried to superior colliculus and pulvinar 
via magnocellular channels and this route is insensitive to HSF. Vuilleumier et al., 
(2003) found that HSF which is important for identity of face activated fusiform gyrus 
and LSF face stimuli activated subcortical pathway. The parsimonious conclusion that 
can be finally drawn from the above is that face is a complex stimulus and requires 
both 'quick and dirty' processing by subcortical pathway as well as sustained 
response from cortical pathway. Perhaps, initially the pathways are acting 
independently then interacting followed by further independent actions by both 
pathways in order to fully process face stimuli. 
3.3. Evidence of specialised face region from ERP and mfR. studies 
3.3.1. Evidence ofNt70 from ERP and MEG in adults 
With the advancement of technology, neuroscientists have used neuroimaging and 
neurophysiological techniques to investigate the uniqueness of face processing and 
the existence of specialised neural mechanism in healthy individuals. One such 
technique is electroencephalography, which records brain electrical potential (ERP) 
from the scalp. In adults, N170 which is a negative deflection, most prominent over 
the occipito-temporal scalp, peaks between 140 and 170 ms after stimulus onset and is 
face-sensitive (Bentin, Allison, Puce, Perez and McCarty, 1996). Sensitivity to the 




other class of stimuli such as hands, feet, trees, cars, buildings, dogs, inverted faces 
(Bentin et aI., 1996; Puce, Allison, Gore and McCarthy 1995). 
In contrast to claims of N 170 being a specialised neural circuit for early face 
detections, some neurophysiological researchers have attempted to demonstrate 
evidence in favour of expertise hypothesis. In support of the expertise hypothesis 
firstly, Rossion et aI., (2000) reported that N170 for inverted and scrambled face is 
also of larger amplitude and shorter latency; inferring that then it cannot be a 
specialised mechanism only to detect faces. Secondly, Gauthier et aI., (2000) 
presented images of cars to car experts and bird images to bird experts while 
undergoing fMRI and reported that the fusiform gyrus selectively activated more for 
bird and car images in bird and car experts respectively. Here the claim was that these 
neural circuits are not exclusively dedicated to processing only face stimuli rather 
they will process any stimuli in which the individual has acquired expertise. Thirdly, 
Tanaka and Curran (2001) reported that N 170 for birds and dogs was higher in 
experts than novices and reiterated the claims of expertise hypothesis. 
In order to counter the above claim there has been numerous researches in favour of 
the face specificity hypothesis, only two of those studies are presented here to stress 
the point in favour of N170 and face specificity hypothesis. de Haan, Pascalis and 
Johnson (2002) presented adults upright and inverted human and monkey faces while 
recording ERP. The adult N170 showed specialisation to upright human faces and 
inverted human face did have increased amplitude and latency of N170 but not to 
monkey faces. The authors concluded that stimuli that are recognisable as a face but 
are not upright may engage both the face-sensitive regions and additional object 
processing regions, resulting in even larger amplitude to inverted human faces 
because of dual component contribution. The findings of Tanaka and Curran (2001) 
was questioned because the study had reported a slightly different location of 'object 
N170' i.e. more superiorly and posterior in comparison to 'face N170' (Xu, Liu and 
Kanwisher, 2005). Xu et aI., (2005) tested car experts with car and human face images 
while undergoing magnetoncephalography (MEG) and examined the effects of visual 
expertise on face selective M170 (MEG), the response component that is same as 
N170 in ERP. The study found that cars did not elicit a higher M170 response in 
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experts compared to novices. Furthermore, no correlation was found between the 
amplitude of M 170 in response to cars and the level of behavioural expertise for cars. 
The M170 amplitude was correlated with successful face identification, but not 
successful car identification in car experts. Hence the inference has been that early 
face processing mechanisms marked by M170 are involved particularly in the 
identification of faces and not identification of objects in experts. 
The N170, on the occipito-temporal scalp activates selectively at 170ms after stimulus 
onset for upright and inverted faces and not to cars, birds or monkey faces signifying 
that it is the location for dealing only face stimuli. 
3.3.2. Evidence of FFA, STS, occipital, temporal and frontal from fMRI in adults 
Exploiting functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) previous researchers 
accentuated the regions of fusiform gyrus as more active for face processing than 
object processing (Sergent, Ohta and MacDonald, 1992) or face processing that 
scrambled face processing (Puce, Allison, Gore and McCarthy, 1995). Activation of 
fusiform gyrus reaches highest level especially in the right hemisphere when 
participants are looking at faces and activation in this area decreases remarkably when 
participants are looking at houses (Haxby et aI., 1999) landscapes or nonsense stimuli 
(Epstein and Kanwisher 1998). Kanwisher, McDermott and Chun (1997) tested 15 
participants with photographs of face and common objects while undergoing an fMRI 
scan. They reported that a region in the fusiform gyrus responded significantly more 
strongly during passive viewing of faces than objects. Following this, numerous other 
tests for face selectivity was conducted while fMRI was being recorded. The results 
clearly indicated that the 'fusiform face' (FF) area responded to a variety of face 
stimuli, including front-view, grey-scale photos of faces, two-tone versions of the 
same faces and three-quarter-view grey-scale faces with hair concealed. This enabled 
Kanwisher et aI., (1997) to conclude that activation of the region of interest i.e. the 
fusiform gyrus; did not reflect only general processing associated either with visual 
attention or with subordinate level classification of any random class of stimuli. This 
activation as they claimed was selectively involved in perception of faces and they 
named this area as Fusiform Face Area, popularly known as FF A. 
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The changeable elements of a face such as emotional expression and lip movements 
are processed by the posterior part of superior temporal sulcus (Hoffman and Haxby, 
2000). Hoffman and Haxby (2000), in their ingenious experiment presented two faces 
with different eye gaze or identity in consecutive trial and asked participants to 
indicate if the presented faces had same eye gaze or same identity. In such a task the 
focus of the participants would be either on dynamic or static features of the face. 
Activity in the STS region was significantly higher when participants were paying 
attention to the changeable aspects of the face (See figure 3.2). The involvement of 
STS for dynamic facial feature has been qualified with the fact that various other 
regions such as the intraparitel sulcus (for attention); auditory cortex (for lip 
movement) and limbic system (for emotional expression) are all simultaneously 
activated for richer interpretation of such stimuli. 
To this point in the chapter it has been established that N170 in adults is responsible 
for early detection of face. FF A activates significantly strongly for a variety of face 
stimuli such as front view, grey-scale photo, two-tone photos etc. (Kanswisher et al., 
1997; Dekowska et al., 2008) and STS activates selectively for eye gaze (Hoffman 
and Haxby, 2000). 
The other areas, such as the anterior part of the middle temporal gyrus (AMTG) and 
the orbitofrontal cortex (OFe) show high activity when famous faces or familiar faces 
are viewed (Sergent et al., 1992; Dekowska et al., 2008). Patients with epilepsy who 
have electrodes surgically implanted in the right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex have 
shown that this region is populated with very little clusters of neurons which respond 
vigorously to human faces (Dekowska et al., 2008). It has been pointed out that, 
because the volume of these structures is very small perhaps the PET and fMRI fail to 
pick it up. 
The above evidence allowed face processing researchers to conclude with confidence 
that in adults a specialised neural system exists with specific neural network pathway 
for detecting face, eyes very early about 170 ms from the stimuli onset; followed by 
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extensive processing of the stimuli in the FFA , STS, OFC, AMTG among other areas. 
Having presented the evidence favouring a neura l system for FR, I now present the 
distributed human neural system model for face perception as proposed by Haxby, 
Hoffman and Gobbini (2000). 
3.4. Model of distributed neural system for face perception 
Haxby, Hoffman and Gobbini . (2000) proposed a distributed neural system model for 
face perception which has a hierarchical and branching structure and accomplishes the 
face perception task by coordination of multiple regIons. 
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Figure 3.1.' The distributed human neural system model for [ace perception. 
Reproduced from Haxby et al.. (2000) 
The model has a branching structure that emphasises a distinction between the 
representation of invariant aspects of faces, i.e. recognition of unique identity, called 
the core system; and the representation of changeable aspects of faces , i.e. the 
perception of information that facilitates social communication, called the extended 
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system. The core system comprises three bilateral regions with an anatomical 
configuration that suggests a hierarchical organisation in which inferior occipital 
region may provide input to lateral fusiform gyrus and superior temporal sul cus (see 
Figure 3.1). 
Hoffman and Haxby (2000) reported a neuroimaging study mentioned earlier and 
confirmed that the STS is more involved in the perception of facial movement and 
static images of changeable aspects of face, such as the expression, eye gaze direction 
and head orientation. On the other hand lateral fu siform gyrus has been shown to be 
more active when task of the experiment was identity. These results provided a direct 
demonstration of double dissociation between the functional roles played by these two 
regions of core system in face perception (see Figure 3.2). 
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Figure 3.2: Direct demonstration o[double dissociation between STS and FFA shown 
by fMRl recordings when participants were asked to attend to gaze or identity and 18 
sec blocks o[brain activity recorded. Adapted (rom Hoffman and Haxby (2000) and 
reproduced (rom Haxby et al.! (2002) . 
According to this model, the neural systems for spatial attention and perc~ption , is the 
intraparietal sulcus. Evolutionarily, both the eye gaze direction and head orientation is 
necessary to be perceived. Eye direction detectors (EDD) are more primitive and 
more ubiquitous than shared attention, perceived only by higher primates. It has been 
suggested that perhaps shared attention mechanisms have evolved to facilitate 
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interactions in complex social groups and enable social learning (Baron-Cohen, 
1995). There are connections between STS and intraparietal sulcus mediating and 
recruiting IPS when perceived gaze direction and head orientation is to be processed 
(Harries and Perrett, 1991). 
Perception of speech related lip movement drawn from numerous neuroscIence 
studies involves coordinated activity of visual region in STS associated with visual 
analysis of lip movement and auditory regions in the STS associated with analysis of 
phonemic content (Haxby et at, 2002). 
Novel face leads to activation of lateral fusiform gyrus and inferior occipital gyrus 
(Hoffman and Haxby, 2000). A familiar face appears to involve a fixed sequence of 
stages that begins with activation in the temporal pole followed by activation in the 
anterior middle temporal gyrus resulting in retrieving name of the known person 
(Sergent et aI., 1992). 
The perception of emotion involves numerous neural circuits and cortical areas and 
these will be discussed in chapter 4. Haxby et aI., (2000) assert that the degree of 
separation between functional roles played by different regions is not clear. For 
instance, fusiform gyrus may playa supportive role in interpreting expressions. At the 
heart of this model is the proposal that many face perception functions are 
accomplished by the coordinated participation of multiple regions. Furthermore, 
Haxby and colleagues have attempted to collate neurophysiological data from series 
of studies involved in investigating face processing, FR, facial expression perception, 
speech perception so as to back up every step of claim they make in their model 
(lIaxby et aI., 2002). 
3.5. Developmental evidence of specialised face region from ERP and 
fMRI studies 
It is established that adults have extensive neural systems dedicated specifically to 
processing faces. Evidence of a developmental pathway of neural mechanisms of face 
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processmg is launched with the aIm to validate developmental models such as 
CONSPEC-CONLERN face recognition model. 
Johnson (2005) asserts that in newborns the visual cortical area is relatively immature 
and compared to the cortical visual route the subcortical route structures seem to be 
more developed at the time of birth. The nasal and temporal visual fields feed 
differentially into the cortical and subcortical visual routes in humans. Anatomically it 
has been known that stimuli presented in the nasal visual field feed into the cortical 
route and stimuli presented in the temporal visual field feed into the subcortical route. 
Simion, Valenza, Umilta and Dalla Barba (1998) exploited this anatomical structure 
and presented face-like stimuli to newborns in either the nasal or the peripheral visual 
field. The study reported that face related preference was observed only when the face 
was presented in the temporal visual field, confirming the subcortical route to be more 
developed in newborns. These findings support existence of the innate mechanism as 
proposed by the CONSPEC-CONLERN model as well as existence of domain general 
processing proposed by the EXPERIENCE-EXPECTANT model of face processing. 
3.5.1 Evidence from ERP ofNc, N290 and P400 in infants and Nt70 in children 
The negative central (Nc) component, which is a negative deflection occurring 
between 400 and 800 ms after stimulus onset, is one of the most well-studied 
components of the infant cognitive visual ERP (de Haan et aI., 2003). Nc has been 
interpreted as reflecting either infant's allocation of attention to more infrequently 
presented faces or to more unexpected face (Nelson, 1994). At six months Nc is of 
larger amplitude for mother's face than for a novel face (de Haan and Nelson, 1997). 
This recognition effect occurs only over the midline and right anterior temporal scalp 
regions and not the left or the posterior scalp regions, which is same as the adults. 
de Haan and Nelson (1999), investigated if infants, like adults, show differences in 
spatial and temporal characteristics of brain activation during face and object 
recognition. 44, six month old infants were presented both familiar and unfamiliar 
faces and toys while recording ERP. The P400, a positive component most prominent 
over posterior lateral electrodes, peak at 450 to 390 ms from stimulus onset, for 3 to 6 
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month old infants was recorded. The P400 has been suggested to be a precursor to 
adult N170 because it has similar location on scalp (de Haan et aI., 2002) and is faster 
for faces compared to objects (de Haan and Nelson, 1999). The Nc was larger for 
familiar than for unfamiliar and this effect interacted with the stimulus category; for 
faces the difference occurred at the midline and right anterior electrodes and for 
objects it was more widespread over midline and all temporal electrodes. This finding 
showed that the asymmetry observed was not due to mere familiarity but was unique 
to faces. 
de Haan et aI., (2002) emphasised that in order to draw any conclusions on existence 
of face expertise neural mechanisms, existence of N 170 or precursors of N 170 in 
infants, further investigation using both the inversion effect and species specific 
paradigm should be done. They presented upright and inverted human and monkey 
faces to adults and 6 month old infants. Adult N 170 showed a unique response to 
upright human faces as mentioned earlier. The putative N170 in infants, P400 was 
larger for upright than for inverted faces but not species specific. It was thus 
concluded that perhaps certain face sensitivity exist from infancy and is spread 
beyond N170 i.e. involvement ofP400; but experiences with human faces is definitely 
essential for the cortical specialisation to adult level. On the other hand, infants N290 
was species specific but not orientation specific; differing from adults in that it peaked 
later than adults (290ms vs. 170ms) with smaller peak amplitude was smaller in 
comparison to adults. 
Halit et aI., (2003), investigated if either of the two face-sensitive infant components 
(N290 and P400) could be considered as developmental precursors of adult N170. 
They used the same paradigm as de Haan et aI., (2002) and tested 3 and 12 month old 
infants and reported that at 12 months of age N290, like the adult N170 showed 
sensitivity to both species specific and orientation of face. The P400 also showed 
specificity to human faces and hence neither could have been ruled out as a precursor 
to the adult N170. 
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In conclusion so far, the N290 component is similar to N170 in that it shows an adult-
like face inversion effect and a relatively similar timing and polarity. The P400 also 
has a shorter latency for faces and shows adult like inversion effect for 12-month-old 
infants. Overall, the findings suggested that both the N290 and P400 reflect processes 
that in adult may become integrated over time to form the N170 pathway. In other 
words, the structural encoding of faces may be spread out over a longer time of 
processing in infants than adults (de Haan et aI., 2003). The speculation is, as this task 
becomes more automated, the processes involved in face processing are carried out 
quicker and/or in parallel rather than serial processing. 
To this point ERP data has been presented for infants up to 12-month-old age, 
drawing home the point that although Nc, N290 and P400 all show selective 
activation to face stimulus, evidence in favour ofN290 and P400 to be putative N170 
in adults is more conclusive (de Haan et aI., 2002). 
At present there is a gap between studies with infant participants' up to 12 month of 
age and studies of older children i.e. 4 to 5 years old preventing a continuous charting 
of the developmental pathway for face processing. 
Taylor, McCarthy, Saliba and Degiovanni (1999) were one of the first to test 4-year-
olds for N170 using ERP technique. The N170 was at 270ms at 4 years of age and 
decreased steadily with increasing age and not reaching adult levels until teenage 
years. Further more, Taylor, Edmonds, McCarthy and Allison (2001), presented 
upright faces, inverted faces, eyes and scrambled faces to children aged 4 to 15 and 
reported that development of N170 for faces continued into adulthood whereas Nl70 
for eyes matured at the age of 11. It was concluded that N170 follows a different 
maturational process for different classes of face stimuli. This finding was juxtaposed 
with behavioural data which claims that younger children use featural processing 
strategy more than configural processing (Mondloch et aI., 2002) and the conclusion 
drawn was, this neurophysiological result is evidence for featural and configural 
processing and gradual switch from using one technique more to using the other 
technique more. The N170 latency and amplitude for eyes (featural processing) 
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matured at the age of 11, whereas N 170 latency and amplitude for upright faces 
(configural processing) continued to shorten in latency until adulthood (Taylor et aI., 
2001). In the same line it can also be claimed to be proof for Mondoloch et aI., 
(2002) three step face processing because the first order processing not only exists at 
4 years of age it exists at the 3 months of age (de Haan et aI., 1999; Halit et aI., 2004); 
however the holistic and second-order relational processing emerges gradually and 
continues to develop until adulthood. 
3.5.2 Evidence from fMRI of FF A in children 
Aylward et aI., (2005) used fMRI and tested 8-14-year-olds, to investigate if there are 
any developmental changes to activation of fusiform gyrus when processing faces. 
fMRI was obtained while participants viewed faces and houses and a developmental 
change was observed. In younger children there was only activation of the inferior 
occipital gyri, whereas older children showed significant activation of bilateral 
fusiform gyrus in addition. Older children showed greater activation on the right than 
the left which was consistent with the adult data (Kanswisher et aI, 1997), however 
this activation was not as robust as the adults. This could suggest that between 12-14 
years of age the fusiform gyrus is still not functioning at the adult level, which is 
consistent with the ERP data (Taylor et aI., 2001) suggesting slower maturation. 
Weighing up this data with Haxby et a!., (2000) model it was stressed that activation 
of inferior occipital gyri in both groups of children was consistent with the role of his 
region in processing the basic featural aspects of the face i.e. the core system. Only 
older children showed activation of the fusiform gyrus, the second level of the model, 
suggesting that older children are perhaps using a different strategy for face 
processing. Although precise conclusions cannot be drawn based on this evidence that 
fusiform gyrus is used for configural face processing; comparison with behavioural 
data (Carey and Diamond, 1977) allowed Aylward et a!., (2005) to conclude that 
fusiform gyrus is not used for featural processing and in a limited way supported the 
multi-component model of face processing (Haxby et aI., 2000) and the experience-




The central debate in face processing has been the quest for existence of innate face 
processing neural mechanism devoted uniquely to human faces. At the same time the 
theories have attempted to propose the actual functioning of such systems through 
behavioural data. Data from prosopagnosia patients clearly indicates existence of a 
localised brain area specifically for face recognition (Farah et al., 2000). 
The pathway for LSF and HSF described her highlights the hard work and precise 
coordination required by a multiple neural sub-systems in order to extract information 
from a face stimulus and a minor fault of a small element in this whole system can 
result in deficiencies in face processing. That perhaps is exactly the case of autism. In 
individuals with autism, research has clearly demonstrated that the entire face 
processing system is not malfunctioning resulting in complete face processing 
inability. Rather a minor 'default' in the aforementioned complex system leading to 
specific difficulty. 
Simion et a1., (1998), de Haan et al.,(1999), (2002), Halit et al., (2004) using the ERP 
method and visual field anatomical representation method, conclude that while 
specific areas and pathways are engaged in face processing from the first months of 
life, their response properties change continuously during first year. Although P400 
and or N290 has been identified as precursor to adult N170 at no point did the infant 
ERP follow the same pattern as adults for face processing, emphasising the 
importance of prolonged experience for the adult like expertise to finally emerge (de 
Haan et al., 2002). Taylor et al., (2001) added to this notion by testing children aged 4 
to 15 and demonstrating that developmental changes in N170 response to upright 
faces continues until the age of 15 years suggesting slow maturation. These lines of 
evidences are consistent with an 'interactive specialisation' perspective on human 
functional brain development in which the functionality of cortical regions arises as a 
result of interactions between brain regions, and between the whole brain and its 
environment (Johnson, 2000). 
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However, scientists such as Gauthier et aI., (2000), Tanaka and Curran (2001), 
Rossion et at, (2000) have challenged such inferences, by demonstrating that the 
same fusiform areas can be preferentially activated by cars in car experts and by birds 
in bird experts. They suggested that visual experience is essential in differentiating 
individual members of a particular category and developing category-sensitive neural 
mechanism such that same cortical areas used for face processing may be deployed 
for the purposes of learning specific categories. Nonetheless, because adults are able 
to deploy fusiform gyri and acquire expertise in other fields it cannot be taken as sole 
indicator to negate the existence of face specific neural mechanisms. Gauthier et aI., 




Facial expression processing in adults and children 
Abstract 
This chapter to initially clarifies what is meant by basic and complex emotions in the 
literature and establishes the emotions and the FEs that will be considered in this 
thesis. Then behavioural studies on development of FE recognition are considered 
from infancy to adolescence. The data from infant research is included here in order 
to chart the developmental pathway of FE recognition. FE researchers have that there 
are certain factors which influence ones perception of FE. Some of these factors are 
considered here followed by limitations in methodology used to investigate FE 
processmg. 
4.1. Introduction 
Facial expressions (FEs) are a crucial component of emotional and social behaviour 
and emotion recognition is crucial for subsequent social interaction and functioning. 
The ability to decode FEs is an important component of social interaction because of 
the significant role of facial information in appropriate modification of social 
behaviours (Herba and Phillips, 2004). For instance, happy facial expression (FE) 
successfully modifies the behaviour by reinforcing the action currently performed, sad 
FE modifies behaviour by aversion (Mineka and Cook, 1993) so on and so forth. So 
in a sense FE have been used as a tool for communication where information can be 
transmitted rapidly (Blair, 2003). This communicatory use of FE exists right from 
infancy and has been demonstrated by the social referencing research, where by an 
infant on discovering a novel object will look at primary caregiver and future 
behaviour of the infant will be determined by caregivers' emotional display (Klinner 
et al., 1983). The second suggestion is that FEs are tools to display current emotional 
experience (Darwin, 1872; Ekman, 1997). This assumes an automatic aspect of FE 
where the purpose is not communication, rather a by-product. The third suggestion 
comes from empirical evidence which shows that displaying emotion is nothing 
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natural or automatic (Camras, 1985) it is overloaded with social and cultural values 
and display rules. From a very young age children learn what when and how to 
display, their emotions using FEs (Blair, 2003; Camras, 1985). 
These are three of the many contrasting views that exist for FEs, illustrating the 
complexity of the social world especially in the case of FEs. Within this framework of 
FE as a tool for communication, as a tool of displaying the current emotional state and 
as a tool for following social norms I review FE recognition in children. 
4.1.1 Communication loop for FE and emotion 
There are three related processes in the FE and emotion communication loop which 
are as follows: 
1. Individuals need to identify emotionally salient cues in their environment. 
2. Identification of emotionally salient cues results in an internal affective state and as 
a response to the environmental cues there will be an emotional behaviour. 
3. Before the emotional behaviour is finally displayed, the aforementioned internal 
affective state and emotional behaviour have to be regulated, possibly through 
inhibition of processes, or updating from past experiences, or following social norms. 
The intact functioning of all of these three processes leads to appropriate behaviour 
within any social context (Herba and Phillips, 2004). All these three processes 
highlight the communicatory function of FEs, the emotional experience necessary and 
the social norms which dictate the display of FEs. For instance, fearful faces are seen 
as aversive unconditioned stimuli that convey information to others of the aversive 
nature of the stimuli (Mineka and Cook, 1993); so if fear is picked up as an 
environmental cue it should result in either a flight or fight reaction, assuming the 
person has a functioning social norm regulating mechanism. 
The communication loop for FE tells us that emotional information can be obtained 
via a number of different domains; non-verbal cues i.e. FEs and body posture, verbal 
cues i.e. semantic information, prosody, context. Research has focussed more on 
identification of FEs as a paradigm for investigating emotion understanding because 
examining the development of emotional information via other domains is difficult 
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due to confounding factors and barriers such as verbal ability (Herba and Phillips, 
2004), scoring the data etc. 
This thesis only considers emotional information transmitted via FEs and reviews the 
first of the three processes i.e. identification of emotionally salient cues namely FEs. 
This chapter summarizes the development of facial expression recognition in typically 
developing from infancy to adolescence. 
4.2 Basic and complex emotion 
4.2.1 Basic emotion 
Paul Ekman through his seminal cross-cultural studies made the Darwinian idea of 
'existence of basic emotion' concrete. Ekman and Friesen, (1971) presented posed 
Caucasian face images in places such as Japan, New Guinea, Borneo, Brazil and 
United states in order to determine if individuals from different cultures would assign 
similar emotional labels to faces with similar emotions. A remarkable 70-80 percent 
agreement was achieved for the six emotional expressions namely happy, sad, anger, 
fear, surprise and disgust irrespective of cultural, geographical, level of media 
exposure and literacy differences. This eventually led Ekman to label these emotions 
as 'basic' (Ekman, 1999); where as other emotions were said to be specific to certain 
cultures and the 'display rules' of such cultures; hence not universal. 
4.2.2 Complex emotions 
Complex emotions unlike basic emotions require less automatic and greater cognitive 
component. It is this greater dependence on cognitive processes that gives these 
emotions the label of 'complex' (Griffiths, 2003). Damasio, (1995) viewed complex 
emotions as subtle variations of the basic emotions. For instance, panic has been 
argued to be variation of fear. 
For the purpose of this thesis only the six 'basic' or 'universal' emotions and six basic 
FEs related to these emotions are considered. 
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4.3 Behavioural studies on development of FE recognition 
The focus here will be on behavioural studies examining identification of FEs. The 
terms identification, recognition and perception have been used interchangeably in 
literature as well as in this thesis. The paradigms used to investigate identification of 
FEs require participants to sort, match, and label or describe FEs in the case of 
children. In the case of infants the paradigms used are obviously very different and 
tasks such as habituation or visual preference comparison tasks have been used. 
4.3.1. Infant studies 
One to two day old full-term infants are able to discriminate happy, sad and surprise 
when posed by live models (Field et aI., 1983). Nelson and Horowitz, (1983) reported 
that 2 month old infants can discriminate happy from neutral face and three month 
infants can discriminate happy, sad and surprise expressions. There has been 
discussion in the literature that infants younger than 4 month old have very limited 
visual acuity in order to notice the subtle differences in FE. Hence the most 
parsimonious conclusion that can be drawn from infant studies testing infants younger 
than 4 month old is that these infants are capable of discriminating change in face on 
some dimension (Nelson, 1987). Nonetheless, it is a vital skill to be able to 
discriminate facial features without the knowledge of the meaning of various changes. 
By 7 months of age, infants can recognise that different examples of the same 
expression belong to the same category (Nelson and Dolgin, 1985). This indicates that 
gradually by age of 7 months meaning of FEs are assimilated by infants. At 7 months 
infants are also able to generalise their discrimination between happy and surprise 
across the faces of six different models, irrespective of the order of presentation 
(Caron et aI., 1982). 
Having ascertained that infants can discriminate between various expressions the next 
step examined if infants notice the intensity of FEs. Kuchuk et aI., (1986) reported 
that infants showed a differential patterns of preference for happy faces with 
increasing intensity. Nelson and Ludemann, (1987) reported a series of studies which 
examined the intensity discrimination in 4-7 -month-old infants for various FEs. 
Firstly, the study concluded that 4-month-old infants can discriminate fear FE that 
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varies in intensity and 7-month-olds can discriminate both fear and happy FE that 
vary in intensity. Secondly, the study found that by 7 month of age infants have 
generalised the discrimination in order to notice the varying intensity across different 
models for both happy and fear FE. So by the age of 7 months infants can 
discriminate between happy, fear and surprise FE and they can discriminate FEs of 
varying intensity. 
At the end of their first year of life infants become capable of social referencing i.e. 
connect others FEs to environmental events and learn from them (Walker-Andrews, 
1997). For example, twelve month olds were presented with a set of novel toys and 
the infants' mothers were directed to pose happy, fearful, or neutral facial expressions. 
Infants remained closer to their mothers when they posed fear, stayed at a middle 
distance for neutral, and moved towards the toys when they expressed happiness 
. (Klinnert, 1984). In another study 12 month old infants were placed on a visual cliff at 
the shallow end and mother's at the other end, either posing happy or fear FE. All the 
infants were able to use the mother's FE to infer if it was safe to crawl across or not 
(Sorce et aI., 1985). The social referencing studies indicate that from the age of 12 
months infants can tell the difference between FEs and apparently modify their 
behaviour in accordance with the meaning of FE. 
It should be noted here that due to absence of language, measures such as habituation 
and visual preference are generally used in infancy to examine FE recognition which 
is different to the paradigms used for older children. These methodological 
discrepancies have led researchers to question whether the same construct of emotion 
expression recognition is being measured over development (when language is 
present or absent), and the claim is that it is difficult to discuss continuity of these 
functions over development (McClure, 2000). 
4.3.2. Developmental trajectory of FE perception from preschool years and 
above 
Recognition of FE improves with age (Gross and BaIlif, 1991); however the 
recognition does not just emerge at one particular age for all the six universal 
expressions (Camras and Allison, 1985). Children as young as two have the ability to 
sort faces showing FE (e.g. happiness) from faces showing physical states (e.g. 
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sleepiness) into separate groups (Russell and Bullock, 1985, 1986). This ability to 
recognise expression has been long found to be related both to age and the specific 
expression (Reichenbach and Masters, 1983); children recognise happy expressions 
earliest and with greatest accuracy followed by sad, then by anger, then surprise or 
fear (Gross and Ballif, 1991). Certain expressions are recognised more accurately and 
faster than others; for instance participants in Ireson and Shields, (1982) were able to 
discriminate happy expressions more accurately more often compared to any other 
expressions. Very little detail is required to recognise happy and sad FE as 
demonstrated by Walden and Field, (1982), where line drawings of happy and sad 
faces were effectively discriminated from surprise and angry faces. Widen and 
Russell, (2003) tested 3-5-year-olds on free labelling of basic FEs. Children's 
emotional expression labelling increased with age in a systematic order: 3-year-olds 
could label happy, angry, and sad expressions; 4-year-olds were also able to label 
fear, and 5-year-olds labelled surprise in addition to the former four. Recognition of 
disgust emerged later and was not consistently labelled by any of these age groups. 
Thus by the age of 5 years children are able to recognise FE of happy, sad and anger. 
Happy is claimed to be recognised with greatest accuracy (Camras and Allison, 1985; 
Gross and Ballif, 1991; Herba and Phillips, 2004). 
In addition, it has been shown that younger children rely on FEs for information on 
another's emotional state to a greater extent than situational cues. Children's ability to 
identify emotions related to situations also increases with age. A study exploring 
facial expressions and situational cues of emotion demonstrated that children's 
reliance on situational cues increased with age. Methodology using emotion matching 
tasks demonstrated that preschool children could accurately match emotion of 
protagonists in familiar situation stories (Borke, 1971) and by the age of 5 children 
could describe situations which evoked basic emotions (Borke and Su, 1972). It was 
not until 7 years of age that children mastered describing complex emotions such as 
pride, shame and guilt (Harris et aI., 1987). Another study reported that 3-5-year-olds 
focused almost exclusively on FEs, whereas by 9 years of age, children relied 
additionally upon situational cues (Hoffner & Badzinski, 1989). So by the age of 9 
children are definitely able to appreciate emotion information from more than one 
source and are able to assimilate such information in order to regulate their behaviour. 
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Research has ascertained at what age a specific FE is noticeable to the child, for 
instance, as stated earlier children as young as 2 years old can sort happy FE. Actually 
it is even earlier than that happy FE can be reliably discriminated (Nelson and Dolgin, 
1985). However, it is only by the age of 10 years, children can categorise FE at a level 
of accuracy comparable to that found in adults, and this developmental pattern is not 
uniform for all FE. Happy and sad are categorised better than fear and disgust 
(Camras and Allison, 1985). The developmental pattern of anger and surprise 
categorising is mixed; Gosselin, (1995) found anger categorisation the same as happy 
and sad whereas Camras and Allison, (1985) reported anger was harder than happy 
and sad but easier than disgust. It seems that anger FE may have very mixed outcome 
depending on the task. 
FEs not only follow a differential pattern of development with ability to recognise a 
FE emerging at different stages of development, the time required to reach the adult 
expertise level is also variable. While happy is been relatively easy to recognise and 
develop expertise in, negative FE are hard for initial start of recognition and perhaps 
take a prolonged period to reach expertise level. Kolb et aI., (1992) attempted to 
investigate at what age expertise is achieved to adult level for 6 FEs. Participants had 
to choose the FE that will best suit the face of the character in cartoon stories. 
Children 6-9 years of age were significantly different to the older groups in matching 
anger, sad, surprise and disgust and performance for sad and surprise continued to 
suffer till the age of 12 years. The FE for the cartoon task demonstrated the 
developmental trend, performance for happy was most accurate and achieved at the 
youngest age to adult levels, performance for sad, surprise and disgust continued to 
suffer till 13 years of age and disgust was the hardest to judge accurately. The authors 
concluded that a developmental shift happens between 6-8 years of age and again at 
the age of 14 years. When studies have used the wide array of FEs and tested a wide 
age range of participants then assertions can be made as regards competency. For 
instance, Widen and Russell (2003) claimed that at age of three children can label sad; 
however when that finding is juxtaposed against claims from Kolb et aI., (1992) study 
it is clear that although a 3-year-old is able to label sad efficiency of such 
performance does not quite reach adult level till age of 13 years. 
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So far it has been established that FE recognition improves gradually and 
differentially for different FEs with happy being the easiest and disgust being hardest. 
Moreover, the task used to test the proficiency in FE must have some effect on the 
result as demonstrated above using categorising, matching and cartoon face task. 
One of the factors essential in the developmental trend of FE is information on speed 
of processing. In real life FEs exist for very brief moments and change very rapidly 
imposing high demands on person's processing capacity. Slow speed of processing 
facial information may seriously hamper social communication and its development. 
FE research does not often include reaction time measures perhaps due to the nature 
of the paradigm or constraints of the design of the study. De Sonneville et aI., (2002) 
investigated speed of processing FE in relation to age of participants. Children 7-10 
years of age were tested on a series of task assessing matching, labelling and 
recognising FEs. Accuracy for recognising improved marginally but the speed of 
processing improved significantly from the 7-10 years of age, particularly for the 
negative FEs. Again speed of different FEs improved differently, happy being fastest 
most accurate followed by fear, angry and sad for speed. Furthermore, adult speed of 
processing was nearly twice as fast as that of children. This showed that when older 
children are tested perhaps reaction time is better measure of performance than 
accuracy. Moreover, in case of clinical population such as children with autism speed 
of processing is one of the factors leading to impairment in social interaction. This is 
discussed in more detail in following chapters. 
Another way of exploring patterns of developmental change would be to use 
longitudinal studies, investigating continuity of individual differences. Brown and 
Dunn, (1996) did exactly that, testing children at 33 months of age, 40 months and 
then again at 6 years of age. A combination of observational (qualitative) and 
quantitative data was collected which among other findings reported that there was a 
remarkable stability of individual differences in children's understanding of emotions 
over a three year period. The children who at 3 years of age were better at identifying 
FE and linking FE to situations that provoke the expression were better at labelling 
and explaining complex emotions at the age of 6 years. This shows that 
developmentally if children are better in early years they retain this enhanced ability 
over the time period and are able to build on it. 
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We know that FE recognition skills develop over a prolonged period of time even 
though infants as young as 7-month-olds can reliably discriminate FEs. It has been 
established that methodology used to investigate FEs does have some impact on the 
findings and at later stage of childhood perhaps reaction time measures will contribute 
more to the progress of children than accuracy data. It has also been ascertained that 
individual differences exist in recognition of FE and this continues with reliable 
stability making children who are better to start with get even better with complex 
emotions in later life. 
The effect of intensity of emotion on performance continues through the preschool 
and adolescent years. Children 4-15 years of age were tested with varying intensity of 
FEs, where intensity varied from 25 % to 100%"for explicit FEs matching task. 
Children's accuracy improved with age for all FEs except anger. Accuracy improved 
with intensity and further analyses revealed that accuracy improved the most from 
25% to higher intensities for fear and happy FE. Higher intensity was associated with 
more accuracy particularly for fear, disgust and happy. This result indicates that both 
expression intensity and emotion category impact on FE recognition (Herba et aI., 
2006). 
4.4 Factors influencing FE perception 
4.4.1 Gender differences 
In general the review on gender differences highlight that the overall performance of 
boys and girls of similar age and verbal ability is not significantly different (Camras 
and Allison, 1985; Brody, 1985). However, Zahn-Waxler et aI., (1984) and Hall, 
(1978) are the two reviewers who claimed that girls were better in FE recognition. In 
literature this difference exists mainly because of the studies included in specific 
reviews (Gross and BaIlif, 1991)and the type of emotion stimuli used in those studies. 
The doubt of sex difference on FE recognition was lifted by a meta-analysis. 
McClure, (2000) conducted a meta-analysis to examine sex differences in FE 
recognition and provided a clear evidence for a small, although robust female 
advantage over the developmental period from infancy to adolescent. The fact that sex 
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effect was noticed at infancy allowed McClure, (2000) to assume that other factors 
associated with being female may play a role in development of FE recognition, 
meaning the differences may be related to difference in neural systems in males and 
females. Another probability speculated by Blair, (2003) and Herba and Phillips, 
(2004) is that the sex difference in upbringing and education may influence sex 
difference in FR. Socialisation and display rules are different for boys and girls and 
this is taught from a very early age eventually perhaps resulting in small but robust 
sex difference. 
4.4.2 Facial features 
The face is composed of facial features namely the eyes, forehead, nose, mouth and 
chin and changes in each of these components leads to a FE. It is the perception of 
individual features as well as the whole gestalt which leads to accurate discrimination 
of FE. Ekman and Friesen, (1971) classified the whole face into action units and it is 
the changes in these action units both individually and in various permutations and 
combination that results in both basic and complex emotions being expressed on our 
face as a FE. Cunningham and Odon, (1986) asserted that children gave more weight 
to certain facial features than others. 
Analysis of misjudgements of FE highlighted a systemic pattern, extraneous facial 
features such as hair line, were never the reason for inaccuracy which meant that 
children only focussed on relevant facial features when perceiving FE. One of the 
reasons for misjudgement was, FEs which had similar eyes and/or mouth were found 
to be confusing. Angry faces have been known to be mismatched to faces having 
similar eyes i.e. disgust (Camras, 1980) and neutral faces misjudged as sad 
(Reichenbach and Masters, 1983). Reichenbach and Masters, (1983) found that 
providing situation information did not aid the decisions and similar pattern of 
misjudgement persisted regardless of age. Although in experimental conditions 
children are known to exhibit systemic errors, in real life social situations typically 
developing children indicated that they were able to effectively discriminate among 
various basic emotions (Gross and Ballif, 1991). It cannot be claimed with same 




4.4.3. Verbal ability and IQ 
Children's verbal ability has a great influence on recognition of FE, depending on the 
response that is required under experimental conditions. When asked open ended 
questions girls made more errors in FE labelling task compared to when they were 
presented with forced choice questions (Ireson and shields, 1982). If the task requires 
an explanation and production of emotion labels then the recognition scores have been 
found to be lower than when only comprehension skills are tested. In the same way, if 
conflicting information was presented then the performance was dependent on verbal 
ability of the child (Reichenbach and Masters, 1983); lower verbal ability participants 
relying more on photograph and higher verbal ability participants relying more on the 
description of situation. Adaptations in research methods, such as providing both 
verbal and visual cues, may ameliorate some of the problems associated with verbal 
response from children. 
It has been established that with increasing age, a wider range of social experiences, 
and accompanying changes in verbal ability, children are able to identify and explain 
both basic and complex emotions effectively (Gross and Ballif, 1991). In typically 
developing populations the relationship between IQ and development of FE has not 
been investigated, however in Williams Syndrome effects of IQ has been found to be 
related to emotion recognition (Gagliardi et aI., 2003). IQ may affect children's 
performance on FE recognition task via different routes such as the ability to attend to 
numerous stimuli at the same time, verbal ability, ability to think abstractly, 
association of experience with the stimuli, speed of processing (Herba and Phillips, 
2004). Studies investigating potential effects of IQ on FE perception throughout 
childhood and adolescence is required in order to draw concrete conclusions. 
4.4.4. Socio economic status (SES) 
There is a substantial body of evidence that children from families of deprived socio-
economic background are significantly more at risk for emotional and behavioural 
difficulties in childhood (Goodyear, 2002). Most studies of FE recognition are 
conducted in schools and educational institutions existing in middle class areas so the 
effect of SES cannot be reliably inferred from this. Smith and Walden, (1998) tested 
Afro-American children from a very deprived area and reported the usual 
developmental trend with a twist. Children's accuracy for fear FE was very high and 
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the suggestion was this was result of exposure to high-stress living environment. 
There is evidence of enhanced level of perception of anger in children who are 
physically abused (Pollack and Kistler, 2002). Taken together these results suggest 
environment in which children develop may bias them towards identification of 
specific expressions. 
4.5 Limitations in methodology and validity of conclusions 
Several characteristics of research in the field of FE have an effect on the external 
validity of the findings. The main sources of bias included are discussed below. 
4.5.1 Quality of visual material 
A number of studies testing preschool children used schematic or line drawing of FE. 
This may have been over simplistic, static and lack the richness of information that is 
available to individuals in natural setting and social environment. Furthermore, Gross 
and Ballif, (1991) argued that in real life individuals use more information than what 
can be provided in experimental conditions. Participants may be drawing on real life 
experiences to make the judgements in experimental conditions; resulting in incorrect 
response. Reviewers canvas for the use of standardised stimuli such as the Ekman and 
Friesen, (1976) faces to enable comparisons across studies resulting in valid 
conclusions (Herba and Phillips, 2004; Gross and Ballif, 1991). Use of dynamic 
stimuli is also highly regarded, as it would be closer to real life situations, and may 
trigger completely different neural structures compared to static faces (Haxby et aI., 
2002). 
Preschool children generally are asked to sort or match the FE and the strategy used 
by participants for such tasks can be dependent on the type of stimuli used. Field and 
Walden, (1982) tested preschool children on FE matching task but used either line 
drawings or videos as stimuli that needed matching. The results in the two matching 
tasks were completely different bringing to light the fact that line drawing matching 
may be tapping into featural processing. One other factor influencing matching task 
results may be educational experiences. Preschool children taking part in research are 
generally children attending day care centres, playgroups etc. where a vital part of 
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regular activity involves matching pictures, sorting etc. Thu~ practice effects may 
have impacted the validity of these studies (Gross and Ballif, 1991). 
4.5.2 The response required from the participants 
The response required from participants for FE has been varied from recognition, 
identification, perception, to description of actual emotion or labelling. Responses 
may rely differentially on verbal ability, visuo-spatial skills or other cognitive skills 
(Vicari et aI., 2000). Language has a huge impact on the response required i.e. 
labelling of description of emotion places demands on participants' language ability 
whereas FE identity using sorting or matching entails very little use of language. 
Researchers testing preschool children try to eliminate language effects by using 
matching, pairing and sorting tasks but they may not be tapping in to the FE 
perceptual skill of the participant at all. In short there is a trade off in not only the 
stimuli used but the task demands associated with it. 
Not many studies record speed of processing, mostly it is the accuracy scores taken 
into consideration. De Sonneville et aI., (2002) reported a study where dynamic FE 
was used and the speed of response was also taken into account. The authors 
emphasised that FE change very rapidly in social situations and slow processing will 
seriously impede communication and social development. Their results indicated that 
speed of processing increases with age more so for the negative emotions. Studies 
such as these stress the importance of numerous variables assessing the development 
of subtle skills in FE processing, especially in case of older children. 
4.5.3 Age range and distribution of the participants tested 
The age of the participants tested has been vague at times, with description based on 
age or school years particular to the country of the researcher or other local 
definitions, the classic one being 'preschool children'. Literature scrutinising the 
developmental pathway would benefit from standard age descriptions. 
4.6 Conclusion 
Literature of FE research verified that a FE discrimination mechanism exists from 
infancy and gradually becomes faster and more accurate as the individual matures 
66 
(Herba and Phillips, 2004). The six basic FEs have a differential developmental trend 
both as far as time line of development is concerned as well as initial start up point. 
Happy is the first FE to be reliably discriminated from approximately the age of 4 
months (Nelson and Horowitz, 1983) and perhaps requires the shortest time length to 
reach an adult level of expertise (Camras and Allison, 1985; Walden and Field, 1982). 
Disgust is the hardest FE to recogn~se and it is not until the age of 6-7 years that 
disgust is reliably recognised (Widen and Russell, 2003),with expertise level not 
reached until almost the age of 15 years (Kolb et aI., 1992). 
So from seven months of age happy is discriminated, from the age of 1 meanings of 
FEs are inferred and behaviours modified by infants, from the age of 3 labelling of 
FEs is achieved and from the age of 5 understanding of complex emotions emerges. 
However, adult-like expertise levels for negative emotions are not reached almost 
until the age of 15 years. When accuracy is achieved for a particular FEs such as 
happy at the age of 10 similar to adult level, even then speed of processing highlights 
room for further improvement (De Sonneville et aI., 2002). Finally both intensity of 
an emotion and emotion category impacts on recognition results (Herba et aI., 2006). 
Children who are better at FEs at the age of 3 continue to retain this superior ability 
over prolonged period of time and build on this. In other words, if a 3-year-old is 
good at FE recognition at the age of 6 the person will be better than their peers in their 
understanding of complex emotions, in picking up emotional cues from environment 
and modulating ones own behaviour accordingly. 
Children gradually start to use situational cues to understand the nature of emotion as 
they get older and draw information both from FEs and situational cues (Borke, 
1971). Understanding of complex emotions, as well as being aware of the dissociation 
between internal emotional state and display of emotion comes later in the childhood. 
However, the learning that in the social world one does not display the emotions felt 
at all times starts very early, and this display rules is likely to cause confounding 
effects in situation cues experiments (Reichenbach and Masters, 1983). 
Methodology and stimuli used in the research has an effect on the findings, as do the 
characteristics of participants such as verbal ability, general intelligence, gender and 
SES. Life experience enhances a person's ability in recognising certain FEs more than 
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others, for instance children subjected to physical abuse are more aware of fear FEs 
and fear emotion in their environment. 
Due to lack of research with adolescents the final endpoint of maturation for each FEs 
is still not ascertained and the time line for each FEs is not known with certainty due 
to lack of focus on typically developing adolescents and their perception of FEs. On 
the other hand infant research has been more robust in their research and findings in 
FE as far as infants are concerned. 
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Chapter 5 
Neural systems for facial expression processing 
Abstract 
The main aim of the thesis was to investigate FE production in the case of children 
with autism and investigating if the FE perception is atypical in the autism population. 
FE processing has been investigated both from behavioural and neurophysiological 
perspective and in order to consider FE in atypical population in its entirety it is vital 
to explore the findings of the neuroscientists as well. The findings of the research 
reported links with behavioural as well as neurophysiological theories of face 
processing. With this in mind I explore the neural system for FE recognition in this 
chapter both in case of adults and children without extensively covering all aspects of 
the complex system. 
5.1 Introduction 
Neuroscientists using imaging techniques have investigated the various aspects of 
face processing and clearly suggested a spatial and temporal dissociation in the 
processing of identity and emotion (Munte et aI., 1998). Most studies investigating 
neural correlates for emotion processing used FE as the stimuli, Phan et aI., (2002) 
conducted a meta-analysis of 55 PET and MRI studies on FE perception using FE as 
the stimuli and concluded that there is no one specific brain region consistently 
engaged in processing FE. Although, both cortical (prefrontal, frontal, orbito-frontal 
cortices, occipito-temporal junction, cingulate cortex) and sub-cortical regions 
(amygdale, basal ganglia and insula) have been claimed to be activated by different 
emotion stimuli (Damasio et aI., 2000; Gomo-Tempini et aI., 2001), the site of 
processing is not always constant. It is more a combination of various cortical and 
subcortical structures resulting in perception of FE. 
5.2 The neural system for FE processing 
Phillips et aI., (2003) proposed the existence of two parallel neural systems for 
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emotion processing which were as follows: 
1. A system comprising subcortical and ventral frontal cortical regions important 
for the identification of the emotionally salient cues and generation of 
emotional states; 
2. A system comprising dorsal frontal cortical regIOns important for the 
regulation of the subsequent behaviour as a result of identification of 
emotional cues. 
This signifies importance of both the subcortical structure namely the amygdala and 
the cortical structures such as the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), medial prefrontal cortex 
(MPFC), prefrontal cortex (PFC) and STS. 
5.2.1 Evidence of subcortical and cortical activation and modulation 
The speed of FE processing has been investigated using event-related functional MRI 
and N170 has been found to be sensitive to faces, being a reliable index of early 
stages of face processing. Batty and Taylor, (2003) presented a large number of 
unfamiliar faces with 6 basic expressions, plus neutral faces, to 26 young adults while 
recording event-related potentials. This was an implicit emotional task, which showed 
effects starting at the PI component (94 ms) followed by N170 (140 to 220 ms). PI 
has been implicated to be involved in global face processing; this study extended it to 
early processing of FE as well. The result of Batty and Taylor is consistent with Bruce 
and Young, (1986) both claiming early automatic encoding of FE alongside other face 
information encoding. Thus FE are detected and processed very rapidly 
approximately 94 ms after stimuli onset and automatically. The N170 for positive and 
negative faces were of different latency i.e. negative faces had longer latency. This 
appears to be counter-intuitive but Batty and Taylor, (2003) reasoned that the 
subcortical pathway is activated by negative emotions and rapidly sends information 
to different levels of ventral pathway resulting in the N170 being activated later. 
Moreover, N170 for fear is larger and this substantiates the subcortical feedback loop. 
Taken together it can be concluded that both the subcortical and the cortical neural 
system activate when FEs are presented for identification. Depending on the FE, the 
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feedback loop to the cortical neural system is different thus affecting the speed of 
processing of different FE. 
5.2.2 Evidence of amygdala activation in adults 
The amygdala, a subcortical structure, has been consistently implicated with FE 
processing, particularly activating in response to fear emotion and FE. (Adolphs, 
200 I; Blair et aI., 1999; Morris, et aI., 1998; Vuilleumier et aI., 2001). 
Studies of patients with brain damage and animal research have long established that 
limbic structures, such as the amygdala, play a vital role in processing biologically 
significant stimuli, especially fear FEs. Amygdala lesions in humans, have 
consistently been associated with impairment in fear expression recognition (Adolphs, 
1999; Calder et aI., 1999), in 50% of cases, with impairment in recognition of sad 
expression (Fine and Blair, 2000); but rarely cause impairment in recognition of 
happy (Fine and Blair, 2000). 
Evidence of the sub-cortical pathway activation in response to FE stimuli of fear was 
demonstrated by Morris et aI., (1998). Using PET the cerebral blood flow to the 
amygdala, the superior colliculus and the pulvinar was reported to increase in 
response to facial expressions of fear. It has been claimed that fear, sad and happy 
expressions all modulate amygdala activity (Morris et aI., 1996; Phillips et aI., 1997). 
Morris et aI., (1998) draw attention to the fact that anatomically, the amygdala 
receives sensory input from the pulvinar and the medial geniculate nucleus and highly 
processed sensory input from the anterior temporal lobe. The output of the amygdala 
is projected to the temporal cortex and to earlier visual areas in the occipital lobe and 
also to OFC. With this knowledge Morris et aI., (1998), embarked to investigate brain 
activation patterns in the regions of interest while participants were watching fear FE 
of varying intensity. The pattern of activation on closer analysis revealed that the left 
amygdala had enhanced responses to fear faces relative to happy and responded to 
increases in intensity of fear. The left amygdala also responded to decreases in 
intensity of happy. This was taken as indication that the left amygdala in particular is 
not merely involved in mediating response to fear and/or threat in the environment but 
is more complex than that. The right amygdala does not respond to any intensity of 
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fear expression. Although other studies have argued the case of right hemisphere 
dominance for face processing tasks, the findings of Morris et aI., (1998) signified 
that facial emotion processing is much more complex than a simplistic right 
hemisphere dominance model. It has been professed that the nature of a task may be 
crucial in determining the extent to which each hemisphere is engaged. 
The case of double dissociation between right and left amygdala ( essentially right 
and left medial temporal lobe) has also been successfully verified by Funayama et aI., 
(2001). This study examined the role of the amygdala in modulation of behavioural 
fear response, both in a picture viewing paradigm and instructed fear paradigm; by 
testing healthy participants, right temporal lobectomy (RTL) and left temporal 
lobectomy (LTL) patients. A clear double dissociation was displayed in the findings 
where by L TL patients showed an increase in startle during a picture viewing task and 
RTL patients showed an increase in startle during an instructed fear task. The 
conclusion was that right amygdala modulates behavioural response when a picture 
stimuli with verbal instruction are presented. Likewise, left amygdala modulates 
behavioural response only when the instruction of threat is associated with innocuous 
stimuli. 
It is well established that the amygdala is involved in the processing of fear FE as well 
as discriminating FE at the very initial stage of processing and modulating the 
activation pattern of cortical neural pathway (Leppanen and Nelson, 2009). 
5.2.3 Evidence of STS and OFC in adults 
The cortical pathway for FE processing among other areas involves the STS initially, 
as reported by Haxby et at, (2000). The posterior STS region is implicated with 
processing dynamic FE (Hoffman and Haxby, 2000) and inferring intentions of 
people from FE (Pelhprey, Morris and McCarthy, 2004). The earliest activity that 
discriminates between FE in the frontal lobe is seen in the midline occipital cortex 
from 80 to 1 1 Oms after stimulus onset (Halgren, Raij, Marinkovic, Jousmaki, and 
Hari, 2000) as recorded using ERP. This is followed by activation of fusiform gyrus at 
approximately 160ms. 
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The orbitofrontal cortex has also been implicated in the recognition of FEs in top-
down modulation of perceptual processing (Damasio et aI., 1994). 
5.2.4 Evidence of other areas processing FE in adults 
Disgust expressions engage insula and putamen (Phillips et aI., 1997) and insula 
damage results in failure to recognise disgust expressions (Calder et aI., 1999). 
Anger expressions are asserted to curtail behaviour of others by response reversal 
(Blair et aI., 1999) and the orbitofrontal cortex is crucially implicated in response 
reversal. Activation of the orbito frontal cortex has been reported in response to anger 
expressions (Blair et aI., 1999) and no amygdala activation for anger has been 
reported in the literature. 
It has been illustrated here using neurophysiological data and evidence from brain 
damaged patients that the amygdala is vital for fear perception. It has also been 
showed that the left and right amygdala activate differently to varying intensity of fear 
and other FEs and to different types of stimuli such as picture images or story context. 
The frontal cortex (namely the PFC, OFC, MPFC) activates in conjunction with 
subcortical structures and is modulated, as well as modulates, structures such as the 
amygdala, insula etc. Hence it appears, frontal cortex is more involved in the second 
level of the parallel neural system of Phillips et aI., (2003) whereas subcortical 
structures influence the level one more. 
5.3 The ontogeny of FE processing 
Prior to verbal communication infants rely on communication via the non-verbal 
channel which primarily is reading others' FEs. It is vitally important for infants to 
derive information regarding primary care givers' mood, feelings and intentions as 
well as to learn continuously about the environment. When infant becomes mobile, 
the FE of the mother is used to derive information regarding the safety of the physical 
environment (Klinnert, 1984). Thus, accurate decoding of FE is absolutely 
fundamental in early interpersonal communication, learning and developing and 
above all effective survival for each individual right from birth. Literature 
corroborates that the adult emotion processing neural network discussed above 
73 
emerges early in postnatal life; with the subcortical brain systems (essentially the 
amygdala) being functional at birth and orienting infants' attention towards faces and 
gradually enhancing cortical activity of specific areas in response to face stimuli 
(Johnson, 2005). Reciprocal connections between visual representation areas and the 
amygdala as well as the orbitofrontal cortex have been observed soon after birth in 
macaque monkeys and both structures seem to reach anatomical maturity relatively 
early in development (Machado et aI., 2003). Amygdala lesions in neonate monkeys 
result in abnormal affiliation and fear-related behaviours, possibly due to the 
underlying impairments in evaluation and discrimination of safe and potentially 
threatening physical and social stimuli (Bauman et aI., 2004). Neurogenesis of the 
amygdala in monkeys completes by birth (Humphrey et aI., 1968) but the subcortical 
pathway in healthy human newborns cannot be researched for ethical reasons and any 
conclusions drawn based on animal research must be tentative. Humans are the only 
species with a prolonged nurturing, developing, learning and caring period that lasts 
for more than a decade. This means, unlike monkey's brain and neural circuits, the 
human brain undergoes a prolonged maturation involving myelination of the axons; 
connections among various brain regions continuing to develop finally resulting in a 
more refined wiring pattern. 
It is unlikely that infants can visually discriminate internal features at birth and in the 
first couple of months of life (Nelson, 1987). Reliable perception of FEs (i.e. attention 
to configural information in face and the ability to recognise FE across variations in 
identity and intensity) has been demonstrated not to exist substantially until 5-7 
months of age (Nelson and Dolgin, 1985). From the time of birth infants rely more on 
muItimodal cues such as audio cues to decipher social communication information 
and only later acquire representation discriminating unimodal information. Flom and 
Bharick, (2007) presented 4-7-month-old infants with happy FEs for a visual-paired 
tasks and then paired habituated faces with novel fear or angry faces. Only from 7 
months of age were infants able to effectively discriminate unimodal stimuli of happy 
faces from fear or angry faces; with unimodal auditory discrimination ability 
appearing at 5 months of age. 
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5.3.1 Evidence of amygdala activation in children 
Halit et aI., (2003) reported a positive ERP component approximately 400 ms after 
stimulus onset over the medial occipital temporal scalp, which is larger for fear face 
compared to neutral FE in 7-month-old infants. This has been taken as a evidence of 
modulatory influence of the amygdala on cortical processing in infants. 
Infants' reactions towards FEs are further biased by eye gaze directions i.e. if a fear 
face gazes at a novel object it induces an increase of the Nc that is more pronounced 
than if the gaze is directed at the infant (Leppanen and Nelson, 2009). As mentioned 
previously, subcortical activation cannot be tested in infants because of ethical 
reasons but the activation of occipito-temporal regions at such short latency has been 
taken as evidence of amygdala activation and of a modulatory effect, especially on the 
attention networks of the cortical face sensitive neural network. 
For practical reasons fMRI is hard to administer with babies as they would not be still 
enough. Thomas et aI., (2001) studied amygdala activation to fearful faces in group of 
children (mean age 11 years) and adults. Adults showed greater amygdalar activation 
consistent with previous research, on the contrary children showed greater activation 
to neutral faces. It was concluded that children perhaps find neutral faces more 
ambiguous resulting in increased activity of amygdala, which is consistent with 
behavioural data. 
Killgore et aI., (2001) studied developmental changes in amygdala in children and 
adolescents and reported that although the left amygdala responded to fearful faces in 
all children, this activity decreased in female adolescents but not in males. Females 
also had greater activation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex over that same period; 
whereas males showed an opposite pattern. This was interpreted by the authors as an 
association between cerebral maturation and regulation of emotional behaviour i.e. 
cerebral maturity eventually leads to suppression of amygdala activation. 
These studies signify that although the subcortical route is functional from birth, it 
might take a long time to mature behaviourally and there may be significant gender 
difference in the developmental phase. 
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5.3.2 Evidence of cortical activation in children 
Fear enhances activity in cortical attention networks from the age of about 7 months. 
Nelson and de Haan, (1996) found that the negative central (NC) component of infant 
ERP was of larger amplitude in response to fear faces compared to happy faces, 
highlighting a greater allocation of attention neural networks for fear facial 
expressions. However, it is difficult to draw conclusions by parallel comparison of 
adult and infant FE research which use completely different paradigms and different 
task demands. Hence Leppanen, Moulson, Vogel-Farley and Nelson, (2007) recorded 
ERPs to fearful, happy and neutral faces in adults and 7 month old infants under 
equivalent viewing conditions. Adults, like previous research, showed augmented 
amplitude of Nl70 for fear faces compared to neutral or happy face. In infants, 
significantly larger positive amplitude at inferior semi-medial occipito-temporal 
region, 380 ms after stimulus onset were recorded for fear faces compared to neutral 
and happy face. The attentional network NC was also larger for fearful face which 
was in line with the studies' behavioural task, where infants had longer looking time 
for fear. Together, these findings were concluded to suggest that cortical processing 
for different facial expressions in 7-month-olds varied, just like adults, and both face 
perception and attention-grabbing networks function in the first year of life. 
Facial expression research in the field of neuroscience is inconclusive after the first 
year of life in humans. The neural network for FE has not been investigated for 
children between 1 to 4 years of age the ontogeny is imprecise. In their seminal study, 
Batty and Taylor, (2006) tested children aged 4 to 15 year olds with six universal 
expressions as well as neutral FE while ERP was being recorded. PI was reported to 
be sensitive to configural changes across childhood and was a large, easy measure 
peak in children. PI also showed marked changes in amplitude and latency with 
increasing age, hence PI was recorded and changes noted in this study. PI latency 
was sensitive to emotions in the young children in this early component. Fear had 
longer latencies that happy and surprised while happy had shorter latency than fear, 
disgust and sad. The PI effect (120 ms for 4 to 7 year oIds) was driven entirely by the 
two youngest age groups who use very early processing to detect emotions, 
suggesting that young children use this mechanism for early perception of certain 
emotions. This effect disappears with age, in parallel with age-related decreases in PI 
latency and amplitude. The effects on N 170 amplitude were only seen in 14 to 15 year 
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olds. This double dissociation due to age indicates that the processing of emotions is 
not static and the neural mechanism changes with maturation. The N 170 comes online 
for configural processing much later and indication is that until that happens other 
areas, such as PI, are executed for inferring information from facial expressions. 
5.4 Conclusion 
The amygdala as a subcortical structure has been ascertained without any doubt to be 
vital for FE processing. Animal studies as well as brain damage patients have long 
been testimony to the impact the amygdala or temporal lobe lesions can have on the 
individual's social life (Damasio et aI., 1994). Although the left and right amygdala 
activate differently, it is still very early to define the neural pathway for every single 
variation of emotion and the influence of amygdala on its processing with any 
conviction. All that can be said at this stage is that both the subcortical and cortical 
pathway are equally important for FE processing. The subcortical pathway may do the 
'quick and dirty' processing however, the OFC, PFC and MPFC have to analyse the 
information based on past experience, compute reward value make decisions, execute 
goal directed output. Both of these systems, as highlighted in the Haxby et aI., (2000) 
model, have to work together continuously in a feedforward and feedback 
mechanism. Furthermore, it has been reported that subcortical neural system for FE 
processing exist from birth and is online from birth onwards more effectively than the 
cortical network initially. However, both the subcortical and cortical neural network 
takes a long time to mature and reach adult level. 
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Chapter 6 
What is autism? Face recognition and facial expression 
recognition in autism population and participant selection 
criteria 
Abstract 
In this chapter I summanze several aspects of autism. I will first describe the 
diagnosis of the syndrome, then will present some theories of autism, such as the 
weak central coherence, social motivation hypothesis and the amygdala theory 
Considering the communication aspect of autism, I will focus on the face processing 
and facial expression processing. I will review the literature both from behavioural 
and neurophysiological perspective. The final section of the chapter discusses the 
types of participants involved in autism research in general and the participants 
involved in this particular research. 
6.1 Introduction 
Childhood autism is sometimes referred to as early infantile autism, childhood autism 
or Kanner's autism (DSM-IV). Manifestation of the disorder varies greatly depending 
on the developmentalleve1 and chronological age of the individual. 
Leo Kanner in 1948 reported 11 case studies, 8 boys and 3 girls who were closely 
followed since 1938. These children presented with 'fascinating peculiarities' as 
reported by Kanner. He highlighted in each of these cases; intense interest with 
objects but minimal interest in people, repetitive patterns of behaviour, and an acute 
interest in specific field or objects combined with language difficulties. The 
outstanding fundamental disorder was the inability of these children to relate to 
people and situations right from birth. Parents in these case studies repeatedly 
highlighted that their child was 'self-sufficient', 'happiest when left alone' or 
'perfectly oblivious to everything about them'. Kanner described this as an 'extreme 
autistic aloneness' that shuts out everything that comes to the child from outside. 
78 
Attention was drawn to language difficulties by highlighting the excellent rote 
memory, delayed echolalia, general language delay and confusion with personal 
pronouns. Most importantly, the communicative function of language was reported to 
be impaired in the sense that children failed to use language in social contexts. They 
also took language in the literal sense and Kanner reported this deficiency extensively 
in the case studies signifying the level of difficulty for the child and parents. Children 
also were reported to insist on sameness almost to an obsessive level leading to great 
distress to the child and as a result parents followed routines and rituals with great 
rigidity. Finally, Kanner, (1948) concluded that these children have come with the 
innate inability to form affective contact with people eventually manifesting in to 
"inborn autistic disturbances or affective contact". 
6.2 Diagnosis of autism 
6.2.1 DSM-IV (APA, 1994) diagnostic criteria: 
DSM-IV specifies that the essential features of Autistic disorder are the presence of 
impaired development in social interaction and communication with restricted 
repertoire of activity and interest. 
Criteria A 1 list all the possible repertoire a child with autism may have that result in 
impairment of reciprocal social interaction which will be gross and sustained. The 
criteria includes impairment in eye to eye gaze, facial expressions, body posture to 
failure in peer relationship development at different developmental level, to lack of 
spontaneous sharing of enjoyment, to showing/taking comfort in their own company. 
Criteria A2 list all the possible difficulties in communication both in the fields of 
nonverbal and verbal skills. The criteria highlights that there may be lack of language 
development to start with or individuals who do speak may have marked impairment 
in their ability to initiate or sustain conversation. The voice intonation, pitch, rhythm, 
rate or stress may be abnormal and there may be repetitive use of language and 
stereotypical or idiosyncratic language. Individuals may use neologisms or words and 
phrases. Finally this criterion warns clinicians to look out for lack of spontaneous 
make-belief play or social imitative play typical of developmental level. Children with 
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autism are often seen not to engage in any imaginative social play such as play 
kitchen, or garage and tend to use these toys in a very mechanical way. 
The final criteria A3 cover repetitive behaviour or restricted interests detailing the 
narrow interests of individuals which become a preoccupation with abnormal intensity 
or focus. It underscores the inflexible adherence to specific, non-functional routines 
and rituals. It has been accentuated that children with autism tend to insist on 
sameness and show resistance to change or are distressed with trivial change to 
routine. It warns clinicians to look out for repetitive motor mannerisms such as hand 
clapping, clicking or finger flicking; or whole body such as rocking, dipping and 
swaymg. 
The diagnosis of autism is reached if there is delay or abnormal functioning in at least 
one of the areas i.e. social interaction, language used in social communication or 
symbolic or imaginative play prior to three years of age. In most cases there is no 
period of unequivocal normal development but in some cases parents report a case of 
normal development until 1-2 years of age and then a difference noticed. If normal 
development is reported then according to DSM-IV (APA, 1994) this must not be 
beyond the age of three. 
DSM-IV (APA, 1994) concludes with the note that children with autism, in most 
cases, have associated diagnoses of mental retardation that can be mild to profound. 
Individuals may display a range of behaviour from hyperactivity, short attention span, 
impulsivity, aggressive behaviour, hypersensitive to loud noise, touch or odour. 
Atypical natures in food habits, sleep patterns and emotions have all been reported. 
6.2.2 ICD-10: DCR-10(WIIO, 1998) diagnostic criteria for childhood autism 
ICD-! 0 diagnostic criteria for research 10 (DCR-! 0) (WHO, 1998), classifies a group 
of disorders 'disorders of psychological development', that have (a) onset during 
infancy or childhood; (b) impairment or delay in development of functions that are 
strongly related to maturation of central nervous system; and (c) a steady course 
without remission or relapses. Childhood autism is one such disorder grouped under 
'disorders of psychological development'. 
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Childhood autism is defined as a type of pervasive developmental disorder that has (a) 
presence of abnormal or impaired development that is manifest before the age of 3 
years and (b) the characteristic type of abnormal functioning in all the following three 
areas - reciprocal social interaction, communication and restricted, stereotyped, 
repetitive behaviour. Other non-specific problems may co-exist such as phobias, 
sleeping and eating disturbances, temper tantrums and self directed aggression. 
ICD-IO specifies the diagnostic criteria more concisely in comparison to DSM-IV and 
the following must be satisfied 
A. Abnormal or impaired development is evident before the age of 3 years in at 
least one of the following areas 
1. receptive or expressive language as used in social communication 
2. development of selective social attachments or of reciprocal social 
interaction 
3. functional or symbolic play 
B. A total of at least six symptoms from (1), (2) and (3) must be present, with at 
least two from (1) and at least (1) from each of(2) and (3) 
1. qualitative abnormalities in reciprocal social interaction are manifest in 
at least two of the following areas: 
(a) failure adequately to use eye-to-eye gaze, facial expression, body 
posture and gesture to regulate social interaction; 
(b) failure to develop (in a manner appropriate' to mental age, and 
despite ample opportunities) peer relationships that involve mutual 
sharing of interests, activities, and emotions; 
(c) lack of socio-emotional reciprocity, as shown by an impaired or 
deviant response to other people's emotions; or lack of modulation 
of behaviour according to social context or a weak integration of 
social, emotional and communicative behaviours; 
(d) lack of spontaneous seeking to share enjoyment, interests or 
achievements with other people (e.g. a lack of showing, bringing 
or pointing out to other people objects of interests to the 
individual). 
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2. Qualitative abnormalities in communication are manifest in at least one 
of the following areas; 
(a) a delay in, a total lack of, development of spoken language that is 
not accompanied by an attempt to compensate through the use of 
gesture or mime as an alternative mode of communication (often 
preceded by a lack of communicative babbling); 
(b) relative failure to initiate or sustain conversational interchange (at 
whatever level of language skills are present), in which there is 
reciprocal responsiveness to the communications of the other 
person; 
(c) stereotyped and repetitive use of language or idiosyncratic use of 
words or phrases; 
(d) lack of varied spontaneous make believe or (when young) social 
imaginative play. 
3. Restricted, repetitive and stereotyped patterns of behaviour, interests 
and activities are manifest in at least one of the following areas; 
(a) an encompassing preoccupation with one or more stereotyped and 
restricted patterns of interest that are abnormal in content or focus; or 
one or more interests that are abnormal in their intensity and 
circumscribed nature, though not in their content or focus. 
(b) Apparently compulsive adherence to specific, non-functional routines 
or rituals; 
(c) Stereotyped and repetitive motor mannerisms that involve either hand 
or finger flapping or twisting, or complex whole-body movements; 
(d) Preoccupations with part-objects or non-functional elements of play 
materials (such as their odour, the feel of their surface, or the noise or 
vibration that they generate); 
Thus, according to the diagnostic criteria, it is clear that this is a social 
neurodevelopmental disorder that is evident by the age of 3. Diagnosis is possible 
from the age of 3 although clinical researchers are attempting to develop tools for 
early diagnosis. One of the prime reasons for early diagnosis is early intervention, as 
it is obvious from clinical research literature that prognosis in case of autism with no 
82 
learning difficulties is very good. These criteria are for diagnosis for research 
purposes which clinicians do not have to follow stringently. Diagnosis for clinical 
purposes can be made on the basis of overall judgement of the clinician who has 
knowledge and experience of lCD-10, from interview encompassing history both 
personal and family and observation of the person at the clinic. 
6.2.3 Autism Diagnostic Interview - Revised (ADI-Rl 
The ADI-R, a semi-structured, investigator based interview for caregivers of children 
and adults for whom autism of pervasive developmental disorders is a possible 
diagnosis (Lord, Rutter and Le Couteur, 1994). This revised interview has been 
reorganised, shortened and modified to be appropriate for children with mental ages 
from about 18 months into adulthood. The ADI-R is linked closely to ICD-lO and 
DSM-IV criteria; because although it was originally designed for research purposes 
only, it has been used more and more for clinical diagnosis (Lord et al. 1994). 
ADI-R consists of 93 individual questions divided into 5 main sections 
Opening sections 
Questions on communication (both early and current) 
Questions on social development and play (both early and current) 
Questions about repetitive and restricted behaviours (both current and ever 
judgements) 
A reduced number of questions concerning general behaviour problems. 
The ADI-R enables better discrimination between non-autism children with severe 
learning difficulty and children with autism. This is because the ADI-R uses focussed 
descriptions of contexts on how non-autism children behave that is consistent through 
early development. The questions in each section and the detailed prompts 
incorporated enable the interviewer to gather information from the caregivers that is 
vital in highlighting characteristics of autism. The interview focuses on the 
caregiver's descriptions of actual behaviour as it has occurred in the child's daily life. 
Questions in the interview have each got a clearly stated purpose that gives the 
interviewer a clear sense of direction and focuses on the end result to be achieved at 
the end of each question. For instance, in the social verbalisation section, the 
questions the interviewer is expected to ask are about small talk, participating in 
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language interchange at present and when the child was younger. However, the 
purpose of the section as stated is to establish, if speech is used by the individual just 
to be friendly or social rather than just express needs or gather information. This fits 
in with ICD-l 0; 1 (d) which is lack of spontaneous sharing by the individual. Although 
the administration of the interview requires a substantial amount of time, most parents 
find it a positive experience because they are allowed to describe important aspects of 
the behaviour in their own words, which helps them to have a better understanding of 
the factors, particularly social behaviours, that are pertinent for the diagnosis and 
.. important part of autism (Lord et al. 1994). A major part of ICD-IO asks clinicians to 
evaluate the communication and language skills and abilities. This is reflected in 
ADI-R, the major part of the interview is assessing the individual's language and 
communication ability from the parent's point of view both skills and ability at 
present and when young, in 40 out of the total 93 questions. This gives a more 
detailed account for the person diagnosing than could be determined only by 
observation in a clinic (Lord et al. 1994). In principle the ADI-R can be administered 
by someone who has had training in administering the interview (essentially by 
administering the interview 3 times) and after the person has established reliability for 
scoring with other experienced individuals (Lord et al. 1994). Nonetheless, substantial 
knowledge and experience of actually working with individuals and children with 
autism is essential for executing the interview in a manner that will gather all the 
appropriate information required for the diagnosis and be both sympathetic and 
empathic towards the parent of a child with autism. Otherwise the person may miss 
vital information even after asking all the prompting questions, and come across as 
very impersonal fact finder. 
Each item on the interview is coded on a scale of 0 to 3 for current behaviour with a 
few exceptions i.e. when the behaviour would have been relevant only during 
particular age periods. For instance, imaginative behaviour is only appropriate for age 
group 4 to 10 beyond that in typical developmental stage the imaginative play phases 
out. Some items are coded for the presence of that behaviour 'ever' because 
individuals with autism either with behaviour therapy or classical conditioning 
therapy may have learnt to not perform certain behaviour however, the fact that they 
ever did behave in that manner would be enough for scoring purposes. A code of 0 is 
given when the autism specified behaviour is definitely not present, 1 when the 
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specific behaviour is probably present but defining criteria is not fully met, 2 when 
autism specific behaviour is definitely present and occasionally a code of 3 is given to 
signify extreme severity. An algorithm for diagnosis has been generated by clustering 
items from the interview that most closely depict the specific ICD-l O:DCR-l 0 and 
DSM-IV criteria. For a confirmed diagnosis of autism using ADI-R the person needs 
to score at least 8 for the social interaction algorithm, 8 for communication algorithm, 
3 for repetitive behaviour algorithm and exhibit atypical behaviour in at least one of 
the three areas by the age of 36 months in the interviewer's or the parent's 
judgements. 
6.2.4 Childhood Autism Rating Scale (CARS) 
CARS (Schopler, Reicheler and Rocher-Renner, 1988) is a 15-item behavioural rating 
scale developed to identify children with autism, and to distinguish them from 
children with learning difficulties without the autism syndrome. The 15 CARS items 
incorporate Kanner's primary autism features and DSM-IV criteria. It was originally 
designed as a research instrument and is reasonably effective in discriminating autism 
children from children with learning difficulty. 
The questionnaire is a quick screening instrument and has been widely used for 
research purposes. It is particularly useful in screening young children, however, older 
children and HF A children who develop strategies to function within social world 
may be misdiagnosed. 
6.3 Theories of autism 
Evidence from behavioural and neurophysiological data has enabled scientists to 
formulate theories of autism in order to explain this pervasive developmental disorder. 
There are numerous theories formulated which address phenotype, genotype as well 
as atypical neural system in autism population. Four of the theories proposed are 
considered in this section. 
6.3.1 Theory of mind (TOM) 
An individual is said to possess a TOM if they are able to attribute mental states both 
to others and self in order to explain a set of behaviour and predict behaviour 
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(Premack and Woodruff, 1978). False belief tasks have been used to test TOM 
because successful performance in these tasks requires an individual to impute a false 
belief to a mistaken protagonist in order to correctly predict the protagonist's 
behaviour. To succeed in these tasks participants must appreciate that people's actions 
are not determined by the real state of the world, but by their mental representation of 
the world, which mayor may not be accurate. The two most commonly used types of 
false belief task are location change (Wimmer and Pemer; 1983) famously known as 
"Sally-Anne" task and unexpected contents task (Pemer, Leekam and Wimmer, 1987) 
famously known as "Smarties tube" task. The TOM hypothesis of autism states that 
attenuated TOM underlies the social and communication impairments that 
characterises autism and researches initially testing the TOM hypothesis have shown 
that children with autism and to some extent adults with autism are impaired in TOM 
tests (Baron-Cohen, 1989; Frith 2003, Leslie 1987; Happe 1994). Although numerous 
studies claimed that as a population individuals with autism are impaired in TOM and 
it is this that accounts for the social disorder there were a proportion of participants 
with autism who successfully completed the tasks in the presence of severe social 
communication impairment (Happe 1995; Bowler 1992). In order to explain the data 
fully TOM hypothesis has been given other names such as mentalising (Hamilton, 
2009) and other more challenging TOM tasks have been designed such as 'reading 
the mind in the eyes' (Baron-Cohen, wheelwright, Hill, Raste, Plumb, 2001), 'strange 
stories test' (Happe 1994), plaster test (Williams and Happe 2009). 
The core issue with the TOM hypothesis has been that while a proportion of autism 
participants have been impaired in TOM some have successfully completed the task 
as well as controls. Moreover various tasks designed to test TOM have subsequently 
been claimed to be either correlated to language ( Lind and Bowler, 2009; Lewis, 
Murdoch and Woodyatt, 2007), IQ (Frith, Happe and Siddons, 1994) or on logical 
reasoning skills to 'hack out' a solution (Bowler, 1992) in contrast to a more intuitive 
way of responding like typically developing children. Since this research focuses on 
facial expression production and not necessarily on false belief or mentalising the 
TOM approach is of limited relevance hence not been taken any further in this 
research. 
6.3.2 \Veak central coherence theory 
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Frith and Happe, (1994) formulated this theory on the basis of the evidence that 
individuals with autism have enhanced ability to focus on local detail. As a result they 
fail to notice the coherent whole. The idea that people with autism make relatively 
less use of context and pay preferential attention to parts rather than wholes, can go 
some way towards explaining the assets and deficits seen in autism. So for example, 
Shah and Frith, (1983) explored the well established block design task with an autism 
sample and reported superior performance in locating the embedded figures due to the 
advantage in segmenting the original design. Presenting pre-segmented designs to 
typical and learning difficult controls significantly improved their performance and 
removed the advantage of the autism sample. While individuals with autism have the 
embedded figure advantage they lack superior processing of meaningful and patterned 
information over random or meaningless stimuli. For example, typical children are 
able to recall meaningful sentences better than random word strings whereas with 
children with autism, there is no difference in performance. Frith and Happe, (1994) 
reviewed the available evidence and suggested this cognitive style as 'weak central 
coherence' i.e. less influenced by background features and more inclined to attend the 
components, parts or individual features. In case of face processing and FE 
understanding the WCC would posit that in case of autism it is a general perceptual 
deficit that affects both face stimuli and non-face stimuli. 
6.3.3 Social motivation hypothesis 
The notion that children with autism lack social motivation is partly based on the 
DSM-IV (APA, 1994) criteria for autism (Dawson et aI., 2005), which includes "lack 
of spontaneous seeking to share enjoyment, interests or achievements with other 
people" and " lack of social or emotional reciprocity" (DSM-IV, APA, 1994). 
According to this hypothesis, an impairment in social motivation results in reduced 
attention to faces as well as to all other social stimuli such as the human voice, hand 
gestures, gaze following and so on. Dawson et aI., (2002) hypothesised that social 
motivation impairments in autism are related to difficulty in forming representations 
of the reward value of social stimuli. This may be due to abnormalities in (a) the 
reward system per se or (b) neural network that might be important for the perception 
of the social reward. Option (a) involves the dopamine system particularly in the OFC 
which plays an important role in mediating the effects of rewards on social behaviour. 
Both behavioural research and neuroscientists have reported a correlation between the 
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severity In joint attention impainnents and neurocognitive tasks that taps the 
orbitofrontal circuit (Dawson et aI., 2002). 
By the second half of the first year in an infant' s life the anticipated reward va lue of a 
stimulus begins to motivate and direct attention towards the social stimu li. In case of 
autism, reduced attention to faces and other soc ially relevant stimul i from a very 
young age (Osterling and Dawson, 1994), wou ld deprive the socia l brain of the 
needed input for normal development and spec iali sation, resulting in a failure to 
become the 'face expert' or 'expert processor' of face stimuli. This is consistent with 
Nelson , (2001) theory of experience-expectant developmental system, which 
essentially states that experience in a critical period drives cortical speciali sation for 
faces. This would further result in a failure of speciali sation of regions that typically 
mediate face processing and would be reflected in decreased cortical speciali sation 
and abnormal brain circuitry for face processing, including FE processing. 
The socia l motivation hypothesis relates to the development of neural circuits 
underlying face processing (see figure 6.1). It has been emphasised that it is not the 
lack of exposure to face stimuli is the problem; rather the lack of interest due to 
impairment in reward mechanism is the key factor in this hypothesis. 
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Figure 6.1.- schematic diagram oOhe social motivation hypothesis drawing attention 
to the impact of early social disinterest on cortical specialisation. Reproduced from 
Dawson et al.. (2005). 
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The social motivation hypothesis has been the result of numerous research with very 
young children with autism both behavioural as well as neuroscience (Dawson et aI., 
2000; Dawson et aI., 2002). Studies based on home videos suggested that 8-10-
month-old infants failed to orient naturally to social stimuli and one case study was 
reported where an infant was studied from birth to two years of age (Dawson et aI., 
2000). ERP of 3-5-year-olds with autism while viewing familiar and unfamiliar face 
and objects was recorded and compared with age matched control sample (Dawson et 
aI., 2002). Typical children showed significantly larger P400 and Nc for unfamiliar 
face in comparison to a familiar face and to a favourite object in comparison to an 
unfamiliar object. Children with autism did not show a differential in brain response 
to familiar and unfamiliar faces, only objects. These findings led Dawson et aI., 
(2002) to hypothesise that the neural mechanism that draws infant to social stimuli are 
dysfunctional in autism. It was argued that according to Nelson, (2001) and Johnson 
and Morton, (1991) the face processing cortical mechanism comes online from the 
second half of the first year. However, in case of autism, the lack of normal social 
attention leads to impairment in the neural system that comes online in the second half 
of the first year. The authors have suggested that this lack of intentional social 
attention is related to a fundamental difficulty in forming representation of reward 
value of social stimuli. Representations regarding the anticipated reward value begin 
to motivate and direct attention to social stimuli in second half of first year of life. 
Establishing such representations may be challenging for children with autism 
because social reward feedback is less predictable and more variable compared to 
non-social reward feedback e.g. sound response to pushing a button. 
6.3.4 Amygdala theory of autism 
Processing of social information is centrally distributed both in space and time. 
Adolphs, (2001) attempted to represent the stages in processing in the form of a flow 
chart (See figure 6.2) where apparently cognition, emotion and motivation all are 
involved for an individual to finally display social behaviour. The figure shows that 
sequence of events leading from perception of a social stimulus to elicitation of a 
social behaviour. The whole process is complex and involves multiple interacting 
neural structures. The neural circuits responsible for each of the tasks necessary to 
finally have a socially relevant output was also diagrammatically represented by 
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Adolphs, 2001 (See figure 6.3). Thi s is similar to the neural basis of soc ial 
intelligence suggested by Brothers, (1990), which involved the amygdala, orbito-
frontal cortex and superior temporal gyrus. Taking all of this together 'social 
intelligence' was defined as our ability to interpret others' behaviour in terms of 
mental states (thoughts, intentions, desires and beliefs), to interact both in complex 
social groups and in close relationships, to empathise with others and predict how 
others will feel , think and act (Baron-Cohen et aI., 2000). FE processing both 
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Figure 6.2: diagrammatic representation of social cognition process and the neural 
circuits involved for each ofthe tasks involved in social cognition. Reproduced from 
Adolphs, 2001, 
Having defined social intelligence and recognised that individuals with autism are in 
deficit in social intelligence; Baron-Cohen collated neurophysiological data available 
in the literature regarding children with autism's abnormality in the areas specifically 
required for social intelligence. Of the three main areas necessary for social cognition 
and social intelligence to perform optimally is the amygdala, and all impairment of 
the amygdala in the case of autism both anatomically, neurologically and functionally 
was emphasised as follows: 
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1. Post-mortem evidence - neuroanatomical study of autism at post-mortem 
found microscopic pathology, in the form of increased cell density in the 
amygdala (Baron-Cohen, 2000). 
2. Animal model of autism - the only animal model of autism involved ablation 
of amygdala. Bachevalier, (1991, 1994) lesioned either the medial temporal 
lobe or the hippocampal formation and amygdala separately in rhesus 
monkeys. The lesioned animals were raised and paired with age-matched 
control animal. These studies reported that medial temporal lobe lesion infants 
at 2-months of age were more passive, displayed increased temper tantrums 
and initiated fewer social contacts. At 6-months of age they interacted very 
little with the control animal and actively withdrew from all approaches by 
normal animals: The amygdala lesion monkeys showed very similar behaviour 
pattern. There are obviously limits to any animal model of autism, given that 
the syndrome involves higher-order cognition but Bachevalier makes the point 
that the effects of amygdala lesion in monkeys resemble certain symptoms in 
autism 
3. Similarities between autism and patients with amygdala lesion - bilateral 
amygdala damage patients have been noted to display abnormal social 
behaviour in terms of abnormally trustworthy and a general positive bias in 
judging faces. Thus amygdala is not only responsible for judging threat from 
faces but also involved in complex judgements essential for regulating social 
behaviour (Adolphs et aI., 1998). Adolphs et aI., (2001) tested HF A, patients 
with bilateral amygdala damage and controls on facial expression recognition 
tasks as well as social judgement tasks. Although HF A were able to recognise 
facial expressions as well as controls but were similar to amygdala damage 
patients in the social judgment tasks such as trustworthiness of a face. This 
was consistent with the amygdala dysfunction hypothesis which suggests 
disproportionate impairment in the processes that subserve higher-level social 
cognition, with relative sparing of perceptual processing of faces, and of 
recognition of basic emotions (Adolphs et aI., 2001). The data of this study 
was consistent with the idea that individuals with autism are able to form 
normal representations of faces and that they are able to retrieve knowledge 
regarding basic emotions expressed but that they fail to link perception of a 
face to the social judgements. 
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4. Structural neuroimaging - structural MRI have reported a reduced amygdala 
volume in individuals with autism (Baron-Cohen et aI., 2000). 
5. Functional neuroimaging - Baron-Cohen et aI., (1999) tested six HF A on 
gender recognition and mental state labelling tasks while undergoing fMRI in 
order to investigate neural dysfunction in autism. The study reported that the 
areas previously stated responsible for social intelligence were confirmed to be 
so, amygdala, orbito-frontal cortex and STG were involved in facial 
expression processing and making social judgements from eyes. From the 
behavioural data it was clear that control sample was significantly better both 
in gender recognition and mental state labelling task. Left amygdala was found 
to be critically involved in identifying emotional information from complex 
visual stimuli e.g. eyes in case of controls. The autism group did not perform 
the tasks using the amygdala like the controls; instead a greater processing 
load was put on temporal lobe structures such as the STG for processing 
mental state from facial stimuli where only eyes were visible. The conclusion 
drawn by Baron-Cohen et aI., (1999) was that autism population even the HF A 
perhaps solve the facial expression tasks using language and facial memory 
seats in the brain in compensation for amygdala abnormality. 
Baron-Cohen et aI., (2000) thus proposed that amygdala was an area that was 
abnormal in individuals with autism leading to atypical social behaviour and impaired 
social intelligence and presented the 'amygdala theory of autism'. The amygdala 
theory claims that individuals with autism have deficit in normal amygdala function; 
as well as the fact that amygdala fails to modulate other brain areas when viewing 
emotional stimuli. The theory also argued the idea that individuals with autism have 
alternative strategies for processing facial information essentially signifying a pattern 
of activity in autism brain that is both deficient and different. 
6.4 Face processing 
The diagnosis criteria as well as the theories of autism clearly indicate that individuals 
with autism are impaired in processing social stimuli. This specifically impacts face 
processing and FE processing. Individuals with autism have difficulty in social 
interaction denoting deficits in eye contact, gaze direction, joint attention, engaging in 
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reciprocal interactions, reading others faces and inferring mental states and 
responding to emotional cues of others (Frith, 2003; Klin, Jones, Shultz, Volkmar and 
Cohen, 2002). Since autism is not diagnosed in most cases before 3 years of age 
(lCD-10, WHO, 1994; Filipek et aI., 1999) it is very difficult for researchers to 
investigate the developmental path from infancy with respect to atypical face 
processing in autism. However, in a retrospective study, Osterling and Dawson, 
(1994) used videotapes of first birthday parties of individuals later diagnosed with 
autism, and reported basic impairments in social interaction such as lack of attention 
to others, failure of meaningful pointing, lack of gaze direction and no orientation to 
name. Dawson et aI., (2004) investigated social attention impairments in 3-4-year-
olds with autism. Social attention, which was coined to mean social orienting, joint 
attention and reaction to others' distress, was significantly impaired in 3-4-year-olds 
with autism in comparison to typically developing children (TD). Although a 
toddler's ability to use facial information such as gaze monitoring during joint 
attention is considered to be one of the critical discriminatory factor in early diagnosis 
of this disorder (Dawson et aI., 2005) the current edition of DSM does not list 
abnormal face processing as a defining feature of disorder (Sasson, 2006). 
Langdell (1978), in the seminal work on face processing reported the impairment in 
children with autism. In this study 9-14-year-olds matched to typically developing 
children of same chronological age and IQ were asked to recognise their peers from 
upright photographs. There was no group difference reported in this task. The next 
task was to recognise ones own peers from parts of faces presented, where by children 
with autism from both age groups were significantly better at recognising faces from 
the mouth region presented in isolation. In contrast, control sample found FR of peers 
easier from eye region alone. This study showed that while children with autism are 
able to recognise a familiar face without difficulty the strategy used is very different 
to TD and in general the information from the eye region is not used by individuals 
with autism. 
In general it has been established that individuals with autism tend to focus on parts 
and have difficulty in deriving global information about the stimuli. For example, 
individuals with autism fail to take the entire visual context into account (Happe, 
1996; Ropar and Mitchell, 1999); fail to perceive geometric figures which requires 
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integration of parts (Mottron and Belleville, 1993); show enhanced ability to detect 
local targets in visual search task (Plaisted, O'Riordan, Baron-Cohen, 1998) and have 
been reported to have superior ability in detecting embedded figures (Happe, 1999). 
Theories have been formulated based on these findings such as weak central 
coherence theory (Frith and Happe, 1994) which will be discussed later on in the 
chapter. 
As regards face memory in autism the general perception is that by middle childhood, 
children with autism are worse than a mental age and chronological age matched 
sample on a number of face processing tasks. This includes a face discrimination task 
(Tantam, Monogham, Nicholson and Stirling, 1989) and FR tasks (Boucher and 
Lewis, 1992). Tantam et aI., (1989) compared children with autism and learning 
difficulty with controls matched on chronological age and nonverbal mental age on a 
test of finding odd face out from a set of photos of faces. The performance of the 
autism sample was not as good as the controls. Boucher and Lewis, (1992) assessed 
children with autism and learning difficulty and matched controls for FR. The authors 
reported that FR for unfamiliar face in autism sample was impaired in comparison to 
sample match on verbal ability and sample matched on nonverbal ability. A control 
task of building recognition was also administered to all the participants and there was 
no group difference in accuracy performance on the building matching task. This 
impairment continues into adulthood where adults with autism have been reported to 
be worse than age and IQ matched samp1es. 
Hobson, Ouston and Lee, (1988) extended on this study, and presented adults with 
autism, in the test phase faces which were either full face or partially obscured. The 
task was face recognition based on identity or emotion. In the case of full FR, 
participants were as good as the controls, both in emotion and identity tasks. 
However, when partially obscured faces were to be recognised, participants with 
autism were better than the control sample when only the mouth was blanked. On the 
surface, this contradicts Langdell, (1978) findings to a limited extent, where it was 
reported that children with autism use information from mouth region more than TO. 
However, on closer inspection of the data presented it is apparent that, one, the 
participants in Hobson et aI., (1988) study were adults and two, the performance of 
FR is only better for identity task. This advantage disappears for the emotion 
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recognition task, where the individuals with autism were worse than controls when 
information from the mouth region was not available. The authors concluded that "if 
in the case of autism, we ask: what's in a face? We can reply that autistic individuals 
probably recognise something about another person's identity, but doubt if the autistic 
individuals fully grasp the feelings that a person's face may express" (Hobson et aI., 
1988). This study highlighted that although children with autism may be impaired in 
FR; adults with autism quite often develop strategies such that in an FR behavioural 
task there may not be a significant difference in performance. Similar results were 
also reported by Tantam, Monogham, Nicholson and Stirling, (1989). A parsimonious 
conclusion that can be drawn is that individuals with autism may differentially attend 
to different facial features in comparison to typical population (Sasson, 2006), thus 
leading to significantly different performance on finer aspects of face processing. 
It is apparent that adults as well as children with autism are impaired in face 
processing especially when it is an unfamiliar face. Moreover, the strategy used to 
process faces by individuals with autism has been demonstrated to be atypical where 
the focus has been on the mouth region rather than the eyes as in TD. This may 
perhaps link somewhat to the lack of joint attention and impairment in gaze following 
and gaze direction in early childhood, if the focus is not on the eye region then one 
cannot be expected to have the ability to process information from this region. 
As discussed in chapter 1, humans are considered as face experts because they process 
face stimuli faster and more efficiently than other physical objects such as houses, 
cars etc. One of the main reasons for such expertise is because faces are processed 
holistically; the individual features are glued together and seen as a whole gestalt 
rather than processing individual features (Galton, 1879; Tanaka and Farah, 1993). 
Configural processing on the other hand means perceiving the distance between the 
features accurately (Mondloch et aI., 2002). Evidence is presented here on how 
individuals with autism, adults as well as children, fare on the FR tasks investigating 
both holistic and configural processing. 
6.4.1 Whole-part face effect 
With a backdrop of general impairment in face processing and atypical strategy being 
used by individuals with autism Joseph and Tanaka, (2003) used the whole-part 
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paradigm to investigate if children with autism are impaired in holistic face 
processing. Twenty two children aged 8 to 14 and diagnosed with autism were 
matched to non-autism sample on full scale IQ and tested on the whole-part face 
paradigm with upright faces. The idea was if children with autism process faces 
holistically, they will show a whole-face test advantage i.e. when face parts are 
presented in context of the original face, accuracy will be higher. Children with 
autism did demonstrate holistic processing i.e. a whole-face advantage only when the 
mouth was presented in context. In fact, for the mouth area, stimuli accuracy was 
even higher than control sample. On the other hand, when recognition had to be based 
on eyes, performance was very poor, worse than that of the control group. This was 
consistent with Langdell, (1978), once again emphasising atypical faces processing in 
individuals with autism at the very least; and highlighting that holistic processing is 
not very effective. 
6.4.2 Inner outer face effect 
A more comprehensive paradigm to assess holistic face processing is investigating 
face identification ability using either inner part of the face or outer part of the face. 
The inner outer research in TD as well as children with autism will be reviewed in 
chapter 7. 
6.4.3 Inversion effect 
Typically developing children are slower at FR if the faces are presented as inverted 
faces (Yin, 1969). Children with autism on the other hand, are better at recognising 
inverted faces compared to control sample. Hobson et al., (1988) presented adults 
with autism, identity recognition tasks where in the test phase stimuli were inverted 
faces. Participants with autism were significantly better than the control sample in 
both identity and emotion recognition from inverted faces. Whatever the 
psychological processes underlying 'inverted face recognition, it was concluded that 
autism population employ processes or strategies that were different either in kind or 
in efficiency than the control sample (Hobson et al., 1988) enabling them to process 
inverted faces more accurately than controls. Lack of inversion effect in adults with 
autism was concluded to signify that they perhaps continue to use featural face 
processing as adults and the qualitative shift to configural processing does not occur, 
because inversion disrupts configural and not featural face processing (Sasson, 2006); 
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suggesting that the visual expertise for faces does not fully develop in individuals 
with autism. It should be pointed out here that Hobson et al., (1988) subsequently 
matched autism sample with controls on a one to one basis both for chronological age, 
verbal and non-verbal mental age and the significant difference disappeared. This 
signifies that adu lts with autism were susceptible to inversion albeit not to the same 
degree as the controls, when the matching was more even. The lack of susceptibi lity 
to inverted faces has been reported in other studies as well (Boucher and Lewis, 1992; 
Davies, Bishop, Manstead and Tantum, 1994). A prudent conclusion can be that 
perhaps autism population is not as effective in processing faces configurall y as 
control sample. 
6.4.4 Configural face processing 
Rondan and Deruelle, (2007) presented adults with autism and control sample a 
schematic face in conjunction with two other patterns: its local and configura l match, 
local choice differed in interspatial distance but had exactly the same elements as the 
main face and the configural match differed in local elements but had the same 
interspatial distance. 
.,..-..... .;,- , 
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Figure 6.3: schematic face stimuli varying in either local features (face on the right) 
or configura! information (face on the left) presented in 'same different' task. 
Reproduced from Rondan and Deruelle (2006). 
The autism sample were significantly different to controls in that they had a local bias 
i.e. when asked to chose same face as shown previously they were focussing on local 
features and choosing faces that matched for local features (See Figure 6.3). This 
study confirmed that adults with autism continue to be deficient in configural 
processing unlike typical individuals, who develop visual expertise in face processing 
which essentially means sensitivity to configuration from adolescent years. 
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Behrmann et aI., (2006) recorded accuracy as well as reaction time in a configural 
processing task for adults with autism and matched controls. The authors noted that 
although there was no significant group difference in accuracy performance there was 
a significant group difference for reaction time, autism population being slower at 
processing faces for gender as well as identity. More specifically there was 
interaction, underscoring the configural processing deficiency, autism sample were 
slower in identity task in comparison to the gender discrimination task. This illustrates 
clearly that an individual with autism may not be impaired completely in face 
processing as stated previously, but it is a case of more a subtle impairment, specific 
deficiency in configural processing leading to perhaps an inability to process the most 
salient social stimuli 'the face'. 
Face processing impairment which has been observed in first years of life (Osterling 
and Dawson, 1994) although seems to recover to some extent enabling autism 
individuals to process faces at a simplistic level; this ability never reaches the visual 
expertise level for face processing as in typical adults. 
Klin et aI., (1999) reported one of the very few researches which used a standardised 
FR assessment which is part of a battery of intellectual assessment the Kaufman 
Assessment of Battery for Children. 102 children with autism who were matched on 
chronological age and non-verbal mental age were administered the aforementioned 
test. The study reported pronounced deficits in FR for children with autism compared 
to control sample. The authors concluded that children with autism have FR deficits 
that cannot be attributed to overall cognitive abilities or task demands. This was one 
of the seminal studies which tested such a big sample size with a standardised FR task 
and compared the data with matched sample. Having controlled task demands and 
group difference the face recognition still differed, enabling researchers within the 
field to come to the conclusion that individuals with autism have face processing 
deficit. 
In general the eye tracking studies supported the above claim. Pelphrey et aI., (2002) 
used eye tracking to investigate the visual scanpaths of high-functioning autism 
(HF A) adults while they were viewing faces. The participants spent significantly more 
time viewing external areas of the face and significantly less time viewing inner face. 
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This was consistent with previous research highlighting that individuals with autism 
pay less attention to faces and specifically eyes. This was conclusive evidence of the 
aberrant processing strategy used by individuals with autism when viewing faces. 
Klin et aI., (2002) applied the eye tracking method to a social situation and examined 
the scanning behaviour in adolescents with autism. HF A were asked to watch a video 
clip of high emotion content while eye tracking was used to investigate visual 
scanpaths. The control group fixated on the eye region 2 times more than the autism 
group. The autism group in contrast fixated more on the mouth region and on the 
objects in the frame than on faces. 
6.5 Facial expression 
Kanner (1943) described one five year old as having "no affective tie to people" and 
the main point driven home was the profound lack of affective contact with other 
people with the striking feature of general inattentiveness to faces. Kanner concluded 
that autistic individuals appear to have "come into the world with innate inability to 
form the usual, biologically provided affective contact with people" (Kanner. 1943). 
One of the hallmark features of autism is a significant qualitative impairment in social 
interaction (DSM-IV, APA, 1994). There was an assumption in the original reporting 
of autism that facial expressions in specific and emotion in general are something 
innate in humans i.e. genetic predisposition. On the other hand, evolutionary 
psychologists have claimed that social cognition is something that has evolved in 
creatures that live in groups. Research in FE as stated in the previous chapter has 
taken both of these angles for investigation, continuing the debate of nature and 
nurture very strongly. Autism being a social disorder has benefited somewhat from 
this because research in FEs, emotion and social cognition both behaviourally and 
neurologically has tended to focus on autism population. 
We first look at behavioural data highlighting the impairment in FE processing and 
finally the neural basis for this impairment, linking it with possible theories for autism 
and impairment in FE and emotion processing. 
Autism is a neurodevelopmental disorder strongly characterised by deficits in social 
interaction that persists in people with autism who have IQ in the normal range 
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(Baron-Cohen, 1997). Impairment in FR in the case of autism has been well 
established in the previous section. Persons with autism particularly those with higher 
ability have been reported to better in labelling and identifying emotions (Oznoff, 
Pennington, Rogers, 1990), and performance for simple FEs such as happy and sad is 
better (Baron-Cohen, 1991) than complex emotions such as surprise. Spezio et aI., 
(2007) tested high functioning adults with autism for FE recognition task using 
Ekman faces for all six expressions. HF A adults were no different in accuracy than 
the matched sample in judgement of basic FEs. This finding was different from those 
reported earlier and numerous reasons for this were given by the authors. Firstly, the 
sample used was HF A adults which may mean that by adulthood at least the HF A 
develop strategies albeit different to accurately recognise FE. Secondly, the matched 
sample was matched both for IQ and chronological age and this perhaps dissipated 
any difference. 
Hobson, (1986) filmed himself whilst enacting happy, angry, unhappy and fear 
expressions. Children with autism and control sample matched for chronological age 
and non-verbal intelligence were asked to match the vocalisations and gestures to 
appropriate FE. Children with autism were reported to be significantly worse in this 
matching task highlighting the deficit in FE processing. Similarly, Loveland et aI., 
(1995) also reported that autism sample were significantly worse than 
developmentally delayed matched sample in matching vocalisation with 
corresponding FE displayed on video. 
Weeks and Hobson, (1987) tested 15-year-old children with autism and controls 
matched for verbal and non-verbal IQ with a FE sorting task. Participants were asked 
to sort faces by posting in one of the two boxes. Individuals with autism sorted faces 
on the basis of paraphernalia (hats) they were sporting and not on the basis of FEs. 
They failed to implicitly notice difference in FE while sorting and tended to focus on 
a feature such as the hat. Even when explicit instruction was given to sort according to 
FEs they failed to notice the difference in expressions. Consequently, it was 
concluded that the autism sample failed to process FEs both implicitly and explicitly 
and tended to focus on feature based processing and missing out on subtle information 
available in the face. 
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Celani et aI., (1999) tested children with autism and a control sample for matching FE 
task as well as sorting by preference task. Participants were first presented with happy 
or sad faces and then presented with three faces (one of them same as the previous 
face) and the task was to pick the same face as seen before. The sorting by preference 
task meant that participant was presented with neutral and happy face and they have 
to choose the face they prefer. The autism sample was significantly worse in matching 
FE of happy and sad. In the sorting by preference task, matched sample participants 
preferred happy faces whereas the autism sample did not prefer happy over neutral 
faces. The conclusion drawn was that individuals with autism have a specific 
difficulty whereby they fail to recognise happy and sad faces and do not prefer a 
happy face over neutral face, like the typical population. It should be pointed out that 
in this study only individuals with severe autism were selected to take part in order to 
make sure that the autism sample definitely had the disorder. This may have resulted 
in autism sample failing to match basic expressions such as happy and sad because 
Gepner et aI., (200 I) demonstrated that children with autism as young as 5-6-year-
olds can recognise happy, surprise, sad and disgust. On the other hand, Riby, Doherty-
sneddon and Bruce, (2008) tested children with autism and matched controls with FE 
recognition and matching tasks. Children with autism were significantly less accurate 
than matched controls in happy, sad, angry and surprise FE recognition. In 
conclusion, the FE recognition research in children with autism has produced mixed 
results. In the same light Gepner, de Gelder, and de Schonen (1996) tested 
participants with autism with a battery of FR and FE discrimination task and reported 
that individuals with autism were impaired in various face processing tasks but not to 
the same extent. Participants were most impaired in FE processing compared to other 
aspects such as identity recognition, gaze detection and facial speech discrimination 
task. 
Spezio et aI., (2007) used a novel paradigm to investigate FE processing ability, i.e. 
the 'bubbles method'. In this method a face is revealed gradually and random areas 
are revealed in order to make emotion judgments of a face. Participants were shown 
happy and fear faces and the task was to decide the expression of the face. Faces were 
masked and different areas were revealed till finally a judgement was made. HF A 
adults were no different to the matched sample in accuracy or reaction time; however 
the difference was in the specific face area used to make such judgements. Controls 
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relied more on information from the eyes to decide if the face was happy or fearful 
whereas HF A adults relied more on information from the mouth region. This 
confirmed a previous finding reported by Klin et aI., (2002), which concluded that 
when viewing naturalistic social situations, individuals with autism demonstrate an 
abnormal pattern of fixation and pay less attention to eyes and more focussed 
attention to mouth, body and objects. 
In a more recent research reported by Boraston, Corden, Miles, Skuse and Blakemore 
(2008) gaze behaviour was investigated using an eye tracking method. Participants 
viewed genuine or posed smiles and were asked to discriminate between the two. At 
the same time gaze behaviour was recorded using eye tracking equipment. Individuals 
with autism were impaired in the discrimination of posed from genuine smile and the 
pattern of eye gaze in the autism group was such that they were looking significantly 
less at the eye region compared to controls. 
6.6 Evidence from neuroscience for face processing and FE 
processing 
The system that sub serves face processmg includes but IS not limited to the 
following: 
1. Lateral fusiform gyrus (FF A), important for structural encoding of faces and 
rapid FR (Kanwisher et aI., 1997). 
2. Superior temporal sulcus (STS), implicated in processing dynamic changes 
hence especially involved in processing mouth and eye region (Pelphrey and 
Carter, 2007). 
3. Amygdala, important for analysis of FEs, perception of fear stimulus and 
general discrimination between various FEs (Baron-Cohen et aI., 1999; 
Adolphs, 2001; Blair et aI., 1999; Morris et aI., 1998; Vuilleumier et aI., 
2001). 
4. OFC, involved in processing the reward value of social stimulus (Dawson et 
aI., 2005) as well as modulating feedback to subcortical structures (Adolphs, 
2001) and along medial frontal cortex recalling the stored memory on facial 
expressions and emotion meaning. 
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5. Anterior cingulate gyrus and insula, involved in processing disgust (Phillips, 
Young, Senior, Brammer, Andrew, Calder, 1997). 
6.6.1 Evidence of atypical neural system for face processing in adults with autism 
NI70 has been established as a temporal marker signifying early face processing with 
a distinct pattern of electrical brain activity. This component slopes negatively in 
adults, peaks at approximately 170 msec after stimulus onset over posterior temporal 
lobe. It is faster for faces and eyes alone and larger amplitude for inverted faces. In 
the first published report of N170 in adolescents and adults with autism McPartland et 
aI., (2004) discovered an altered NI70 pattern. HFA exhibited slower NI70 to faces in 
comparison to furniture and failed to show a face inversion effect. In addition the 
speed of processing was slower correlating to the behavioural performance of FR. 
This study provided evidence of disruption in early structural encoding of faces 
characterised by slower speed of processing. In addition, there was evidence at least 
in some participants that the right hemisphere specialisation did not exist in case of 
autism sample. Therefore, it can be concluded that in autism the cortical circuit 
corresponding to N170 is functionally different to TD. The presence of atypical 
cortical representation led to the conclusion that it is not only a temporal difference in 
face processing with autism sample rather an aberrant neural circuit resulting in less 
efficient processing strategies. 
FE recognition has been demonstrated to be very early: 80 to 110 msec after stimulus 
onset at midline occipital cortex followed by fusiform gyrus activation at 160 msec 
(Halgren et aI., 2000). Several fMRI studies have shown that adolescents and adults 
with autism have reduced levels of activity in FFA to images of human faces 
(Critchley et aI., 2000; Shultz et aI., 2000). Shultz et aI., (2000) tested 14 HFA and 
Asperger syndrome adults and matched sample with FR task while recording brain 
images. The study reported significant hypoactivation of the FF A area compared to 
the control sample, when the participants were doing FR task but the brain areas for 
object discrimination were activated to the same level as controls for object 
discrimination task. Critchley et aI., (2000) demonstrated the effect in a group of 9 
adult males with diagnosis of autism or Aspergers, using a active face perception task 
requiring the participants to categorise faces as expressive or not, replicating the 
hypoactivation. 
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Shultz et aI., (2005) linked the hypoactivation of FFA with the Nelson, (2001) 
development of face recognition 'experience-expectant' theory and concluded that 
experience in a critical period is essential for the cortical structures to develop and 
acquire the expertise. As children with autism do not naturally orient to faces they fail 
to develop the cortical plasticity and hence lack of expertise. Consequently FF A 
hypoactivation is a result of autism and not a cause of autism. 
The STS region has a differential activation to gaze direction, direct and indirect gaze 
has a differential pattern of activation as does congruent and incongruent gaze 
direction (Pelphrey and Carter, 2007). However, in case of the autism population, this 
differential activation does not happen. The STS region also has been reported to be 
over activated when perceiving facial expressions which are atypical as amygdala and 
OFC are predominantly responsible for emotion processing (Baron-Cohen et aI., 
1999). The STS activation pattern in the case of autism demonstrates aberrant 
strategies executed by the autism population when processing face stimuli. STS 
region is used instead of the social brain areas and perhaps as a result it fails to 
process the subtle dynamic changes in faces. 
Baron-Cohen et aI., (1999) reported a fMRI study with HFA adults investigating the 
neural circuits for social cognition, essentially using numerous FEs where only the 
eye region information was available to participants. The task was to label the mental 
state from eyes using the famous 'mind in the eye task' while a brain image was being 
acquired. The areas of STG, amygdala and the prefrontal cortex were recorded and 
used in analysis. The left amygdala was found to be critically involved in identifying 
emotional information from complex visual stimuli e.g. eyes in case of control 
sample. But the autism group did not perform the tasks using the amygdala like the 
controls; instead a greater processing load was put on temporal lobe structures such as 
the STG for processing mental state from facial stimuli where only eyes were visible. 
The prefrontal cortex was less active in the autism sample but this difference was not 
significant. The conclusion drawn by Baron-Cohen et aI., (1999) was that in the 
autism population even the HF A perhaps solve the FE tasks using language and facial 
memory seats in the brain, in compensation for amygdala abnormality. 
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Ashwin et al., (2007) reported a fMRI study investigating neural activity in various 
social brain areas in adults with autism during perception of fear, anger, disgust, 
surprise and sad FEs. Control sample showed significantly more activation in the left 
amygdala and left OFC compared to the autism sample; modulated activity in other 
areas of social brain processing emotional stimuli was observed in the control sample, 
not present in the autism sample. These findings were in line with previous data 
available confirming dysfunctional activity in social brain areas in case of autism. 
These findings were also consistent with data from patients with amygdala damage. In 
individuals with autism amygdala also failed to modulate activity in other relevant 
social brain areas during perception of various emotional expressions. 
Pelphrey et aI., (2007) investigated the effect of dynamic FEs on the brain activity in 
HF A adults. Participants viewed dynamic fear, anger and neutral FEs while 
undergoing fMRI. The activation of amygdala was exactly the same as previously 
reported by Critchley et aI., (2000); Baron-Cohen et al., (1999) and Ashwin et aI., 
(2006); left amygdala hypoactivation and no modulation. The dynamic FEs did not 
change this result. The FF A and STS region showed a lack of modulation to FE and 
dynamic nature of stimuli. Overall, this study demonstrated very well that the social 
brain areas are dysfunctional in autism and the nature of the face stimuli, whether 
static or dynamic, did not change such conclusion. 
6.6.2 Evidence of atypical neural svstem for face processing in children with 
autism 
In typical developing individuals, N170 undergoes a prolonged period of development 
and a precursor to adult N170 has been identified in children (de Haan and Nelson, 
1996) which does not have a negative deflection and has longer latency peaking at 
anywhere between 270 msec to 400 msec after stimulus onset. Webb et aI., (2003) 
and Webb et al., (2005) investigated the equivalent of N170 component in children 
with autism aged 3 to 6 and compared them to matched controls. Unlike TD, children 
with autism showed larger amplitude to objects compared to faces and had shorter 
latency for objects compared to faces. Thus, it appeared that early on, in individuals 
with autism the speed advantage for face processing is pot present for faces, as in TD. 
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Dawson et aI., (2002) investigated ERP of familiar and unfamiliar faces versus 
familiar and unfamiliar objects in 3-6-year-olds with autism and age matched 
controls. TD showed differential ERPs to unfamiliar and familiar faces at P400 and 
frontal Nc component. Children with autism failed to show differential ERPs to 
familiar versus unfamiliar faces at either component but did show differential ERPs to 
familiar and unfamiliar toys at both the component i.e. P400 and Nc. This was taken 
as evidence that there is a specific impairment in face representation in autism and 
this data was later used to formulate a hypothesis for autism and social disorder, 
namely the social motivation hypothesis. This finding was confirmed by Webb et aI., 
(2006) with a bigger sample size of 63 children with autism and similar size matched 
controls, where the finding was exactly the same; atypical scalp topography and faster 
latency for toys. Thus, children with autism as young as 6-year-olds have defiant 
processing strategy where by the FF A and STS region are not used for face processing 
tasks resulting in lack of expertise and speed. 
Nelson and de Haan, (1996) reported a negative central component (Nc) in response 
to fear faces compared to happy faces establishing that typically developing infants as 
young as 7-month-olds have specialised cortical pathways responding differently to 
different FEs. So, typically developing infants have specialised neural pathways for 
processing FE which develops all through the adolescent years. However, in case of 
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autism firstly the cortical specialisation does not follow the same pattern and secondly 
never reaches the expertise level. 
Dawson et aI., (2004) showed 3-4-year-olds with autism and matched controls a face 
with fear and neutral expression while recording ERP. N300 was recorded and 
reported which is the same as adult N170; a negative peak after 300 msec of stimuli 
onset in the posterior scalp area especially for right hemisphere. The 300 msec 
sharpens to 170 msec by the age of 5 in typical children. Children with autism had 
significantly slower brain response to fear (N300) compared to typical sample. They 
also failed to show differential ERP as shown by typical sample. Furthermore, the 
scalp topography for fear faces was aberrant in case of children with autism. The 
latency signified the speed of processing fear faces being compromised and abnormal 
topography signified lack of cortical specialisation and atypical recruitment of cortical 
areas. 
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While cognitive neuroscientists have generated a wealth of information regarding the 
brain regions involved in social cognition and perception, very little work has been 
done to evaluate the development in children perhaps due to the constraint of testing 
and hence clear developmental pathway as regards the deficits are still to be explored. 
6.7 Theories of autism accounting the FR and FE impairment in 
autism 
In order to explain the various features of the disorder, a number of theories have been 
proposed and supported with data to demonstrate the atypical nature of autism. Since 
this thesis is investigating FR and FE production it has led me to look closely at the 
theories that explain the face processing and FE processing deficits. To that end, I will 
consider a theory that has predominantly taken the behavioural data into account and 
formulated the social motivation hypothesis and a theory that has taken neuroscience 
data into account and formulated the amygdala theory of autism. General theories 
which encompass all deficiency in autism such as the weak central coherence (WCC) 
has also been used occasionally to explain the specific impairment more in FR. 
6.7.1 \Veak central coherence 
One possible explanation for why persons with autism have difficulty in processing 
facial information is that they experience a fundamental deficit in perceiving features 
of objects and persons and forming coherent and meaningful wholes. As explained 
earlier this has been referred to as weak central coherence theory (Frith and Happe, 
1994). For face and FE processing it would claim that there is less inclination to 
perceive faces as meaningful wholes. Persons with autism have been shown by 
behavioural research to attend to specific regions or features of the face for 
information i.e. focus on the mouth region, lack of gaze perception, avoid processing 
eyes etc. However, there are numerous studies that have demonstrated that individuals 
with autism perform at a level similar to typical individuals and those studies would 
counter the wee argument. 
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6.7.2 Social motivation hypothesis 
The lack of perceived reward from face stimuli might ultimately result in a lack of 
attention to social stimuli, including faces and facial expressions, thereby creating a 
deprivation of normal learning experiences with faces. The amygdala is essential in 
assessing and judging emotional valence of a stimuli and because children with 
autism have dysfunctional amygdala they fail to develop emotional meaning memory, 
which then is not accessible when reward feedback is needed, further impairing the 
reward mechanism. Thus the social motivation theory highlights impairment of the 
amygdala and orbito-frontal cortex and the impact one impairment has on another. 
Dawson et aI., (2002) formulated the social motivation hypothesis based on the 
observation from the infant studies (Dawson et aI., 2000; Osterling and Dawson, 
1994) which clearly emphasised the lack of interest in social stimuli in children with 
autism. It is interesting that instead of concluding that a lack of interest in social 
stimuli leads to impairment in learning of reward value the theory goes beyond 
behavioural data and claims that it is actually the dysfunctional reward value which 
causes the disinterest in the face and not the other way round. This assumes more a 
neurophysiological and genetic impairment and the disinterest in face and social 
world is the result of autism not the cause. 
6.7.3 The amygdala theory of autism 
Ashwin et aI., (2007) tested if adults with autism have differential pattern of neural 
activity in various social brain areas compared to typical adults. Participants were 
presented with fear, anger, disgust, surprise and sadness facial expression while 
undergoing fMRI and the results confirmed that autism involves an atypical pattern of 
activation within social brain during the processing of facial expressions of emotion. 
These differences were less activation in left amygdala, left orbitofrontal cortex and a 
lack of modulated activity in all the areas implicated with social intelligence. For 
instance when typical adults viewed fear faces activation in left amygdala was 
significantly more than for other faces but not in autism sample. This was concluded 
to reflect either a deficit in the ability to label social stimuli as emotionally significant 
or in the ability to use and integrate emotional information. Autism sample also 
showed significantly more activity in STS and anterior cingulate cortex. It should be 
noted here that it is not exclusively amygdala that has a hypoactivation in individuals 
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with autism. Other brain regions that have been highly implicated in social 
intelligence such as the orbito-frontal cortex, STS, anterior cingulate cortex all show 
atypical activation in the autism sample. The OFC follows the same pattern as 
amygdala i.e. hypoactivity (Baron-Cohen et aI., 1999) but the STS and anterior 
cingulate cortex has a pattern of over activity (Baron-Cohen et aI., 1999; Ashwin et 
aI., 2007). However, these areas were not singled out as the primary cause of autism 
or a primary cause of deficit in face and FE processing. 
Unlike the social motivation hypothesis which considers the abnormality of both 
amygdala and OFC; the amygdala theory considers abnormality of amygdala 
exclusively and fails to present a more inclusive theory. 
6.8 Limitations in research for face processing in autism 
Although comparisons are made between all the studies conducted in this area to 
come to the common conclusion that there is deficits in face processing mechanism in 
autism we need to bear in mind that the diagnosis of the sample of autism used has 
been varied; the sample of autism population is very heterogeneous. The matched 
sampling has been very varied. Some researchers matched according to mental age 
others according to verbal or nonverbal or chronological age. Sometimes the 
chronological age of the match is much lower than the autism population because the 
sample has been matched for IQ. This does not seem to be a fair comparison 
especially when the research topic is faces as experience is one of major factors 
impacting FR results. Recent studies have taken on board that experience does have 
an impact on social cognition and hence in recent studies autism sample has been 
matched for both chronological age and IQ. However, once again this IQ and CA 
match is based on group means. 
FEs used as stimuli have also been very varied. Some are very schematic and lose real 
life relevance; some are close to real life but lose experimental validity. Paradigms 
used have also been very varied. The innovative FE production paradigm used in this 
research will be discussed elsewhere in the thesis but the participants included in this 
research and selection and exclusion criteria are considered next. 
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6.9 Participants 
This section describes participants who took part in the inner outer study as well as 
the FE production study, the selection and the exclusion criteria for participants in the 
different groups, the parameters used for matching the control samples and any 
limitations of the selected sample. 
The ethics committee of Sheffield University, Psychology department and NHS trust 
of South Yorkshire approved all the studies in this thesis. Parents and schools were 
provided with written information covering the aims of the studies and explained the 
participant's tasks. Parents were required to give written consent for the child to 
participate in the study. 
Researches in the field of autism have recruited only male participants. But both the 
studies reported in this thesis have recruited both males and females, in no definite 
proportion because this study is not investigating gender difference and primarily 
because of the constraints of recruiting individuals with autism. as participants, 
recruitment was not limited to males only. 
6.10 Recruitment 
6.10.1 HFA group 
Participants were recruited from numerous sources, including the volunteers from 
secondary schools in Nottingham and Sheffield, the National Autistic Society website 
and support groups for parents. 
Information leaflet specified that the study was funded by research council, University 
of Sheffield and Nottingham. It also described the aims of the study, actual tasks 
involved and the time commitment required from the participants. An active consent 
was sought for participating and permission for videoing each participant was also 
sought. Information regarding the complaints procedure if the participant or the 
family was unhappy was provided along with named contact. HF A participants were 
tested either at school or at their home individually. 
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6.10.2 Matched controls 
The matched control was recruited through mainstream secondary schools. 
Information was sent to school to pass it to parents providing them with exactly the 
same information as HF A participants. 
6.10.3 Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
To be included in the HF A group, participants had to have a diagnosis of Childhood 
autism or high functioning autism (HFA) by a clinician using ICD-IO (WHO, 1994) 
criteria. In addition 7 out of the 15 children with autism who participated were 
administered ADI-R (Lord et aI. 1994), a semi-structured interview with the mother. 
All the participants scored above the cut off point in social interaction algorithm, 
communication algorithm, repetitive behaviour algorithm and exhibited atypical 
behaviour in at least one of the three areas by the age of 36 months in the parents' 
judgements. This was both one of the characteristics of this thesis as well as a 
limitation. The ADI-R training was acquired during the course of this research hence 
administering the ADI-R to individuals was definitely very useful in building personal 
skills both in clinical and research diagnosis. Due to time constraints the ADI-R could 
not be administered to all the participants and I had to rely on the diagnosis of the 
clinicians to a certain extent. However, Charman, (2006) stated that an experienced 
clinician's diagnosis is the most reliable method of diagnosing autism; bearing this in 
mind it was decided on balance to rely on the clinician's diagnosis for rest of the 
participants. 
CARS was administered as a screening for autism questionnaire. Teachers or parents 
filled up the questionnaire independently and in their own time. CARS classified all 
HFA participants as 'mildly or moderately autistic' and participants in the MC groups 
as 'non-autistic'. It should be noted that these participants were 9-15 years old in 
mainstream education who have developed strategies for social functioning and 
interaction as a rule based system. CARS fails to pick up the subtle differences in 
communication and interaction as ADI-R does. 
Facial expression recognition is dependent on verbal ability (Gross and Ballif, 1991) 
and in the facial expression production experiment labelling each emotion and certain 
level of comprehension was required. Taking this into account a second inclusion 
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criterion was set to include participants with full scale IQ of above 70 (i.e. two 
standard deviations below average). Setting such an IQ threshold is one of the 
limitations of the study as it does not represent the wide spectrum of autism 
population. 
Children with autism often get support in social and emotional skills development at 
school. Taking part in such skill development activity or belonging to any support 
group was not set as an exclusion criterion. 
Both autism sample and matched control sample had exclusion criteria of diagnosis of 
mental illness, neurological difficulty, ADHD, dyslexia, reading difficulty and needed 
to have an IQ of above 70. No actual medical records were seen but verbal 
information provided by teachers and parents were relied on as far as other diagnoses 
were concerned. 
Also children with diagnosis of Asperger syndrome were excluded because the 
diagnostic criteria for both are different according to ICD-I0 (World Health 
Organisation, 1994) and the abilities may also be different. 
6.10.4 Matching groups 
In order to limit the influence of confounding variables as much as possible, 
participants were matched on several factors deemed relevant and important for facial 
expression and face recognition study: full scale IQ, chronological age and similar 
educational background. Each participant was matched individually for IQ, and 
chronological age. 
Full scale IQ encompassing verbal and performance IQ was used to match the control 
sample as both of these have been found to predict facial expression and emotion 
understanding (Gross and Ball if, 1991; Buitelaar et a1. 1999). Once again due to time 
constraints both from the research perspective and from the perspective of 
participants, Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI), comprising the 
vocabulary, similarities, block design and matrix reasoning tests was used to test IQ 
instead of the full Wechsler scale. The W ASI produces verbal, performance and full 
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scale IQ scores, with correlations of .88, .84 and .92 with the full Wechsler scales 
(Wechsler, 1999). 
The groups were matched for chronological age as facial expressIon recognition 
continues to develop right through adulthood. 
6.10.5 Limitations of participant selection 
Beyond the limitations already mentioned, one of the limitations of the studies 
reported here is relying on the clinician's diagnosis. Although Charman, (2006) stated 
that an experience clinician's diagnosis is the most reliable method of diagnosing 
autism; there is a small chance of a wrong or inaccurate diagnosis. Clinicians do not 
necessarily follow the lCD-I O:DCR-I 0, which is stringent diagnostic criteria 
primarily for research purpose. It is wise to administer ADI-R (Lord et al. 1994) or 
ADOS-G (Lord et al. 1989) for a more accurate diagnosis. It should be noted that it 
was beyond the scope of the thesis to administer IQ tests, interviews for diagnosis and 
recruit autism and non-autism participants by single researcher. 
6.11 Conclusion 
The ADI-R is a semi-structured, investigator based interview for parents of children 
and adults for whom autism is a possible diagnosis. The revised version is linked 
more closely to ICD-IO and DSM-IV (Lord et al. 1994); whereby the 93 questions of 
the interview are clustered into three main sections which are social interaction, 
language and communication and interests and behaviours. The social interaction 
section has questions that cover criteria Al of DSM-IV and/or subsection Blof 
ICDIO:DCR-lO, language and communication covers criteria A2 of DSM-IV and/or 
subsection B2 ofICD-IO: DCR-lO, finally interests and behaviours covers criteria A3 
of DSM-IV and/or subsection B3 ofICD-lO:DCR-lO. DSM-IV and ICD-IO:DCR-IO 
give equal weight to social interaction, language and communication, and interests 
and behaviour but ADI-R gives a lot more weight to language and communication, 
both expressive and loss of the expressive language, with 40 out of the 93 questions in 
the interview covering only language and communication. 
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The most striking difference is that DSM-IV and ICD-I0 presumes vast knowledge 
and experience of the clinicians and only gives guidelines for diagnosis but the ADI-R 
is a very detailed step-by-step tool. This means that anyone with sufficient training is 
able to administer ADI-R. This perhaps means that diagnosis according to DSM-IV 
and ICD-IO may vary whereas ADI-R as a tool has high reliability. The disadvantage 
of ADI-R is that it is very time consuming and often researches having sample size of 
15 to 20 will inevitably mean administering ADI-R to the whole sample as near 
impossible for individual researcher. 
Theories of autism presented in this chapter highlighted that Baron-Cohen et aI., 
(2000) proposed that amygdala was an area that was abnormal in individuals with 
autism leading to atypical social behaviour and impaired social intelligence and 
presented the 'amygdala theory of autism'. Dawson et aI., (2005) propose the social 
motivation hypothesis, proposing a failure in the 'reward mechanism' due to 
impairment in OFC; consistent with Nelson's, (2001) theory of 'experience-
expectant' developmental system, which essentially states that experience in a critical 
period drives cortical specialisation for faces. However, Shultz et aI., (2005) linked 
the hypoactivation ofFFA with the Nelson, (2001) development of face recognition 
'experience-expectant' theory and concluded that experience in a critical period is 
essential for the cortical structures to develop and acquire the expertise. As children 
with autism do not naturally orient to faces, they fail to develop the cortical plasticity 
and hence lack of expertise. Consequently FF A hypoactivation is result of autism and 
not a cause of autism 
Individuals with autism may be able to recognise familiar faces and this ability may 
already be established in childhood but overall unfamiliar face processing is impaired 
and this impairment carries on into adulthood. Paradigms used to test the configural 
and holistic face processing have clearly demonstrated that face expertise is never 
achieved by individuals with autism leading to piecemeal face processing (Dawson et 
aI., 2005) and atypical strategies developed over the years where by information from 
the mouth region is used much more than information from the eye region (Klin et aI., 
1999; Hobson et aI., 1989). This may perhaps link somewhat to the lack of joint 
attention and impairment in gaze following and gaze direction, if the focus is not on 
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the eye region then one cannot be expected to have any ability to process information 
from this region. 
In summary, behavioural data for face processing is conflicting on the surface. Adults 
with autism in some studies have been reported to achieve the same level of accuracy 
as matched controls (Langdell, 1978; Hobson et aI. 1988). However, when processing 
strategy is explored, individuals with autism display atypical strategy for face 
processing focussing only on mouth region (Joseph and Tanaka, 2003) or on local 
features (Rondan and Deruelle, 2007). There also appears to be a speed accuracy 
"trade off' (Behrmann et aI., 2006), when accuracy is achieved at the same level as 
controls the speed has been compromised. Thus, even though on the surface the 
results of face processing in adults with autism is conflicting; when looked deeper it is 
clear that adults perhaps are not using the configural and holistic face processing 
strategy as effectively as typical adults and that is where the impairment lies. 
In children with autism FR, is not so impaired in older children (LangdeU, 1978) 
compared to younger children (Klin et aI., 1999) but the strategy used is atypical 
focussing more on information on the mouth region (Langdell, 1978; Klin et aI., 
2002) and being distracted by paraphernalia (Hobson et aI., 1988). 
Children with autism, especially those who are very high on the spectrum and 
severely autistic fail to recognise happy and sad faces and do not prefer a happy face 
over a neutral face unlike the typical population. Adults with autism fail to process 
facial expressions both implicitly and explicitly and tend to focus on feature based 
processing, missing out on subtle information available in face stimuli. This result is 
slightly mixed as some studies have reported that individuals are able to process facial 
expressions but the strategy executed is significantly different. In brief, it has been 
well established that a significant impairment in processing FEs exists in children 
with autism and this persists in adulthood. In adults especially in the case of HF A 
even when the accuracy level for recognition is the same as controls the strategy used 
. is atypical. 
Neurophysiological studies have detected impairment in both early (NI70) and late 
(Nc) stage of face processing using ERP, deficit in FFA, STS, amygdala and OFC. A 
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failure to show a speed advantage for processing faces as existing in typical 
population as well as atypical cortical topography, no right hemisphere specialisation 
in autism population for face processing means the final result being that individuals 
with autism are significantly worse at FR, FE recognition and general social 
interaction. 
Neuroscience data proved that face processing impairments in autism is present early 
in life, at least by the age of 3 years. Studies have detected impairment in both early 
(N 170) and late (Nc) stage of face processing using ERP, deficit in FF A, STS, 
amygdala and OFC. A failure to show a speed advantage for processing faces and the 
atypical cortical with no right hemisphere specialisation in autism population for faces 
means significantly worse at FR, FE recognition and general social interaction. 
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Chapter 7 
Face processing using the inner outer face paradigm 
Abstract 
This chapter covers the literature for inner outer FR in typically developing children 
and the rationale for inner outer face recognition research of this thesis. The 
introduction section reiterates meaning of terms such as holistic and configural face 
processing particularly from the perspective of this thesis. The literature highlights 
that familiar and unfamiliar faces are processed differently by adults and children. In 
addition information from inner and outer face is used differently by adults and 
children. Since this thesis uses the inner outer face paradigm to investigate face 
recognition and is investigating unfamiliar face recognition evidence in literature from 
infancy to adults is presented in brief. 
7.1 Introduction 
It has been established that typical adults are 'face experts' as they are able to 
recognise thousands of faces, at least for a short time, including the ones they 
encounter briefly in the course of research. Behavioural studies have verified and 
confirmed that this expertise is due to holistic processing, which means face stimuli 
are processed by adults as a whole, glueing the features such as mouth, eyes, nose, 
ears all together into a gestalt, rather than piecemeal processing of individual 
components (Maurer et aI., 2002; Taylor et aI., 2004; Diamond and Carey, 1977). 
Another characteristic of face processing well established is that for processing mood, 
emotion, intentions and mental state; configural processing is essential, processing of 
the spacing between the individual features also called second-order relational 
processing (Maurer et aI., 2002). However, these skills are only efficient when the 
face is in the canonical upright orientation. Neuroscience research has successfully 
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associated the adult expertise with particular neural correlates: the N170 in ERP 
studies (Bentin et aI., 1996) and increased activity in the FF A (Kanwisher et aI., 1997) 
and STS region (Pelphrey and Carter, 2007) in fMRI studies. 
This expertise in face processing does not emerge until adolescence (De Sonneville et 
aI., 2002) with recognition ability improving remarkably from 7-11-years of age 
(Carey et aI., 1980). Nonetheless, infants have mechanisms enabling them to naturally 
orient towards schematic faces at 9 minutes from birth (Goren et aI., 1975), 
discriminate mother's face from a strangers face at 4 days of age (Pascalis et aI., 
1995); and it has been demonstrated that such a task executes specialised brain areas 
such as N290 and P400 (de Haan et aI., 2002) in infants as young as seven months 
old. The quest has been to ascertain if this is due to a quantitative difference whereby 
gradual maturity leads to performance at adult level or if this IS a qualitative 
difference whereby children process faces differently to adults. The qualitative 
difference is researched using paradigms such as inverted face processing (Yin, 1969; 
Valentine, 1988), whole-part processing (Tanaka and Farah, 1993), composite face 
processing (Carey and Diamond, 1994; Hole, 1994), spatial relation manipulation 
(Mondloch et aI., 2002) as well as inner outer face processing (Newcombe and Lie, 
1995; Ellis et aI., 1979) . No experiment is needed to show that inner face parts are 
more important than outer face parts for functioning in the social world (Campbell et 
aI., 1995). The evidence leans towards a qualitative difference because although 
maturity is a factor, it has been ascertained that children are immature at processing 
spatial relationship among features (Mondloch et aI., 2002) and they tend to focus on 
the outer paraphernalia more than the inner facial features (Diamond and Carey, 
1977) all signifying qualitative difference and perceptual style of face processing. 
One of the claims on face processing strategy has been that TD tend to focus on outer 
parts of the face for identity decisions until the age of 10 (Diamond and Carey, 1977) 
and then gradually switch to focussing on the inner face. Research in the field of face 
processing in children with autism has attempted to investigate if the same 
developmental pattern exists in children with autism. As discussed in chapter 5 the FR 
research in children with autism has established that face processing is atypical and 
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even when accuracy is at same level as TD the strategy for face processing is different 
(Joseph and Tanaka, 2003; Rondan and DeruelIe, 2007); and this persists in adulthood 
(Behrmann et aI., 2006). 
Although research in the field of FR in children with autism has focussed on 
investigating if there is a deficit in face processing, there has been not much research 
using inner outer face recognition paradigm in order to investigate holistic face 
processing per se. Hence, before embarking on the second part of this research, which 
essentially is the main focus of this thesis, the holistic face processing in TD 6-10-
year-olds and high functioning children with autism was investigated using inner 
outer face recognition paradigm. 
7.2 Inner outer face recognition in typical population 
7.2.1 Adults 
7.2.1.1 Familiar face 
Adults' face processing strategy has been established to be oriented more towards 
processing the inner face and less dependent on outer face parts such as the hairline, 
chin etc. especially for familiar faces. The outer face parts are more prone to frequent 
changes whereas the inner features are relatively stable over longer time period. 
Familiar faces are claimed to be processed using the inner face parts (Ellis et aI., 
1979) for recognition. Ellis et aI., (1979) presented adults with only inner or outer 
parts of a familiar face for recognition, performance was better when only the inner 
face was available, as opposed to only the outer face. In the same study for an 
unfamiliar FR task both inner and outer features were used by participants equally in 
order to recognise the face. 
7.2.1.2 Unfamiliar face 
Young et aI., (1985) used a face matching task and found that internal features of 
unfamiliar faces were matched equally as fast as the external features. Thus, in the 
case of adults familiar and unfamiliar faces are processed differently whereby for 
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familiar FR, the inner face is processed but for unfamiliar FR both the inner and outer 
face parts are equally informative for adults, and FR is based more on the inner parts 
than outer. This was confirmed by O'Donnell and Bruce, (2001), who reported that 
for unfamiliar faces adults are more likely to detect changes made to hair styles than 
changes made to an inner face feature ( e.g. eyes), meaning the outer face may have an 
advantage for unfamiliar FR in adults. 
Bonner et aI., (2003) took this one step further by testing adults for unfamiliar FR and 
examined if the recognition improved over a period of 3 days of familiarisation. 
Participants were presented with a face matching task where either the inner or outer 
face video was to be matched to full face stimuli. All throughout accuracy for 
matching using the outer face was better than matching using the inner face. The inner 
face matching improved over the 3-day period but the outer face matching remained 
stable over that period. The conclusion drawn from this study was firstly, familiar and 
unfamiliar faces are processed differently by adults; secondly, adults rely initially 
more on outer face parts for recognition and slowly switch to inner face processing as 
the face gets more and more familiar. On the whole, for unfamiliar face processing 
either both inner and outer face information is used equally or there is an outer face 
advantage. 
One line of investigation has been, do children and infants behave the same as adults? 
It is claimed that children unlike adults focus on outer face for familiar and unfamiliar 
face recognition. The second line of investigation has been to ascertain the age when 
individuals switch to using inner face more and use the inner face information for 
recognition and establishing progressive lowering of the age. I am now going to 
review the literature for infants and children on inner and outer face processing and 
the use of information for FR. 
7.2.2 Infants 
As face experts adults process unfamiliar face differently to familiar face and use the 
information from the inner face selectively. Infants have been shown to have innate 
ability to orient towards schematic faces (Goren et aI., 1975), highlighting that they 
120 
can perform first order processing from about 9 minutes of being born. The question 
then is, do infants perform holistic face processing or differentiate between familiar 
and unfamiliar face using inner and outer face information? 
7.2.2. t Familiar face 
Pascalis et al., (1995) presented 4-day-old neonates with the mother's face and a 
novel face and recorded looking time which showed that when the full face was 
visible, neonates looked longer at the mother's face. However, when a scarf was worn 
to occlude outer face, neonates were not able to discriminate the mother's face from 
the novel face. Therefore, it was concluded that neonates acquire representation of 
their mother's face where the outer face parts are an integral part, and discrimination 
is based more on the outer face information. It was inferred that infants can 
discriminate between familiar and unfamiliar faces when outer face information is 
available. 
Bartrip, Morton and de Schon en, (2001) tested infants aged 19- IS5-day-oIds for inner 
outer feature preference of mothers face. Infants were shown either full face or inner 
or outer face of mother's along with a strangers and infants preferred mother's face 
till the age of 2-months and then the preference shifted to strangers face in full face 
condition. However, for inner or outer face condition the visual behaviour pattern of 
infants appeared unstable for mother's face, with outer face preferred at 25 days of 
age, inner face preferred at 40 days of age and again outer face preferred at 155 days. 
A prudent conclusion from this data can be that firstly, it is disturbing for infants to 
see a live face masked so that only hairline and chin is visible. Infants visual acuity is 
limited so the HSF information from face is not available even then at least the first 
order configurations are available. Not being able to see the contours of inner face 
may be disturbing and the authors highlight this fact by stating that on numerous 
occasions infants were distressed. It is this distress that may have shifted the 
preference to inner face in some age groups. Secondly, it appears that infants are 
capable of forming a holistic representation of the mother's face by the age of 40 days 
and if one source of information is removed it affects the looking behaviour. 
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7.2.2.2 Unfamiliar face 
Turati, Cassia, Simion and Leo, (2006) presented infants 1-3-day-olds with either full , 
inner or outer face for habituation and then tested for visual preference paired with a 
novel face for full, inner or outer face recognition (See figure 7.1.) Infants were able 
to recognise an unfamiliar face to which they were experimentally familiari sed. 
Moreover, they were able to recognise faces from inner or outer faces alone, although 
recognition from the inner face must have been harder because the sample size 
required to reach significance was much bigger than for outer face condition. This 
finding was contradictory to Pascalis et aI. , (1995) or Bartrip et aI., (2001), but on 
closer inspection of the data the authors concluded that if the infant is habituated to 
the inner face they have no problem in recognising the inner face in the test condition. 
It is only the difference in stimuli in habituation and test condition that causes the 
perceptual conflict thus affecting the recognition pattern. 
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Figure 7.1.- Stimuli used by Turati et al., (2006) to test infants aged 1 to 3 days old. 
Reproduced from Turati et aI., (2006). 
In order to prove this hypothesis, Turati et aI., (2006) tested infants again with stimuli 
similar to what has been used so far i.e. habituation with full face and recognition 
with inner face or habituation with the inner face and recognition with full face (see 
figure 7.2). 
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Figure 7. 2: stimuli used in Turati et al .. (2006) experiment 2 to test infants aged 1 to 3 
days old. Reproduced (rom Turati et al .. (2006). 
Infants failed to recognise familiar faces due to difficulty in recognising a perceptual 
similarity between two highly different stimuli in appearance (Turati et aI., 2006). 
Cohen and Cashon, (2001) investigated holistic processing ability in 7-month-old 
infants with a 'switch' paradigm, whereby infant is habituated to two faces then the 
internal and external face parts are switched to form a novel face. Infants habituated 
to the 2 original faces looked at the switched face longer, demonstrating that the 
switch appeared to be a novel face. It should be noted that this is evidence of holistic 
processing as the inner face and outer contour of two familiar but different faces are 
glued together and perceived as a new face by 7-month-old infants. Holistic 
processing occurs not only among internal features but among inner face and external 
contour, making it difficult to recognise the inner face within a different contour 
(Young et aI., 1987; Maurer et aI., 2002b). Holistic processing is not only glueing 
internal features together, it can also be glueing inner face to the outer contour 
resulting in the face being perceived as a novel face. 
Infants at birth are able to visualise the contour of the face and discriminate familiar 
and unfamiliar face predominantly from the outer face information and from 7 month 
of age perceive a face constructed out of the inner part of one and outer part of 
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another habituated face as a novel face. So, some rudimentary discrimination between 
familiar and unfamiliar and holistic processing exists in infancy. To add to this if 
there is a perceptual difference between face presented for habituation to face 
presented for recognition it affects accuracy results. 
7.2.3 Childhood 
7.2.3.1. Familiar face 
It has generally been accepted that children continue to use the outer face more for 
FR tasks especially at a younger age and they gradually switch to inner face 
processing as they get older. Both for familiar and unfamiliar FR, young children tend 
to focus more on the outer face. This is different from adults, who process the inner 
face more for familiar faces and the outer face more for unfamiliar faces. Campbell, 
Walker and Baron-Cohen (1995) presented 3-11-year-olds with whole, inner or outer 
familiar faces for a recognition task and found that up to the age of 7, children were 
better at recognising familiar faces from the outer face whereas children aged 10 and' 
above were better at recognising familiar faces from internal features. Children 
recognised familiar faces better from outer face parts and at around age of 10 there 
was a switch to greater accuracy for internal faces. Campbell et al. (1995) state that 
"the present study can be construed as providing closely converging evidence for 
Carey and Diamond's "two-process" theory of configural processes in face 
recognition and suggests a possible reason for their findings." They go on to make it 
clear that "findings reported here should not be taken to indicate that children under 
the age of 10 are unable to make effective use of the configural information delivered 
by the inner parts of the face." 
As stated earlier this switch from outer to inner face processing for recognition has 
been claimed to be due to development of configural processing and or holistic 
processing. In this thesis as only holistic processing is investigated I am only 
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establishing links and interpreting results of previous research for holistic processing. 
Campbell et al. (1995) has been reported to reinforce the idea that firstly for familiar 
FR inner face is used more and secondly the age at which the FR is mastered has 
shifted continuously depending on the paradigm used. Holistic processing occurs not 
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only among internal features but among the inner face and external contour, making 
recognition difficult when a familiar inner face is placed in a novel contour. Young et 
aI., (1987) made composite faces from inner and outer facia l features of well-known 
people and presented these for a FR task. These configurations were perceived as 
novel faces convincing that recognising parts of a familiar face was very difficult for 
the participants. Sinha and Poggio, (1996) presented identical inner face of famous 
people with different external contour and participants failed to recognise the 
similarity (see figure 7.3). 
Figure 7.3: Gore/Clinton composite with identical inner face and different outer 
faces. Reproduced (rom Sinha and Poggio (1996). 
Campbell et aI., (1999) presented 5-15-year-olds with either fu ll face or faces with 
blurred inner or outer face parts of famous people for FR. All age groups were not 
good in FR where the outer face was blurred and the switch to inner face was 
achieved at a much later age. Consequently, it can be inferred that glueing of the inner 
face to an external contour is a very strong phenomenon, making it difficult to 
recognise that inner face are the same. 
7.2.3.2 Unfamiliar face 
The advantage of familiar FR is that they have been viewed from various angles 
perhaps with different hair styles over a relatively long period of time and a stable 
memory formed. Unfamiliar FR data on the other hand, has been less clear. Ellis et 
aI., (1979) tested 54 adults for unfamiliar FR by presenting them with one face at a 
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time for 6s with a 3s interstimulus interval in the test phase. In the recognition phase 
either whole, inner or outer target as well as distracter faces was presented for same 
length of time and participants were asked to respond if they had seen the face before. 
The study reported that accuracy of judgement for inner or outer face was same, and 
concluded that face seen once may be assessed equally well by either the inner or the 
outer face parts. 
Diamond and Carey, (1977) presented an unfamiliar face matching task to children 6-
16 years of age. The task was to identify either inner face similarity or outer face 
similarity. This study reported that young children represent unfamiliar faces from 
isolated outer features such as hats, scarves etc. rather than the inner face. The switch 
to inner face was reported at the age of 10-12 years. It was concluded that by the age 
of 10 to 12 years children form a representation of an unfamiliar face that is based 
more on the inner face information, until then the children represent unfamiliar face 
more on the basis of paraphernalia. It may seem that the developmental pathway for 
identity recognition is that younger children rely on outer face information until the 
age of 10 years and then gradually switch to processing inner face information. As 
stated previously this was the famous, 'encoding switch' hypothesis. 
Want et aI., (2003) investigated unfamiliar face processing in children 5-9 years of 
age using the inner outer FR paradigm. Children and adults were presented with 3s 
video clips of unfamiliar male and female faces in the learning phase. In the test phase 
still photographs of a target face and a distracter which were either full or just inner or 
just outer faces were presented and the task was to match it to the previously seen 
video. 5-7 -year-olds were better at recognising the unfamiliar face from outer parts 
than inner parts. Nine year olds and adults accuracy for the inner and outer face was 
not significantly different. Therefore, according to this study nine year olds behave 
the same as adults whereby the inner face disadvantage reduces significantly. This 
study also recorded reaction times which emphasised that children and adults make 
significantly faster and more accurate FR judgements from outer face information in 
comparison to the inner face. Based on the evidence reported by Want et aI., (2003) it 
can be inferred that children as young as nine and seven years of age, process 
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unfamiliar faces holistically in a manner that is similar to adults, where information 
from the inner and outer face is used equally but the judgements based on outer face 
parts are more efficient. One interpretation can be that until about the age of 10, 
children and adults process faces differently; not only are children less proficient in 
processing the inner face; they treat both familiar and unfamiliar faces the same 
whereas adults process familiar and unfamiliar faces differently. Children in general 
recognise faces from outer feature better and only later in life prefer the inner face. 
Conversely, adults recognise familiar faces from the inner face and unfamiliar face 
equally from inner or outer face parts. This notion has been challenged by Bonner and 
Burton (2004) who presented 7 to 11 year olds with a familiar and unfamiliar face 
matching task. Children as young as 7 years old processed faces in the same way as 
adults and demonstrated an inner face advantage in the matching task. This 
progressive lowering of age for switching from outer-face to inner-face has continued 
albeit using different paradigm and researchers have claimed that children as young as 
4 can do holistic face processing at levels similar to adults (De Heering et aI., 2007). 
Mondloch et aI., (2002) used one face stimulus called' Jane' and manipulated it by 
modifying the features, external contour or spacing between the features to create 
'sisters of Jane'. The external contour set had same inner-face placed in external 
contours of different shapes. For the external contour set accuracy of 6-year-olds was 
as good as adults tested in this experiment and the authors concluded that holistic face 
processing involving glueing inner face with external contour matures at the age of 6 
for an unfamiliar face. 
7.3 Inner outer face recognition in children with autism 
Chapter 6 gave a detailed account of the deficit in face processing that exists in 
children with autism disabling them to function in the social world in a way that can 
be deemed effective. A number of investigators (Langdell, 1978; Hobson et aI., 1988; 
Sasson, 2006) have appealed to the notion that individuals with autism are impaired in 
holistic face processing and fail to process inner face as efficiently as TD. 
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7.3.1 Familiar face 
The inner outer face paradigm has not been used often to test face processing ability 
or processing strategy in children with autism. Wilson et aI., (2007) used inner outer 
face paradigm to test familiar FR in children with autism aged 8 years and matched 
controls. Both groups had the inner face superiority effect in the FR task, similar to 
evidence available in the literature for typically developing children processing a 
familiar face. 
7.3.2 Unfamiliar face 
Weeks and Hobson, (1987) demonstrated that individuals with autism tend to get 
distracted with paraphernalia and sort faces on the basis of hats rather than inner face 
similarity. A parsimonious conclusion that can be drawn is that individuals with 
autism may differentially attend to different facial features in comparison to typical 
population (Sasson, 2006) thus leading to a significantly different performance on 
finer aspects of face processing. 
Joseph and Tanaka, (2003) demonstrated that children with autism are better at 
processing individual face parts in isolation rather than in context of the face. The 
idea was that if children with autism process the face holistically, they will show a 
whole-face test advantage i.e. when face parts are presented in context of the original 
face, accuracy will be higher. Children with autism did demonstrate holistic 
processing i.e. a whole-face advantage but only when mouth was presented in context. 
In fact when mouth area stimuli were used accuracy was even higher than control 
sample. On the other hand, when recognition had to be based on eyes area stimuli, 
performance was very poor, worse than control. This study showed that children with 
autism can to a limited extent do holistic processing. 
Rondan, Gepner and Deruelle, (2003) tested FR in children with autism using inner 
outer face matching paradigm for unfamiliar faces. Fourteen children with autism 
with mean age of 10 were individually matched to children with the same verbal 
mental age and chronological age and asked to match faces on the basis of either the 
outer or inner face. Children with autism performed equally well in both conditions 
but matched control had higher accuracy for the outer face, performance of typical 
children being in line with rest of the literature. 
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Wilson et aI., (in press) tested children with autism for unfamiliar FR using full, inner 
or outer face during the test phase. It was reported that the autism sample performed 
at the same level as developmentally delayed and TD matched for verbal mental age 
but were younger in chronological age. It is difficult to conclude from such finding 
because TD sample in this study were younger to the autism sample which can be an 
indication of delayed development in the autism sample for FR. On the other hand 
autism sample has been described as low functioning so IQ can be a factor for FR 
effect. 
In general, Children with autism demonstrate atypical face processing and inefficient 
ways of using inner and outer face parts for FR. 
7.4 Conclusion 
Adults process familiar and unfamiliar faces differently (Ellis et aI., 1979) relying 
more on inner face features when processing familiar faces and equally distributing 
attention to inner and outer face features when processing unfamiliar faces. 
The 'encoding switch' hypothesis claimed that children focus on outer-face parts 
more until the age of 10 years and then gradually switch to more inner-face 
processing. This claim has been challenged and the age at which children process 
inner-face has progressively been lowered (Want et aI., 2003; Bonner and Burton, 
2004; De Heering et aI., 2007). 
Holistic face processing in its entirety is glueing inner-face features together as well 
as glueing inner-face to outer-face contour (Young et aI., 1987; Sinha and Poggio, 
1996; Mondloch et aI., 2002). 
Children with autism show an atypical face processing mechanism and not very 
effective mechanism for holistic processing. Nonetheless, they do process faces 
holistically especially when information from mouth region is available (Joseph and 
Tanaka, 2003) and can recognise the face from inner-face only information (Rondan 
et aI., 2003). 
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Although research in the field of FR in children with autism has focussed on 
investigating if there is deficit in face processing there has been not much research 
using inner-outer FR paradigm or research investigating holistic face processing per 
se (Joseph and Tanaka, 2003). Hence, before embarking on second part of this 
research which essentially is the main focus of this thesis, the holistic face processing 
in typically developing children aged 5-10 years was investigated. Holistic face 
processing ability in high functioning children with autism was investigated and 
difference between them and individually matched sample was investigated using 





In this chapter I will explain the objectives of this thesis while looking back at the 
point when this research was conceived. Primary aims stated in chapter 1 are 
explained in detail and how I am going to achieve these aims are explained. 
8.1 Producing facial expressions with and without context 
The first and main aim was to investigate if children with autism can produce facial 
expressions and compare group differences with IQ and age matched on a one to one 
basis sample. However, this was completely uncharted territory at the time I started 
this research, and even since then, to my knowledge, there has been one study 
(McIntosh et aI., 2004) which essentially reported implicit and explicit imitation by 
children with autism. Boraston et al. 2008 The literature is littered with concrete 
behavioural and neurological evidence that children with autism are impaired in 
recognising complex facial expressions such as disgust, but are able to recognise 
simple expressions such as happy and sad as stated in chapter 3. As I state in chapter 
3, facial expressions and emotions not only involve recognising the expressions and 
being able to label them, but to regulate oneself and produce an appropriate response. 
One of the main criteria in autism diagnosis is abnormal or impaired development of 
reciprocal social interaction. Autism research has primarily evaluated this by 
questioning the ability to recognise emotions and facial expressions in the interaction. 
However, that is a small part of the whole social interaction conundrum, so I decided 
to investigate another aspect of this i.e. actual behavioural response in terms of facial 
expression production. Anecdotal evidence from parents provides us the information 
that it is not that children with autism do not feel any emotions, it is more that the way 
of expressing is perhaps atypical and sometimes there is lack of understanding the 
subtle and or complex emotions. It was then my aim to approach the facial 
expressions and emotion from a novel perspective and pose some fresh questions: Can 
children with autism control the facial muscle movements that are essential to produce 
facial expressions? Do children with autism have understanding of the facial 
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expression labels and are able to correctly produce the expressions on demand without 
any context? Would the context help in production of facial expressions, in other 
. 
words would context help inducing emotion and aid facial expression production? 
8.2 Children with autism and holistic face processing 
As mentioned above when this thesis was first conceived, the mam aim was to 
investigate if children with autism can produce FEs and compare group differences 
with a matched sample. Before attempting to embark on such ambitious exploration, it 
was deemed logical to first establish if children with autism process the inner face for 
tasks such as identity recognition. The rationale behind this decision was two fold 
firstly; it will be highly improbable to investigate FEs with my sample of autism 
participants if they do not attend to the inner face. Secondly, FE production was 
completely uncharted territory at the time this thesis was conceived; hence the idea 
was if the methodology for FE production does not come to fruition I have another 
avenue available to take my research as well as stressing the limitations of my FE 
production methodology. Therefore, the second aim of this thesis was to determine if 
children with autism can use efficiently the inner features of a face to identify a 
person, when only those inner features were available during the learning, primarily 
deploying holistic face processing. 
Children with autism have some face processing deficits but are able to do holistic 
processing to a limited extent (Joseph and Tanaka, 2003). Not many investigators in 
autism research have used the inner outer face paradigm to investigate holistic face 
processing abilities of individuals with autism, particularly for unfamiliar faces. 
Joseph and Tanaka, (2003) stated that impairment in holistic processing could not be 
firmly established using whole-part face paradigm because when recognition 
judgements were based on the mouth area, performance was on a par with the 
matched controls but when judgements were based on information from the eye area, 
performance was significantly worse. Whole-part paradigm does not seem to be the 
most effective tool for investigating holistic processing in individuals with autism as it 
presents conflicting results; children with autism may either be perceived to be 
inefficient or super efficient in holistic processing. Rondan et at, (2003) testified that, 
for matching faces, children with autism use inner and outer face information equally 
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but this does not clarify if the inner features are processed by the autism population in 
isolation, in identity recognition tasks as opposed to matching tasks. 
The inner/outer paradigm has been used with success for familiar faces (Wilson et aI., 
2007) and we decided to use it with unfamiliar faces. 
One of the questions that we investigated was the ability of ASC population of using 
inner feature for learning andrecognition when they are the only ones available. 
Since only the inner face has not been presented in the learning phase to children with 
autism to our knowledge, as stated, the second aim was to investigate FR in children 
with autism when they have only inner face during learning. 
8.3 Holistic processing with only inner face 
None of the studies using inner outer face paradigm for TD has to our knowledge 
presented only inner face during the learning phase. All the studies presented full face 
in the learning or encoding stage and the inner or outer face was presented only 
during the test phase except Turati et aI., (2006). It is possible, as observed for 
neonates (Turati et aI., 2006), that children will have no problem in learing and 
recognising face from inner features. Only changes, i.e. adding or removing features 
between the learning and the test phase will prevent recognition. The aim of our 
studies was to investigate if children can recognise faces when only inner features are 
available during learning phase. 
We will investigate this ability first in a control population before assessing it in an 
ASD population. Also, progressive lowering of the reported age of fully accomplished 
holistic processing ability (as demonstrated in Chapter 7) underlies the justification in 
looking towards an even earlier inception. Hence, one of the aims of the thesis was to 
investigate FR for identity, when children have only the inner face available during 
the learning phase at an early age of 5 years onwards. 
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Chapter 9 
Inner and outer face effects in typically developing children 
and children ,vith autism: a series of investigations. 
9.1 Study 1 
9.1.1 Aims of experiment 1 
Children rely more on outer-face information for recognition of unfamiliar faces 
(Want et al. 2003; Bonner and Burton, 2004) and then at a certain age process inner 
face information relatively more. The main issues to be considered in this part of the 
thesis are as follows: 
1. To investigate the effect on identity recognition when only inner face information is 
available in the learning phase. 
2. To investigate if holistic processing ability is fully accomplished at 5 years of age. 
9.1.2 Hypotheses 
1. The first prediction was that, as usually observed, older children will be 
significantly better than younger children in all conditions. 
2. The second prediction was that younger children, when presented with inner face 
for learning and recognition, accuracy for recognition will be as good as the 
recognition when full face is presented in the learning phase. This is based on the 
finding of Turatj et aI., (2006) from infant research. 
3. The third and final prediction was that older children will be significantly better at 
. full to inner face recognition. This was based on findings of Want et aI., (2003) which 
reported accuracy of full to inner recognition in 9-year-olds to be at the same level as 
adults. 
Inner to full face condition was the exploratory part of this experiment and so it is 




Typically developing children of three age groups, 5-6-year-olds, 8-8-year-olds and 9-
1 O-year-olds, participated in the study. There were twenty one children in each group. 
All participants were tested at their school in a quiet environment. Information and 
consent forms were sent to parents and only when parents actually sent an affi rmative 
consent form back was the child tested. The purpose of the work and actual task was 
explained to each child before seeking assent to participate in the experiment. 
9.1.3.2 Apparatus and material 
The face images were acquired and edited using Adobe Photo Shop version 8.0 so as 
to remove any distinguishing marks, ear-rings etc. Thirty faces were cropped at the 
top of the neck and cut precisely around the face including the hair line such that only 
face and hair line was left in the image. Each image was 300X3 00 pixels. The same 
thirty faces and twenty more faces were also cropped di fferently so as to leave only 
the inner features of the face. Thus finally there were three groups of faces, group one 
with ten inner faces matched to ten other inner faces all general features matched; 
group two with ten full faces and then just their inner face of these full faces matched 
to ten other inner faces for all general fea tures and group three with ten inner faces 
where their full faces were matched to ten other full faces for hair as we ll as general 
internal features (see fi gure 9.1). 
The computer program Dev Lab version 2005 was used to design the experiment and 
present stimuli to participants. The stimuli were di vided into three lists resulting in 
three experimental conditions. 
Full to inner face condition - Full face for learning and inner face for recogn ition 
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Inner to fu ll face condition - Inner face for learning and fu ll face for recognition 
Inner to inner face condition - Inner face both for learning and recognition 
Figure 9.1: Examples ofthe three groups o{stimuli used in experiment 1 
Full to inner face condition: The participant learnt full face and had to recognize the 
face from a pair of inner faces in the test phase. There were 10 trials. 
Inner to fu ll face condition: The participant learnt inner face and had to recognise the 
face from a pair of fu ll faces. There were 10 trials. 
Inner to inner face condition: The participant learnt inner face and had to recogn.ise 
the face from a pair of inner faces. There were 10 trail s. 
9.1.3.3 Procedure 
Each participant was instructed individually that "a picture wi ll come here 
(experimenter pointed at the top of the screen) and will go away immediately then two 
pictures wi ll come here (experimenter pointed at the bottom part of the computer 
screen). One of these pictures (experimenter sti ll pointing at the bottom of the screen) 
wi ll be the same as you saw at the top. It is your job to decide which one you saw up 
here (Experimenter pointing at the top of the screen). If you think it is this one 
(experimenter pointing at the bottom left of the screen) then press 'z' and if you think 
it is this one (experimenter pointing at the bottom right of the screen) then press 'M"'. 
The image on the top of the screen appeared for 1 ODOms fo llowed by blank screen for 
SOOms and then test phase images appeared at the bottom of the screen. Test phase 
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images remained on the screen till a response was made by the participant. Once a 
response was made next face stimuli appeared after 500 ms interstimulus interval. 
It should be noted here that the initial stage of presenting faces at the top of the 
screen will be referred to as 'learning phase' and the later stage of presenting two 
faces at the bottom of the screen will be referred to as 'recognition or testing phase', 
for the purpose of this thesis. 
A practice trial with images of toys was delivered first, which had to be completed 
successfully in order to take part in the FR task. The 'toy condition' had 6 trials 
where a picture of one toy appeared at the top of screen and then same image along 
with a distracter appeared at the bottom of screen and task was to press 'Z' or 'M' 
depending on which toy they had seen in the learning phase. 
Once the toy condition was completed successfully, the participant was presented 
with the FR task and each condition was presented in a pseudo random order. 
Participants were expected to complete all the three conditions inner to inner, full to 
inner and inner to full without any break in between. 
9.1.3.4 Results 
The 'toy condition' was performed by each participant at 100 % accuracy level. This 
was not analysed any further. 
Mean accuracy for the FR tasks increased with age for full to inner face condition and 
inner to inner face condition but stayed steady for inner to full face condition (See 
Table 9.1). 
Table 9.1: Mean percent accuracy for three ace croups for all three conditions 
Face condition 5-6 years 8-8 years 9-10 years 
Mean % sd Mean % sd Mean % sd 
Full to Inner face 65.2 19.90 83.8 12.03 81.9 13.28 
Inner to Full face 82.9 19.28 68.1 14.54 84.86 10.35 
Inner to Inner face 80.9 16.09 88.1 10.30 90.95 9.43 
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A 3 (age) X 3 (face) mixed ANOVA was conducted. The effect of age was significant 
(F (2, 60) = 4.34, P = 0.018). The effect of the face condition was also significant (F 
(1, 60) = 32.48, p = 0.001). The interaction between age and face condition was not 
significant (F (2, 60) = 0.86, P = 0.46). 
The main effect of age was further analysed using independent sample t-tests. 5-6-
year-olds were not significantly different to 8-8-year-olds in any face conditions (t = 
1.68, P = 0.09; t = 1.08, P = 0.28; t = 1.41, P = 0.16 for 3 face conditions). 8-8-year-
aIds were significantly different to 9-1O-year-olds both for full to inner (t = 2.08, P 
=0.04) and inner to full face (t = 1.95, P =0.05) condition but not for the inner to inner 
face (t = 1.15, P = 0.25) condition. 5-6-year-olds were also significantly different to 9-
lO-year-olds, in full to inner face (t = 3.19, P = 0.003) and inner to inner face (t = 
2.45, P = 0.018) condition but not significant for inner to full face condition (t = 0.39, 
P =0.69). 
The main effect of the face condition was further analysed using paired sample t-test. 
5-6-year-olds performed significantly better in inner to inner face condition compared 
to full to inner face condition (t = 3.53, p= 0.002). Other face conditions for this age 
group were not significantly different i.e. comparison between full to inner and inner 
to full (t = 2.01, p= 0.058); inner to full and inner to inner (t = 2.05, P = 0.053). 8-8-
year-olds were significantly better in inner to inner face condition compared to full to 
inner (t = 3.83, P = 0.001) and inner to full (t = 5.04, P = 0.001). There was no 
difference between full to inner and inner to full face conditions within group (t = 
1.06, P = 0.125). 9-1O-year-olds were significantly better in inner to inner face 
condition compared to full to inner (t = 2.52, P = 0.02) and inner to full (t = 6.39, P = 
0.001). The full to inner face condition was in turn significantly better compared to 
inner to full face condition (t = 2.3, p =0.03). 
This shows that 9-10-year-olds were significantly better than the two younger age 
groups but there was no significant difference between the two younger groups. 
Performance or all children was exemplary for the inner to inner face condition. They 
had no problem processing inner face when inner face was available in isolation both 
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for learning and recognition. All children were relatively poor at recognising full face 
after seeing only inner face and the performance for this did not improve with age. 
5-6-year-olds performed equally for full to inner and inner to full face conditions 
however, performance for inner to inner face condition was significantly better than 
full to inner face condition. They were significantly worse than 9-10-year-olds in 
recognising inner face both from full face and from inner face only information. 
8-8-year-olds performed equally for full to inner and inner to full face conditions. 
However, performance for inner to inner face condition was significantly better than 
both the other conditions. They were significantly worse than 9-10-year-olds in 
recognising full face from inner face and inner face from full face. 
9-10-year-olds performed significantly better in the inner to inner face condition 
compared to the two other conditions and full to inner was in turn significantly better 
than inner to full face condition within group. As stated earlier, both younger age 
groups were significantly worse than this age group. 
9.1.3.5 Discussion 
Older children, particularly 9-10-year-olds were significantly better than both the 
younger age groups in some of the face conditions tested, which partially meets the 
first hypothesis. Overall all children were excellent in recognising faces from inner 
face only information and the youngest group were significantly worse than the oldest 
group for this face condition. For inner to inner face recognition 8-8-year-olds were 
not different to either group. This is a new finding as previous research never 
presented inner face only during learning to children aged 5-10 years. Turati et aI., 
(2006) had presented similar stimuli to infants and the study reported that infants 
successfully discriminated inner faces. Based on that data a prediction was made that 
if infants are able to process inner face without any difficulty children will be able to 
do the same and thus performance for this will be at least similar to full to inner face. 
However, performance for inner to inner was significantly better than full to inner for 
all age groups hence this prediction did not come true. The research presented in this 
thesis extends the findings of infant research to typically developing children 5-10 
years of age. 
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The full to inner face condition where children learn the full face and recognise the 
same face from inner face only, produced results similar to those existing in the 
literature (Want et aI., 2003; Bonner and Burton, 2004). It is in line with the third 
prediction and meets the hypothesis. In Want et aI., (2003) participants were provided 
with 3 second long videos of full face during learning followed by inner face. The 
accuracy reported in that study is very similar to those reported in this study. For 
instance, 8-year-olds were 81% and 9-year-olds were 89% accurate (Want et aI., 
2003) compared to 83% and 81 % for the two age groups in the present study. It can 
be concluded that even very brief exposure to unfamiliar faces under experimental 
conditions is sufficient for testing FR ability in children. There has been evidence of 
progressive lowering of the reported age for fully accomplished holistic processing 
ability (De Herring et aI., 2008; Mondloch et aI., 2002; Carey and Diamond, 1994). 
One of the underlying justifications of this experiment was to look towards an even 
earlier inception, the prediction should have perhaps been two tailed on the balance 
rather than directional prediction. So, an easy conclusion to draw from this would be 
that children as young as five years of age do process faces holistically and can 
process inner face when only inner face is available during learning. 
The accuracy for the inner to full face condition result was the lowest for all three age 
groups and performance for this face condition did not improve at all. This is a new 
finding as in previous research inner face during learning and full face for recognition 
has not been presented. This was the exploratory part of the research hence there was 
no prediction. It is this third finding that does not allow simple conclusions made 
previously on holistic face processing because when children of all three age groups 
had only inner face during learning and full face for recognition the performance rose 
from 82% to only 84%. To add to this, there was a significant dip at 8-8 years of age 
when identity judgements are based on full face having seen inner face only at the 
learning phase. This finding questions the proficiency in holistic processing in older 
children. If children as old as 6 years are deemed to have mature holistic processing 
and perform at the same level as adults (Mondloch et aI., 2008), then 10-year-olds in 
this experiment should be have been able to improve performance for inner to full 
face condition steadily just like the other two conditions. 
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In summary, 9-1O-year-olds were significantly better than 5-6-year-olds in the full to 
inner face condition, providing conformation of a developmental trend for holistic 
face processing which is in line with Want et aI., (2003); Bonner and Burton, (2003); 
Mondloch et aI., (2008). In addition, my data also shows that inner facial features 
alone convey sufficient information to operate holistic face processing, even at the 
age of five. This provides conformation of progressive lowering of age for holistic 
face processing, which is in line with De Heering et aI., (2008). Yet evidence gathered 
in this experiment raises 2 different issues, which need to be addressed. First, as 
noted, although accuracy was reasonably good (82% at age of 5 years) when only 
inner face was presented for learning followed by full face for recognition, it did not 
increase with age. On the contrary, there was a dip at the age of 8-8 years of age and 
then marginal increase bringing 9-10-year-olds at same level as 5-year-olds. 
Secondly, accuracy when only inner face was available for learning and recognition 
performance was exceptionally good for all three age groups. 
This apparent discrepancy between the experiment reported here and previous ones 
ca"n be explained by highlighting a methodological fact stated by Turati et aI., (2006). 
In the inner to inner face condition the learning stimuli and recognition stimuli were 
exactly the same along with a distracter. In all the previous studies participants were 
asked to recognise inner or outer face having learnt the face in its entirety. Turati et 
aI., (2006) state that infant studies such as Pascalis et aI., (1995) and Bartrip et aI., 
(2001) revealed newborns' failure to accomplish a more demanding task, namely the 
detection of the perceptual invariance between two appearances of the same face, the 
mother's face with and without hair. Turati et aI., (2006) asserted that any alteration in 
the perceptual appearance of a face, produced either by removal or addition of 
specific feature would affect recognition. Extending this argument to the findings of 
this experiment, it can be concluded that an alteration in perceptual appearance was 
caused when full or inner faces were presented alternatively during learning and 
recognition. This continues to hamper accuracy in recognition task, even at the age of 
10. Hence, like the infants in Turati et aI., (2006) children 5-10 years of age had no 
problem recognising faces from inner face information only when there was no 
perceptual alteration but the recognition accuracy suffered when there was perceptual 
alteration. 
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A second explanation could be that holistic face processing does not only mean 
glueing inner facial features together, but also glueing the inner face to external 
contours, making it difficult to recognise internal features presented in different 
contours (Sinha and Poggio, 1996; Young et aI., 1988; Maurer et aI., 2002) as the 
same face. This may have caused the poor recognition in the inner to full face 
condition reported here and will be discussed in detail under general discussion. 
Perceptual similarity (Turati et aI., 2006) and both aspects of holistic face processing 
(glueing inner facial features together as well as glueing inner face with external 
contour) can explain the data presented in this experiment. Not only have the two 
older groups demonstrated holistic face processing but children as young as five have 
also demonstrated holistic face processing in this experiment. Juxtaposing the data 
from this experiment with previous research (Mondloch et aI., 2008; De Beering et 
aI., 2008) we can perhaps assume that both aspects of holistic processing are 
functioning at the age offive. 
Finally, data gathered in experiment 1 poses the intriguing question, whether the 
children in inner to inner face condition relied on local feature matching or actually 
executed holistic processing. In order to resolve this question it seemed logical to 
investigate featural processing or holistic processing operating when inner face is 
presented both during learning and recognition condition. An inversion effect can be 
used to examine holistic processing (Maurer et aI., 2002), hence experiment 2 was 
designed to investigate this. 
9.2 Experiment 2 
Identity recognition, specifically in an inner to inner face condition, can be argued to 
be completely based on featural processing, whereby children are only matching one 
specific feature of the face. In order to investigate if participants are actually matching 
features for face recognition in the inner to inner face condition or using holistic face 
processing, experiment 2 was carried out as a control experiment. 
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9.2.1 Aim of the experiment 
1. To investigate if children use featura l processing when only inner face 1S 
presented during both learning and recognition phases. 
9.2.2 Hypotheses 
The prediction was that FR for upright inner faces will be signifi cantly better than FR 
for inverted inner faces for all age groups. 
9.2.3 Method 
9.2.3.1 Participants 
Typically developing children of three age groups, 5-6-year-olds, 8-8-year-olds and 9-
10-year-olds parti cipated in the study. There were twenty three children in each 
group. All the conditions of experiment I were applied for testing. 
9.2.3.2 Apparatus and material 
Fifteen colour photographs each of male and female faces were taken from the data 
base of face lab and matched to thirty other faces from the data base for hair and eye 
colour and general feature similari ty. A ll of these images Were then edi ted using 
Adobe Photo Shop version 8.0. Each image was imported into Photo shop, any 
di stinguishing marks, ear-rings etc. were removed. All faces were cropped to leave 
only inner fea tures in the image. 
Face stimulus fo r learning 
Face stimuli for recognition 
Figure 9. 2: Examples of/ aces presented [or inversion effect investigation 
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The image size was 300X300 pixels. Finally we had sixty inner faces, thirty pairs 
matched for general feature similarity (see figure 9.2). 
The same computer program was used to design the experiment and present stimuli to 
participants. Two lists each of 15 photos one upright and one inverted was to be given 
to participants in a pseudorandom order. 
9.2.3.2 Procedure 
The procedure was exactly same as the experiment 1 first a trial toy condition and 
then the FR task was administered. In half of the trials the recognition test was done 
on upright faces and on the other half on inverted faces. 
The image on the top of the screen appeared for 1000ms followed by blank screen for 
500ms and then test phase images appeared at the bottom of the screen. Test phase 
images remained on the screen till a response was made by the participant. Once a 
response was made next face stimuli appeared after 500 ms interstimulus interval. 
9.2.3.3 Results 
All participants performed at 100% accuracy level for the toy condition and this was 
not analysed any further. Table 9.2 shows mean accuracy for three age groups. 
Table 9.2: Mean percent accuracy for three age groups 
Face condition 5-6 years .8-8 years 9-10 years 
Mean % sd Mean % sd Mean % sd 
Upright face 89.86 8.59 90.89 6.49 91.13 8.98 
Inverted face 81.43 8.34 80.89 11.05 69.84 11.48 
A 3x2 split-plot ANOV A was conducted on the accuracy scores of three age groups. 
The main effect of the face condition was significant (F = 222.85, p = 0.001), main 
effect of age was not significant, (F = 0.01, P = 0.9) and interaction was not 
significant (F = 0.38, P = 0.68). As the age groups were not significantly different to 
each other, data was collapsed to just one group and paired comparison of means 
revealed that mean accuracy for the upright face trials was significantly different to 
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the inverted face trials in a two-tailed t test, t = 15.08, P = 0.001. All children were 
better at recognising upright faces compared to inverted faces. 
9.2.3.4 Discussion 
The purpose of this experiment was to examine if children 5-10 years of age use 
featural processing when presented with inner face during learning and recognition 
phases.' The results clearly demonstrate that all age groups were sensitive to the 
'inversion effect' whereby performance for upright faces were significantly better 
than for inverted faces. The tendency to use holistic face processing is very strong by 
the age of 5, whereby even when only the inner face is available for learning and 
recognition, featural processing is not used. 
This finding reinforces the conclusions of experiment 1: 5-10-year-olds can process 
inner face when only inner face is available. Previously seen inner face when 
presented within novel external contour accuracy deteriorates because of holistic 
processing. 
The next step would be to examine children's behaviour for FR when both full and 
inner faces are available for learning. Which one would children process better and 
recognise easily? Before embarking in that direction, children with autism were tested 
for holistic face processing, more specifically for inner face processing. The main 
focus of this research was FE production in children with autism. For this it was vital 
to examine if children with autism process inner faces. The literature for this is very 
mixed as presented in chapter 6. It was imperative that the autism sample taking part 
in FE production study were able to process inner faces. This is the main rationale for 
the experiment 3. 
9.3 Experiment 3 
Experiment 1 and 2 established that typically developing children can process inner 
faces exclusively for identity recognition and use a holistic face processing strategy 
when only inner face features are available for learning. The second significant 
finding was that holistic face processing glueing the inner face and external contours 
makes it difficult to recognise the inner face previously seen in isolation. 
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Holistic face processing in an autism population has been investigated mainly using 
whole-part paradigm or inner outer face matching tasks. The inner outer FR paradigm 
has only been used by Wilson et al., (in press) with low-functioning children with 
autism. Moreover, only inner face during learning has not been reported to be part of 
the design in any research with an autism sample. Hence the main aims of the 
experiment were as follows: 
9.3. t Aims of experiment 3 
1. To examine the effect of 'only inner face' on learning and subsequent 
recognition either from full face or from the same inner face. 
2. To deternline if holistic face processing is significantly different in children 
with autism in comparison to a control sample matched on one to one basis for 
IQ and Chronological age. 
These were actually the second aims of the thesis as I mentioned in Chapter 8. 
9.3.2 Hypotheses 
1. The first prediction was that children with autism will not be significantly 
different to TO in identity recognition. This is based on the literature where 
older children, adults and high functioning individuals with autism generally 
have been reported to have the same accuracy level as TO even when the 
strategy used is atypical. 
2. The second prediction was that children with autism will be better than TO in 
the inner to full face condition particularly because the autism population is 
known for local level processing and avoiding global processing so the 
external contour will not hamper identity recognition to the same extent as for 
TO. 
3. The third and final prediction would then be that the autism sample will not be 
as efficient in holistic face processing as TO. 
9.3.3 Method 
9.3.3. t Participants 
146 
Seventeen children with autism aged 9-15 years matched individually for both age 
and IQ to seventeen typically developing children were tested (see Table 9.3) 
Chapter 6 gives a detailed account of recruitment, inclusion and exclusion criteria and 
matching groups. Actual age, full scale IQ, verbal IQ and performance IQ of each 
HF A and MC participant is attached in appendix 5. 
Table 9.3: Mean age and TQ for HFA and matched control sample 
Mean Age Mean FSIQ Mean VIQ Mean PIQ 
Matched controls (Me) 12.98 106.11 104.94 106.11 
HFA sample 13.11 105.94 106.11 104.64 
9.3.3.2 Apparatus and material 
The Wechsler Abbreviated Scale ofIntelligence (WASI) was used to measure verbal, 
non-verbal and full scale IQ for all participants. 
The Autism diagnostic interview - revised (ADI-R) was used for the semi-structured 
interview with parents of children with autism. 
Other apparatus and material of experiment 1 was used for the actual inner-outer face 
study. 
9.3.3.3 Procedure 
The same procedure as in experiment 1 was followed for the FR task both for children 
with autism and TD. 
Each child with autism was first asked to complete inner-outer face paradigm task. 
Once the computer task was successfully completed by the participant then W ASI 
was administered individually by me at a separate appointment in a quiet area at the 
participant's school, which was scored to get verbal, non-verbal and full scale IQ 
score. 
Typically developing children were then recruited, administered W ASI individually 
by me in a quiet area at the participant's school and if the IQ matched to a participant 
along with chronological age then they were further tested. . 
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9.3.3.4 Results 
There was no significant difference between the HF A and MC groups on matching 
criteria of age (t = 0.268, p= 0.891) and IQ (t = 0.04, P = 0.969). 
All participants performed at 100% accuracy level for the toy condition and this was 
not analysed any further. On the whole, both ASC and TD sample were above 80% 
accurate in FR. Table 9,4 shows the mean percentage accuracy of both the groups for 
all three face conditions. 
Table 9.4: Mean percent accuracy of II FA and MC for three face conditions. 
Face condition HFA MC 
Mean % sd Mean % sd 
Full to inner face 88.65 13,48 81.18 10.53 
Inner to full face 89.41 10.29 82.35 13.01 
Inner to Inner face 92.35 16.01 95.88 8.12 
A 3x2 split plot ANDV A was conducted. The face condition effect was significant (F 
(1, 32) = 22.86, P = 0.001). The group effect was not significant (F (1, 32) = 1.18, P = 
0.28). The interaction between group and face condition was also not significant (F (2, 
32) = 0.1, P = 0.9). As the difference between HF A and MC sample was not 
significant the data of the two groups were collapsed as one group for further 
investigation of the face condition differences. 
A paired sample t-test was carried out and mean accuracy for full to inner face was 
not significantly different to mean accuracy for inner to full face condition (t = 0.62, 
p= 0.53). The mean accuracy for inner to inner face condition was significantly better 
than inner to full face (t = 4.68, p=O.OOI) and inner to inner face condition was also 
significantly better than full to inner face (t = 8.15, P = 0.001). 
9.3.3.5 Correlation between TO and production scores 
Literature in the past has explored the correlation between CARS score and 
performance on face processing tasks (Riby et aI., 2008) in order to investigate if the 
level of functioning on the autism spectrum has an impact on level of performance. In 
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this thesis correlation between level of performance and IQ was investigated because 
the CARS score may not have been very reliable. As stated in chapter 6 the CARS 
questionnaire was completed by teachers or parents. As this scoring was not 
monitored by researchers of this experiment it is extremely difficult to estimate how 
the pre-existing diagnosis affected the perception of person answering the 
questionnaire. Taking such bias due to previous knowledge and information into 
consideration it was decided to investigate the correlation with IQ. None of the 
correlation was significant (See appendix 6). 
9.3.4 Discussion 
To my knowledge previous researches have not presented inner face in learning phase 
to children with autism. 
Children with autism were not significantly different to TO which is in line with the 
first prediction. This is also in line with findings of a section of previous research 
testing children with autism but focussing on mouth region (Joseph and Tanaka, 
2003), adults with autism for holistic processing (Behrmann et al., 2006), for accuracy 
in face matching (Rondan et aI., 2003) and FR using either outer or inner face during 
testing (Wilson et al., in press). Closer inspection of percentage accuracy reveals that 
TO were marginally better than HF A in identity recognition for all three conditions, 
nonetheless these differences were not significant. It can be concluded that there was 
no difference between HF A sample and age and IQ matched controls for FR using 
inner-outer face paradigm. 
The second prediction was that children with autism will be better than the TO 
particularly in the inner to full face condition because, autism population is known for 
superior local level processing ability (Mottron et al., 2006) and avoid global 
processing so the external contour will not hamper identity recognition to the same 
extent as the TD. HF A sample were as affected as the TD in the inner to full face 
condition; meaning the accuracy for inner to full face was significantly worse than the 
inner to inner face condition leading to the rejection second prediction. The autism 
sample appear to be operating holistic face processing whereby the inner face was 
glued to external contour making the previously seen inner face appear to be a novel 
face. 
149 
The third and final prediction was that the autism sample will not be as efficient in 
holistic face processing as TD. Based on the finding for all three face conditions it is 
clear that children with autism were no different than the TD and thus the final 
prediction also had to be rejected. 
This means that the HFA sample can, just like the TD, process inner face information 
when only inner face information is available both during learning and testing. In fact, 
the recognition accuracy demonstrates that when only inner face information was 
available the accuracy performance was best, which is in line with experiment 1 
reported here. The findings of this experiment allow me to extend the possible 
explanations given for children aged 5-10 years to children with autism. It appears 
that alteration in perceptual appearance continues to hamper identity recognition in 
the HFA sample just like 5-IO-year-olds in experiment 1 and infants in experiment 
reported by Turati et aI., (2006). It is also evident that the HF A sample executes a 
holistic face processing strategy, which enhances the FR for inner face in isolation 
and deteriorates FR of inner face when presented with novel external contour. 
It has been demonstrated that the HF A sample can process inner faces and that they 
process such stimuli holistically. They can thus be tested for the FE production 
experiment which will be presented under chapter 11. The final investigation in the 
holistic processing is examining if children are presented with both full and inner face 
which they will process better. 
9.3.5 Limitation of experiment 3 
Face processing studies in the recent past have used techniques such as reaction time 
or eye tracking in order to investigate if the autism samples are achieving the same 
task in more time (Behrmann et aI., 2006) or by using an entirely different strategy 
(Rondan and Deruelle, 2008 ). Although, using eye tracking was beyond the remit of 
this thesis, reaction time could have been monitored, recorded and analysed. Since the 
participants in experiment 1 and 2 were not told that their reaction time was recorded, 
it was decided that the same approach would be adopted for experiment 3. 
Nonetheless, on retrospective analysis of data and reflection it appears that this may 
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actually be a limitation of this experiment, whereby opportunities to further explore 
any difference in holistic face processing within the present design was lost. 
9.4 Experiment 4 
As I move on to exploring FE production in the HF A sample the one last question to 
address in this area using either inner or outer face was: What do TD do if they have 
both full and inner face available for learning and then at recognition? Which one 
would they prefer? 
It should be noted here that familiar and unfamiliar faces are processed differently by 
adults, who rely initially more on outer face parts for recognition and slowly switch to 
inner face processing as the face gets more familiar (Bonner et aI., 2003). In the case 
of children, Want et aI., (2003) demonstrated and Bonner and Burton, (2004) 
reiterated that children as young as nine and seven respectively, process unfamiliar 
faces holistically in a manner that is similar to adults, where the inner and outer face 
information are used equally but the judgements based on outer face parts are more 
efficient. 
So if children learn both full face and inner only face the investigation was will this 
help them in using the inner features for recognition? 
9.4.1 Aim of the experiment 
To explore when both full and inner face. are available for learning which one do 
children use more effectively. 
The second was to record reaction time, in order to address one of the flaws of 
previous experiment and to explore the difference HF A and TD group performance 
both in accuracy and speed. 
9.4.2 Hypotheses 
1. My first prediction was that older children will be significantly more accurate 
younger children in the identity recognition task. 
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2. The second prediction was that recognition for full face and inner face will be 
equivalent. This was based on the hypothesis presented by Turati et aI., (2006) , 
that perceptual similarity enhances accuracy levels. 




Typically developing children of three age groups, 5-6-year-olds, 8-8-year-olds and 9-
10-year-olds participated in the study. There were twenty three children in each 
group. All the conditions of experiment 1 were applied for testing. 
9.4.3.2 Apparatus and material 
Female and male adults were filmed individually using digital camcorder. Before the 
filming started the protagonist was asked to wear a black hooded jacket to achieve 
uniform clothing and the hood was needed later in the recording. The protagonist 
began by facing the camera and then moved his head by 90 degrees to face away from 
. the camera so that the face now appeared in a profile shot. He then moved his head 
slowly from his left shoulder to right shoulder i.e. moving head by 180 degree and 
then came back to the resting position so that the camera had the full frontal face in 
view. As he moved the head he spoke the following phrase "Baba black sheep have 
you any wool" in order to introduce motion in the internal features of the face. Once 
back in the resting position he put the hood on such that only the inner face was 
visible now and all the hair as well as the hairline was covered. He then once again 
moved his head from full frontal view of the face to the left side by 90 degrees for the 
face to appear in profile shot. This time when he started to move the head by 180 
degrees and finally come back to the resting position (front facing the camera) he said 
"yes sir, yes sir three bags full". Thirty film clips were edited to make them 10 
seconds long and sound was removed. Portrait photographs of adults from the film 
were extracted and matched for general similarity with 30 novel adult faces. These 
photos were then edited using Photoshop and cropped. Fifteen photos were cropped to 
show the full face and nothing else and fifteen were cut in an oval such that the oval 
had the inner face only 
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The computer program Dev Lab 2005 version was used to design the experiment and 
present stimuli to participants. This program showed the IDs recording at the top of 
the screen and after a delay of 500 ms when the screen was blank, showed a pair of 
faces side by side at the bottom of screen. The stimuli were divided into two lists both 
had fifteen randomised trials of a video followed by either pairs of full faces or pairs 
of inner faces. 
9.4.3.3 Procedure 
It was exactly same as experiment 1, although participants were informed that they 
will be watching a short video and urged not to get distracted but to keep looking at 
the screen. 
9.4.3.4Results 
The mean accuracy for full and inner face conditions increased with age (see table 
9.5) with 9-1O-year-olds reaching the ceiling limit of accuracy. 
Table 9.5: Mean percentage accuracy for full and inner face 
Age Mean% accuracy Mean % accuracy T test for difference p 
groups for full face for inner face between two face 
conditions (t=) 
5-6 80.95 66.11 4.56 0.001 
years 
8-8 88.55 83.95 5.34 0.001 
years 
9-10 93.88 84.03 4.65 0.001 
years 
A 3x2 split plot ANDV A was conducted for age and face conditions. The main effect 
of age was significant (F = 10.81, P = 0.001), and the main effect of face condition 
was also significant (F = 68.94, p = 0.001), but the interaction between the two factors 
was not significant (F = 0.99, p = 0.38). 
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The main effect of age was further analysed using independent sample t-test, which 
revealed 5-6-year-olds were not significantly different to 8-8-year-olds (t = 1.85, p = 
0.08) for full face or for inner face (t = 1.58, P = 0.123). The difference between 8-8-
year-olds and 9-10-year-olds was significant (t = 2.25, p = 0.03) for full face and for 
inner face conditions (t = 2.4, P = 0.02). 5-6-year-olds were also significantly worse 
than 9-1O-year-olds (t= 4.06, p = 0.001) for full face and for inner face (t= 4.62, P = 
0.001). 
The main effect of the face condition was further analysed using paired sample t-test 
which revealed that for all age groups full face recognition was significantly better 
than inner face recognition (See table 9.5). 
The reaction time was recorded and this information shows that mean reaction time 
decreased with age (See table 9.6). 
Table 9.6: Mean reaction time of all ace groups for two face conditions 
Full face recognition (msec) Inner face recognition (msec) 
5-6 years 3943.62 3590.38 
8-8 years 2514.05 2548.05 
9-10 years 1848.84 1982.86 
A 3x2 split plot ANOV A was conducted for age and mean reaction time. The main 
effect of age was significant (F = 32.23; P = 0.001), and the main effect of face 
condition was not significant (F = 3.28, P = 0.08) and the interaction not was 
significant. (F=.361, P = 0.69). Since the reaction time for full and inner face 
condition were not significantly different both the data sets were collapsed and the 
main effect of age was further analysed using independent sample t-test, which 
revealed that 5-6-year-olds were significantly slower than 8-8-year-olds (t = 4.36, P = 




The aim of experiment 4 was to explore when both full and inner faces are available 
during learning, which one children use more effectively, taking both speed and 
accuracy measures into consideration. 
9-10-year-olds were significantly better than both the younger age groups indicating 
that the first prediction was true. This was in line with previous research (Want et aI., 
2003; Bonner and Burton, 2004). 
There was a significant difference between full and inner FR for each age group: all 
the children were better at recognising faces from full face in comparison to inner 
face. Thus recognition of full face was well above chance at 80% to start with and it 
increased to 93 % for 9 to 10 year olds reaching almost ceiling limits. The 9 to 10 
year olds were significantly different to 8 to 8 year olds but 5 to 6 year olds were not 
significantly different to 8 to 8 year olds so even though children are better at 
recognising faces from full face this does not improve significantly with age. 
All participants were significantly better in full FR compared to inner FR, thus 
rejecting second prediction. This was based on the argument presented by Turati et 
aI., (2006) regarding perceptual similarity. Although the stimuli used for learning and 
recognition were such that perceptual similarity is maintained, it did not achieve the 
same results. Children in general recognised full face better and preferred to learn a 
face from the full face rather than the inner face. It can be concluded that children can 
process inner face when this is the only information available such as condition 3 in 
experiment 1, however if they have full face available they prefer to use this instead. 
The reaction time data indicates that younger children are significantly slower than 
the older children. The reaction time performance emphasised that even when 5-year-
olds perform at 80 % level which is very good; it was achieved in significantly longer 
time. So holistic face processing does exist from the age of five years but in a sense it 
is still developing because as the child matures the efficiency improves remarkably, 
allowing ten-year-oIds to perform the same task significantly faster. 
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Exploratory examinations performed to investigate the novel components previously 
unexplored from developmental perspectives; (namely the effect of both full and inner 
face being available for learning) exposed numerous issues. Firstly, it can be 
concluded that when both full and inner face information is available for learning, 
holistic face processing task can be achieved by children as young as 5 quite easily for 
full face leading to accurate judgement 80 % of the time. Secondly, even when inner 
face is available for learning it is not used as efficiently as the full face information 
resulting in, 66 % accuracy in 5-6-year-olds which is very similar to 8-8-year-olds (83 
% accurate). It was only the 9-10-year- olds that were significantly different to both 
the younger groups with accuracy level of 84 %. Accuracy for FR rises showing that 
finally by the age of 9 years children can make effective judgements from only inner 
face. However, this accuracy level is not as good as when judgements are made from 
full face. Thirdly, the reaction time results highlight that children do not spend any 
more time in recognising inner face in comparison to full ,face. These findings are in 
line with Want et aI., (2003) and Bonner and Burton, (2004) whereby children process 
unfamiliar faces holistically. Both inner and outer face information can be used, but 
the judgements based on outer face parts are more efficient and more accurate. 
Younger children may be using holistic face processing but they still do not seem to 
have reached the level of adult expertise and there is a speed accuracy trade off 
between full face and inner face recognition. 
9.5 General discussions 
The aim of the series of experiments reported here was to investigate the effect on 
face recognition when only the inner face is presented to children as young as 6 year 
olds. Children aged 6-IO-year-olds were significantly better at recognising an inner 
face which was originally learnt as a whole face. The performance of 10-year-olds 
was significantly better than 6-year-olds which highlights that face processing is 
affected by both maturational factors as well as qualitative factors. Research in face 
recognition clearly indicates that children process unfamiliar faces differently to 
adults. One of the main aims of this thesis was to examine holistic face processing in 
children using the inner outer face recognition paradigm. It can be concluded that 
children process faces as a whole and the findings of the experiments reported here 
substantiates this. The susceptibility to perceive faces as a whole is so strong that 
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when participants were presented with a previously seen inner face within a novel 
contour it was perceived as a new face. This has been reported previously elsewhere 
(Sinha and Poggio, 1996; Young et aI., 1988) and Campbell et a1. (1999) reported that 
even blurring of the outer face contour draws attention and cannot be ignored. 
Experiments 2 and 3 reported here investigated the effect on face recognition when 
only the inner face is available for learning. Children aged 6 to 10 years of age were 
sensitive to the 'inversion effect' with only the inner face. One explanation may be 
that the inner face was processed holistically rather than piecemeal processing. 
However, when both the inner and the whole face were available participants were 
faster in recognising the whole face and accuracy for the whole face was significantly 
better. Since the inner face has not been presented previously in the learning phase 
the only parsimonious conclusion I draw from this finding is that children process the 
inner face if they have to but their perfornlance for recognition is better when the 
whole face is available for learning. The findings of these experiments fit well with 
the experience-expectant theory which claims that experience is essential for face 
expertise to develop. It appears from the findings reported here that experience with 
the full face definitely enhances recognition performance for full face stimuli. Since 
in day to day life children are not exposed to just the inner face in Britain perhaps 
recognition of the inner face takes longer and is not as accurate. 
HF A participants were as good as matched controls in face processing when the inner 
or the full face were presented during learning and testing. It can be concluded that 
HF A participants were as susceptible to holistic processing as MC. The neural system 
model for face perception (Haxby et aI., 2000) clearly states that lateral fusiform 
gyrus is responsible for identity recognition. Juxtaposing the finding of the 
experiment reported here with this model one inference may be that in the HF A 
sample the lateral fusiform gyrus is functioning and so the face processing deficit in 
HF A is the result of a more downstream insult. However, previous researchers have 
reliably demonstrated that autism population can develop alternative strategies to 
process faces (Behrmann et aI., 2006). Thus an alternative explanation could be that 
HF A sample even with atypical lateral fusiform gyrus can perform at levels similar to 
MC by developing alternative strategies. 
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Chapter 10 
Production of FE on demand and with context in two age 
groups: a series of investigation 
10.1 Introduction: Production of facial expression 
To date there has been no generally accepted theory of emotion processing, or any 
generally accepted theoretical framework with which to understand the development 
of emotion processing and associated neural systems (Mclure, 2000; Herba and 
Phillips, 2004). The processing of emotionally salient information is vital for our 
survival as social beings. It is comprised of physiological, experiential, cognitive, 
behavioural, expressive, attitudinal and regulatory components (Brody, 1985). 
Chapter 3 covers the processes important in understanding emotional experiences 
(Phillips et aI., 2003) and outlines that FE is a very small part of the whole complex 
system, but one that has received a lot of attention. This is primarily because probing 
into other domains, such as discrimination of body postures or prosody in voice, 
involves many more confounding factors, including verbal and physical ability (Herba 
and Phillips, 2004). Even within the field of FE most studies have focussed on 
identification, discrimination or labelling while there has been little research on actual 
production. This is because, apart from various confounding factors of recording and 
scoring, FEs are governed by two contradictory purposes (Blair, 2003). 
One of the purposes of FE is the communication of valence; imparting specific 
information to the observer (Mineka and Cook, 1993; Blair, 2003; Matthew and 
Wells, 1999). The second purpose of FE is an automatic display of the emotional 
experience one is going through (Darwin, 1872; Ekman, 1997). However, empirical 
evidence strongly suggests that the emotions a person displays are not always what 
the person emotionally experiences (Camras, 1994).This is contradictory to both the 
purposes of FE. Societal and cultural proscriptions as to what emotion should be 
displayed under what circumstances and how intensely are major factors regulating 
the expression of emotion via FE (Blair, 2003; Ekman and Friesen, 1969). There is a 
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suggestion that presence of an observer is one of the factors that regulates 
spontaneous and over learned FE as well as controlled and posed FE (Rinn, 1984). FE 
and emotions are multidimensional because on one hand we understand emotions to 
be product of emotional experience while on the other hand we understand FEs are 
tools to communicate. The overarching factor nullifying both the above perceptions is 
the 'display rules'; It is within this framework I embarked to explore FE production 
and emotion understanding in HF A sample; it is an avenue not previously considered, 
at least not to my knowledge. 
Individuals with autism have impairment in social interaction, communication and 
imitation as stated by ICD-lO (WHO, 1994). From this understanding scientists have 
examined autism individuals' ability for FE recognition, discrimination and labelling. 
This chapter discusses the scattered and limited evidence of FE imitation and labelling 
of emotions within a typically developing population, population with learning 
difficulties and autism. 
J 0.1. J FE labelling and production in Me 
It is known that FE is governed by display rules. Reichenbach and Masters, (1983) 
scrutinised children's understanding of actual FE produced in a given context. In 
other words they examined whether children can label emotions when they are given 
a particular context in which the character of the story should feel that emotion. For 
example "Mary left her favourite toy at someone's house and will not get it for a long 
time" meant that Mary would feel sad. In this study children were read the short 
stories while four FE were displayed on slide; happy, sad, angry and neutral. The 
study reported that recognition of expressive facial expression was enhanced by the 
context. Happy was judged more accurately than the other four affects, but older 
children misjudged happy more than younger children, who judged 95 % of happy 
context accurately. The study also reported that anger was misjudged as sad on 38 % 
of occasions, making it the most misjudged emotion; this was particularly pronounced 
in older children. Rather than concluding that some expressions are more difficult to 
learn or that accuracy increases with age, experience and socialisation, the authors 
concluded that different expressions are conceptualised differently. The expressions 
are conceptualised in terms of perceptual cues as well as other ways such as the 
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likelihood of a specific behaviour when that emotion is experienced or the feedback 
received from others when that emotion is expressed. 
Stewart and Singh, (1995) reported a study investigating the ability of children with 
learning difficulties to produce FE and understanding of emotions in context. Six, 12 
to 13 year olds with IQs ranging from 44 to 64 were asked to match the emotion 
described in a story to one of the six basic FE. Participants were then asked to show 
how that FE would appear on their face. For instance, "if someone gave you a present 
that you had always wanted, you would be glad. You would be pleased and happy" is 
an example of happy story; task being to pick the FE which is happy and then show 
the same FE on their own face. Happy expressions were the easiest to match and 
surprised was the hardest to match to the story condition. This study was essentialIy 
looking at improving the FE production ability via training so baseline data for 
production was recorded, training provided and then improvement was noted in 
children with learning difficulty. 
Linda Camras investigated FE production in infants. For instance, Camras, Lambreht 
and Michel, (1996) reported that infants produced prototypical FE in situations that 
were not congruent with the situation. Camras et aI., (2002) reported findings contrary 
to the previous one where infants were experiencing an emotion but not producing the 
congruent prototypical FE. In addition Camras, (1992) had observed considerable 
lability in infants FE i.e. rapid shifts between anger, pain and sad FE when crying. AlI 
of these findings taken together emphasise the influence of 'display rules' and how 
early children start picking up social and cultural proscriptions. 
Field and Walden, (1982) investigated FE production and discrimination in typicalIy 
developing children 3-5 years of age. Participants were required to produce a range of 
FEs as weII as discriminate FEs produced. Children were best at producing happy FEs 
followed by angry and afraid. The study reported that children's ability to produce FE 
was superior than their ability discriminate FEs and that IQ scores were correlated to 
expressivity. 
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10.1.2 FE imitation in ASC 
In the autism population FE production has been investigated only in toddlers and it is 
the imitation of FE as opposed to production that has generally been examined. This 
is because imitation over the first two years of life is very elaborate and serves several 
functions, for instance imitation of FE provides a sense of connectedness, mutuality 
and a means of communication with social partners (Meltzoff and Gopnik, 1993). 
Imitation also gives the toddler information about the physical and social world 
allowing socialleaming through imitation (Rogers et aI., 2003). With autism being a 
social disorder, and impairment in communication and interaction being one of its 
cardinal features (according to ICD-} 0; WHO, 1994), imitation deficit has been 
claimed to be a fundamental to social deficit and hence empirically investigated. 
Rogers et aI., (2003) investigated facial imitation among various other forms of 
imitation such as body posture and action on objects they reported that three-year-old 
children with autism were significantly worse at imitation than MC. 
McIntosh et aI., (2006) examined implicit and explicit imitation of FE in adolescents 
with autism and a typically developing sample matched for age, gender and verbal 
intelligence. 18-30-year-old participants were asked first just to look at the pictures as 
they appeared and in the second task asked to explicitly copy the facial movements. 
The performance was recorded using electromyography (EMG) which records all the 
muscle movements. The expressions used were happy and angry and results showed 
that individuals with autism were impaired in implicit imitation but the performance 
of explicit imitation was same as the MC. The authors concluded that when 
individuals with autism are asked to copy FE they would be able to do it as 
successfully as MC but when they are expected to copy FE automatically they will 
fail the task. 
10.2 Aim of experiment 1: Investigation of FE production in Me 
children 
It has been established that FE has been researched mostly examining recognition, 
discrimination, matching and labelling the expressions. Labelling of emotions has 
been researched to a very limited extent because of the confounding factor of verbal 
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ability. Studies which have used labelling emotion tasks have emphasised the impact 
of display rules on these tasks. It appears that children learn from a very young age 
that the emotions feIt and FE displayed may not always be congruent. In addition, 
children learn that not all emotions felt ought to be displayed. Literature claims that 
FE production has not been investigated because of the confounding factors such as 
measurement and scoring; as well as the social and cultural proscriptions, attitudes 
and display rules that hugely impacts FE production (Herba and Phillips, 2004; 
Reichenbach and Masters, 1983). 
Bearing all the constraints in mind, I attempted to explore FE production in high 
functioning children with autism (HFA) in order to investigate whether individuals 
with autism are able to produce FEs on demand, as in McIntosh et ai's., (2006) 
sample, without any prompts or cues. In addition, ability to label the emotion of the 
character in the story was investigated. Finally, having accurately labelled an emotion, 
it was examined if individuals with autism are able to produce the FE that best depicts 
that emotion. 
A task was developed to measure FE production in children. Since there is no data or 
information on FE production available, the first study was designed to create some 
baseline data underpinning the developmental trend. 
10.2.1 Hypotheses 
To my knowledge production of the six basic FE has not been investigated before in 
typically developing children beyond preschool years. The first section was an 
exploratory study to establish baseline data in MC hence predictions cannot be made 
on the ability of MC children. Intuition suggests that when context is provided 
children will find it easier to produce expressions. However, I cannot make such 
assumptions because in previous research context was not found to help children 
asked to label FEs (Reichenbach and Masters, 1983). 
FE recognition has a developmental trend with happy being recognised the best and 
earliest followed by sad or angry, followed by surprise or fear and disgust emerging 
last. Based on this, the only prediction that can be made by extrapolation is that a 
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• Happy FE will be easiest to produce followed by sad or angry or fear or surprise 
and that disgust FE will be hardest to produce. 
10.2.2 Method 
10.2.2.1 Participants 
Typically developing children of two age groups, 6-7-year-olds and 9-1O-year-olds, 
twelve in each group, participated in the study. All participants were tested at their 
school in a quiet environment. Information and consent forms were sent to parents 
and only when parents actually sent an affirmative consent form back was the child 
tested. The purpose of the work and actual task was explained to each child before 
seeking assent. 
10.2.2.2 Apparatus and material 
• Vignettes: Eighteen stories that described the events likely to elicit six basic 
emotions were written up; seeking guidance from Reichenbach and Masters, 
(1983) and Stewart and Singh, (1995). All the vignettes were such that concealing 
ones emotions was not called for; all of the scenarios either had more than one 
person involved or the situation was such that expressing cine's emotion would be 
the right thing to do. Because if children are aware of display rules they would not 
inhibit their ability to naturally express the emotion. Twelve adults were then 
recruited to label each vignette with the appropriate emotion, where six possible 
labels were provided. Only the vignettes which had 80% or above congruent 
rating (i.e. ones which were correctly labelled by 9 out of 12 adults) were retained 
for the experiment and the rest were rejected. Of these 12 with the highest ratings 
were selected to be finally included in the study (See Appendix 1). 
The stories were then given to 6 six primary school teachers teaching children 
with special needs i.e. various learning and educational difficulties. They were 
asked to state clearly if children aged 6 or above would find the stories simple and 
easy to comprehend and ifnot then to specify the difficult ones clearly. They were 
to also look at the language and words used in the stories for unfamiliarity and 
difficulty and specify those. All the teachers unanimously gave the feedback that 
163 
each story was simple and that the language was accessible and familiar to 
children aged 6 with or without a learning difficulty (See Appendix 2). 
Once the twelve stories were finalised I was filmed reading each story clearly, at 
normal reading speed for children, with as little intonation in voice as possible and 
minimal facial expression so as not to provide any additional clues to participants 
apart from the context of the story. This recording was copied to a DVD which 
could be played using media player. This was done so that vignettes can be 
presented in a standardised format to each participant and thus to minimise 
variation. 
• Facial Action Coding System (FACS) - Ekman and Friesen (1978) produced 
F ACS, which catalogued all possible distinguishable facial movements, termed 
facial action units (FAU), associated with each of the six basic FE of emotions. 
The F ACS is a standard method for describing facial movements associated with 
each emotion (Ekman and Friesen, 1978) and I trained on F AU rating and facial 
muscles movement and achieved 94% reliability. Once having achieved the 
reliability, I practiced the facial movements needed for producing FE in order to 
produce the 10 facial movements necessary for the production of the six basic FE. 
• Facial movement DVD: in order to check that all the muscles required for 
producing the six basic FE are functional and each participant is able to 
voluntarily control these facial muscles, the baseline task was designed. 
According to FACS, 10 FAU are necessary for producing the 6 basic FE. These 
facial movements as follows 
1. AU4: upper forehead (muscles contracting). 
2. AU2: eye brow (arch) 
3. AU5: eyes (wide opening) 
4. AU7: eyes (narrowing) 
5. AU 45: eyes blink 
6. AU9: nose wrinkle 
7. AUlO: upper lip (open) 
8. AU17: lower lip (push upwards) 
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9. AU25/27: mouth open! teeth clenched 
10. AU20: lip stretcher 
I was filmed performing each of the above facial movement at the normal speed after 
saying the label aloud, but once the facial movement was complete I held the 
exaggerated end facial muscle in position for 10 seconds. This recording was then 
made into a DVD which can be played with the sound using media player on any 
laptop computer. 
• Coding sheet: Two data coding sheets were designed to score and record each of 
the facial movements and FE produced. It was thought that some expressions 
such as surprise may involve hand gestures and body part movement; bearing this 
in mind data coding sheet 1 was designed to record not only FEs but body 
movements. Since the experiment was primarily designed to investigate FE data, 
coding sheet 2 was designed where each correct FE was to be rated on a Likert 
scale of 1 to 7, 1 being very mild FE and 7 being intense FE. Also provisions 
were made to code any spontaneous FE. Any incorrect FE was not to be coded at 
all. The raters would be provided the information as to which FE was demanded 
and the task would be to code if participant produces the correct FE (See 
Appendix 2 and 3) 
• A Sony camcorder was used to film each participant throughout the whole task. 
Each recording was then downloaded onto DVD to make 2 copies for future 
rating. 
• A Laptop computer was used to play both the facial movement baseline task 
DVD and the short stories DVD to participants during testing. 
10.2.2.3 Procedure 
Each participant was tested in a quiet room on a one to one basis. Participants were 
explained the purpose of study in brief and informed that they will be filmed 
throughout the task. Active consent for filming as well as participation was sought 
from each participant. 
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Participants were then instructed that the first part of the task was to copy the faces I 
am making in the DVD and the second part of the task was to make the FE on their 
own without any copying. The first task started when the participant was ready and 
the experimenter had set the camcorder ready for filming. 
10.2.2.3.1 Baseline task- when the participant was ready the instruction was to press 
play on the laptop computer which had the DVD for baseline task loaded and ready to 
be played. Once the play button was pressed on the computer the experimenter started 
filming using the camcorder. 
The first instruction on the DVD was 'Please copy the faces I am making'. Then the 
10 facial movement task started, first naming the face area that would be involved 
followed by actual facial muscle movement. For instance, first baseline task would be 
presented as "upper forehead" followed by visual presentation of forehead muscle 
contracting in order to display an exaggerated frown i.e. AU4 in action. When they 
had seen the facial movement being performed, participants would perform the task 
themselves. Once a F AU movement was presented on the DVD it was held in the 
exaggerated form for 10 secs in the video giving the participant plenty of opportunity 
to observe and copy. If the participant immediately achieved the task they would still 
have to wait for 10 secs while the facial movement on the DVD is displayed giving 
the participant opportunity for further scrutiny in order to improve their personal 
display, if they are not completely satisfied with their first attempt. I provided positive 
feedback if the task was achieved straight away or prompted pm1icipant to take a 
closer look and try again if they had not immediately achieved the task. Each 
participant was given the full 10 secs for each facial movement and if they did not 
achieve a particular facial movement at all then the DVD was paused, rewound and 
that facial movement shown again. This was done only once and then the participant 
was encouraged to move on and continue if they still did not achieve the facial 
movement. In total there were 10 facial movements and each participant needed to 
achieve at least 8 in order to move onto the FE production task. 
10.2.2.3.2 Production of FE on demand 
Once a participant has achieved the baseline task above the required threshold (i.e. 8 
out of 10) then they would move to the next task. The computer was moved while I 
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explained, "I am going to ask you to make some faces for me, please listen carefully 
and do what is asked of you. If you do not follow any instructions please ask to repeat 
immediately. Ok. When you are ready." Once participants indicated that they were 
ready for the task, I would ask them to produce the six basic FE one by one. These 
questions would be interspersed with other questions such as 'can you stick your 
tongue out for me?' To ensure that participants do not have problems following 
instructions and executing them (See appendix 4). 
10.2.2.3.3 Story condition and production of FE with context 
Once participants had finished the FE production task they would move to this task. If 
they have failed to produce any particular FE then before moving onto the context 
condition I verified whether they knew the meaning 'of that particular FE label, 
explained what was meant by that specific label and produced the FE to demonstrate 
what was expected. 
For the context condition I started by saying, "Now I will present you with some short 
stories, you need to listen very carefully. I will then ask you how the person in the 
story is feeling. You need to choose one of these words to answer my question ok?" 
The six labels for the FE were shown in writing and the computer was again brought 
to fore and each participant was asked to indicate when they were ready to press the 
start button in order to play DVD 2 for the story. When the start button was pressed 
by the participant, I started filming. At the end of each story when it said - 'how 
would (character in the vignette) feel?' participants were expected to respond verbally 
and provide the FE label choosing one of the six labels provided. Handwritten labels 
for six FE were visible at all times for the participant. Once provided with the verbal 
label I would ask, 'Will you show me the face you make when you feel happy?' and 
participants would be expected to produce the relevant FE once again. After the first 
couple of times participants became accustomed to of the task and mostly produced 
FE after the labelling without any prompts. 
At the end participants were thanked for taking part and working hard for the 
university. 
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] 0.2.3 Coding 
Coding the video data - two raters coded each participants' facial movements and the 
FE produced for accuracy using coding sheet 1 and 2. I was trained on the F ACS in 
order to identify the F AU units associated with each FE using the pictures and 
dynamic FE presented in F ACS. The independent rater did not undergo the full F ACS 
training but was familiarised with the F AU needed for the 6 FE, how to identify and 
rate them; how to notice the essential FAU and the non-occurrence ofFAU. This was 
done using the F ACS pictures and dynamic FE such that both the independent rater 
and I achieved 94 % agreement in the training session. 
The independent rater and I coded the data independently and any discrepancy was 
first looked at by the independent rater individually and then reasons for the specific 
rating were discussed and we reached a consensus and common code. 
Baseline tasks - were coded on a categorical scale of yes or no. A minimum of 8 was 
required in order to participate in the study which was based on F ACS manual. All 
participants achieved 100 % accuracy on the baseline task. The inter-rater reliability 
was evaluated using Cohen's Kappa and the score was 0.86 which means a substantial 
agreement between raters. 
FE on demand - FE produced on demand without any prompts, clues or context were 
then coded using coding sheet 2, part 1 independently by both the raters. This was on 
a Likert scale of 1 to 7. Only accurate FEs were coded for accuracy, clarity and 
intensity. FE on demand was ordinal data with more than two categories hence 
Cohen's Kappa could not be used here. The inter-rater reliability for this score was 
percentage of times the two raters agreed. Raters agreed on average 92% of times. 
Thi"s will be presented in detail later. 
Instructional questions - were coded on a categorical scale of yes or no. All three 
questions received a coding of 'yes' for all the participants, meaning that participants 
achieved 100 % accuracy signifying they had no difficulty in understanding and 
executing the instructions. The inter-rater reliability was evaluated using Cohen's 
Kappa and the score was 0.96 which means a substantial agreement between raters. 
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Story labels - each FE had two vignettes and each vignette that was correctly labelled 
for emotion by the participant got a score of 1 and a wrong label got a score of O. This 
meant that participants had the potential to get a score of 2 for each of the six basic 
emotions, making a possible total of 12. Since the basic score for each vignette could 
only be 0 or 1 once again Cohen' Kappa was used to examine the inter-rater 
reliability, which was above 0.8. 
FE with context - once the stories were labelled FEs were produced which were 
considered by participants to be 'in context'. These FE were coded using coding sheet 
2, part 2, once again independently by both the raters. Only the stories that were 
labelled accurately were scored for accuracy, clarity and intensity. This was on a 
Likert scale of 1 to 7. This will be presented in detail later. The inter-rater reliability 
was calculated as percentage of times the two raters agreed, which was 89 %. 
Attempts were made to use the data coding sheet 1 when scoring FE on demand, story 
labels and FE with context. However, participants made very few significant hand and 
or body gestures linked with producing FE and hence this scoring was not included 
further in any analysis. This will also be discussed later. 
The baseline score and instructional questions scores were not analysed any further. 
The rest of the scores were entered into an excel sheet and further analysed using 
SPSS version 12. 
The inter-rater reliability was measured using Cohen's Kappa and the percentage of 
agreement among raters. This indicates the ratings assigned by both coders were very 
congruent. Both the independent- rater and I worked independently coding each and 
every participant without any knowledge of each others' ratings. The independent 
rater was completely blind to the purpose of the study. One of the reasons for such 
high level of agreement on coding FE is perhaps our training, based on F ACS. F ACS 
provides in great detail exactly which FAU the coders should inspect and what is 
needed to display a particular FE. Stewart and Singh (1995) report that their coders 
were trained on F ACS and that study achieved a 94 % agreement between raters. 
Thus it can be concluded that F ACS is a vital training tool for coding FE and even 
though researchers may not use specific F AU as a coding system; the training based 
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on F ACS provides a good grounding on exactly what to look for and code 
professionally. 
] 0.2.4 Results 
] 0.2.4.] FE on demand 
Mean accuracy data shows that 9-1O-year-olds were marginally better than 6-7-year-
olds in all the expressions except surprise. Both the groups produced accurate FE on 
demand without any prompts and clues and such FE were more intense and clear on 
the whole (See table 1 0.1) 
Table] 0.]: Mean of accurate scores for FE production on demand based on 
Likert scale of J t07 
Happy Sad Angry Fear Surprise Disgust 
9-10 years 5.83 5.67 5.58 4.25 5.50 3.33 
6-7 years 5.75 5.00 5.58 3.67 5.92 2.92 
A 2 (age groups: 10 and 6) X 6 (FE: happy, sad, angry, fear, surprise and disgust) split 
plot ANOV A was conducted. The effect of facial expression was significant (F = 
17.53, P = 0.001), the main effect of age was not significant (F = 0.38, p = 0.54), 
meaning performance of both age groups was same. The interaction was not 
significant (F = 0.23, p = 0.88). 
Both 6-7-year-olds and 9-1 O-year-olds behave in a similar manner for FE production 
on demand. The age effect was not significant indicating that both age groups 
behaved same, hence all the data was collapsed to one group and paired sample t-tests 
were carried out to examine the main effect of FE condition. Happy, sad, angry and 
surprise were significantly different to fear and disgust (See Table 10.2. for all 
significant t-test and p values). 
Table 10.2: t-test and p values for FEs that were significantly different to fear 
and disgust FE 
t-test p 
Happy 4.11 0.001 For fear 
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4.35 0.001 For disgust 
Sad 2.65 0.01 For fear 
3.42 0.002 For disgust 
Angry 2.91 0.008 For fear 
3.56 0.002 For disgust 
Surprise 3.l3 0.005 For fear 
4.05 0.001 For disgust 
There was no significant age difference in the production of FE taking clarity and 
intensity of FEs into consideration. Angry FE was produced with the same clarity and 
intensity on average by the two age groups tested here. FEs happy, sad and fear FEs 
produced by 9-1O-year-olds were better that FEs produced by 6-7-year-olds but the 
difference failed to reach levels of significance. Happy, sad, angry and surprise were 
significantly better than fear and disgust FEs produced by both groups. Disgust FE got 
very poor score, with 6-7-year-olds performing particularly poorly. 
10.2.4.2 Story labels 
Participants were asked to label the emotions of the characters in the stories. The 
mean accuracy scores for correct labels provided shows that on average 9-10-year-
olds performed bctter (Sce Table 10.3) than 6-7-year-olds. 
Table 10.3: Mean scores for accurate story labels based on scale of 0 t02 
Happy Sad Angry Fear Surprise Disgust 
9-10 years 1.42 2 0.83 l.92 l.42 l.17 
6-7 years 1.58 1.83 0.25 l.08 0.83 l.33 
A 6 (FE) X 2 (age) split plot ANOVA was conducted. The main effect of FE (F = 
4.92, P = 0.03) was significant and the main effect of age (F = 9.02, P =0.007) was 
also significant. The interaction was not significant (F = 0.39, P = 0.53). 
The main effect of age was further analysed using independent sample t-test. Fear (t = 
4.89, p = 0.001) and angry (t = 2.75, P = 0.012) were labelled significantly better by 
9-1O-year-olds compared to 6-7-year-olds. 
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The main effect of FE was further analysed using paired sample t-test. 9-10-year-olds 
mean accuracy for FE labelling of sad and fear were significantly different to happy, 
angry, surprise and disgust (See table 10.4), with performance for anger being the 
worst and sad being the best. 
Table 10.4: t-test and p valucs for the story labels that are significantly different 
for 10-year-olds 
t-test p 
Happy 3.92 0.002 For sad 
3.02 0.012 For angry 
3.31 0.01 For fear 
Surprise 3.02 0.01 For sad 
2.56 0.02 For fear 
Disgust 3.45 0.005 For sad 
2.69 0.02 For fcar 
Anger 5.61 0.001 For fcar 
7 0.001 For sad 
Table J 0.5: t-test and p values for the story labcls that are significantly different 
for 6-7-year-olds 
t test p 
Happy 7.09 0.001 For angry 
2.17 0.05 For fear 
2.46 0.03 For surprise 
Sad 10.65 0.001 For angry 
3.44 0.005 For fear 
4.06 0.002 For surprise 
2.17 0.05 For disgust 
Angry 3.45 0.005 For fear 
2.54 0.02 F or surprise 
4.73 0.001 For disgust 
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The mean scores demonstrate that the ability to label FEs of 6-7 -year-olds are similar 
to 9-1 O-year-olds, for both the groups the judgements of sad emotion is the best and of 
angry emotion is the worst. 6-7 -year-olds ability to label the happy emotion is 
significantly better than their ability to label angry, fear and surprise. Their ability to 
label sad is significantly better than everything except happy and labelling anger is 
significantly worse compared to everything else (See Table 10.5). 
Emotion labels for the characters in the stories were provided more accurately by 9-
100year-olds compared to 6-7year-olds. Older children were significantly better than 
younger children in labelling fear and anger. Within group analysis revealed that 9-
10-year-olds labelling of sad and fear was best and significantly different to their own 
performance for happy, anger, surprise and disgust. 9-10-year-olds labelled sad most 
accurately, scoring the perfect score of 2 on average and labelled anger the least 
accurately, scoring on average only 0.8. Within group analysis of 6-7-year-olds 
revealed that labelling of the anger emotion was least accurate and it was significantly 
different to all the other emotions labelled. They also found labelling thc surprise 
cmotion very difficult; performance was poor and significantly differcnt to 
performance for all other emotions except fear. Like older children, performancc for 
sad was the most accurate and this was significantly bcttcr than anger, surprise, fear 
and disgust. 
10.2.4.3 FE production with context 
Children were provided the context of each emotion through short stories and were 
then asked to produce FE. The performance of 9-1 O-year-olds was bctter than 6-7-
year-olds. In order to examine this differcncc more closely a 6X2 split plot ANOV A 
was conducted which showed that main effect of age was significant (F = 4.27, p = 
0.05). The main effect of FE (F = 4.32, P = 0.05) was also significant but intcraction 
was not significant (F = 0.22, p = 0.64). 
Thc main effcct of age was further analysed using an independcnt sample t-tcst which 
showed that older children were significantly better than the youngcr group in the 
production of happy FE (t = 1.99, P = 0.05) and angry FE (t = 2.28, P = 0.03). 
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Table 10.6: Mean of accurate scores for FE production within context based on 
Likert scale of 1 t07 
Happy Sad Angry Fear Surprise Disgust 
9-10 6.17 5.5 4.08 4.75 5.08 4.25 
years 
6-7 years 5.42 4.83 1.67 3.92 4.17 4.08 
The main effect of FE was further analysed using paired sample t-test with split file 
data; this showed that within group happy was significantly better for 9-1 O-year-olds 
but the other expressions were not significantly different to each other in production. 
For 6-7-year-olds production of angry was significantly worse than the rest of the FE 
and happy was significantly better. There were no other significant differences. 
10.2.4.4 Comparison of FE with and without context 
Paired sample t-test was carried out to investigate if FEs produced on demand were 
significantly different to those produced within context. Production of FEs with and 
without context was not significantly different for 9-10-year-olds. Context did not 
make an impact on FE production in a way that production improved or deteriorated 
significantly when explicit context was provided. Production of FE with and without 
context was significantly different for 6-7-year-olds in the case of angry FE (t = 4.1, P 
= 0.002), surprise FE (t = 2.29, P = 0.04) and disgust FE (t = 3.88, P = 0.003). 
Examining the mean score for FEs produced with and without context we can see that 
with context performance for disgust improved but performance of anger and surprise 
was significantly worse. 
10.2.5 Discussion 
10.2.5.1 naseline task 
This was designed to evaluate if all the muscles required for producing six basic FE 
are functional and under voluntary control of the participants. In all a score of 8 out of 
10 was required to participate further in the study. This was based on FACS because 
all FAU may not be used to express a specific FE. For example, disgust FE can be 
achieved either by protruding ones tongue out or wrinkling nose or a combination of 
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both. Now if a participant in baseline task failed to achieve nose wrinkle (AU9) then 
there is no guarantee that they will not be able to produce disgust FE. They may still 
be able to display disgust FE by protruding tongue. Similarly, angry FE may be 
achieved by narrowing the eyes (AU7) or forehead contracting (AU4) or a 
combination of both. These were highlighted very well by F ACS which I took on 
board when designing the requirements and set the minimum to 8. However, this 
sample of typically developing 6-10-year-olds achieved 100 % in baseline task, 
demonstrating that facial muscles required for producing six basic FE were 
completely functional and under their voluntary control. All participants went ahead 
with rest of the tasks of the study. This task was successful in evaluating the muscular 
movement and voluntary control and the F ACS system has been the main tool 
enabling such a design to be developed. 
10.2.5.2 Instructional questions 
These were set in order to evaluate if participants have any difficulty in understanding 
and executing instructions. Three instructional questions were asked and all the 
participants achieved 100 % in terms of accuracy. This signified that all participants 
had the ability to comprehend instructions and carry them out. Through this it can be 
ensured that failure to produce FE is not failure to understand instructions or difficulty 
in carrying them out. Instructional questions have been an easy but effective way of 
investigating if participants can comprehend simple instructions and carry them out. 
Herba and Phillips, (2004) state that it has been difficult to investigate FE production 
to certain extent due to the confounding factor of verbal ability. Although, verbal 
ability as a confounding factor for story condition cannot be completely eliminated, 
these instructional questions enabled to minimise the effect of verbal ability at least in 
the FE production condition. Since the experiment was developed to investigate 
children with autism's FE production ability, it is essential to ensure that there is no 
problem in participant's understanding and following instructions to produce FE, 
what can only be classed a 'social instruction'. The findings with MC demonstrate 
that the task is effective and hence will be useful in autism research. 
Children made very few gestures and these were not linked with FE production, as a 
result the data coding sheet 2 did not generate enough data for further analysis. It was 
175 
decided not to continue coding data using coding sheet 2 but to code FE data only 
using coding sheet 1. 
Spontaneous FEs were also not produced often enough in order to generate sufficient 
data for further analysis and hence it was decided not to continue to code for 
spontaneous FE either. 
10.2.5.3 FE produced on demand 
Moving onto matters more pertinent, production of FE, I first consider FE produced 
on demand, without any prompts, clues or context. Participants were asked to produce 
a particular FE in a voice which was very monotonous (so as not to provide them any 
clues) and any feedback in this part was avoided. 
Production of happy FE was best for both age groups closely followed by surprise. FE 
recognition literature states that recognition of happy is first acquired at the age of 
nearly 4 months of age (Nelson, 1987). This is followed by sad and angry, followed 
by surprise (Gross and Ballif, 1991; Herba and Phillips, 2004) with fear and disgust 
emerging much later (Widen and Russell, 2003). From the mean scores for clarity and 
intensity of 9-1 O-year-olds it appears that for FE production there is a similar pathway 
for FE production. Average scores for happy were best, followed by sad, anger, then 
surprise, then fear and finally disgust being produced with minimum clarity and 
intensity. In the case of 6-7-year-olds the trend is slightly different and although all 
average scores are close to each other, production of surprise was surprisingly best 
followed by happy, anger, sad and fear. Production of disgust by 6-7-year-olds was 
worst and this was a combination of failing to produce the disgust expression 
completely and producing expressions that were not very clear which failed to receive 
high scores on Likert scale for clarity and intensity and not having the understanding 
of the word disgust. This is in line with recognition literature which states that young 
children fail to recognise disgust (Kolb et aI., 1992) or start to label disgust at age of 5 
(Widen and Russell, 2003) or seven (Harris et at, 1987). It is possible that a child as 
young as 6-7 years of age does not consistently understand disgust and cannot 
produce it accurately. 
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By the age of 10 years children can categorise happy and sad at a level comparable to 
adults (Gosselin, 1995). The literature reports, however mixed findings for anger and 
surprise with Gosselin, (1995) reporting happy and anger to be of same difficulty 
while Camras and Allison, (1985) reporting that anger is harder than happy but easier 
than disgust. The results presented here reflect that for production both anger and 
surprise FEs were on par with happy for both age groups. Only fear and disgust were 
significantly worse than other FEs produced. 
Production of disgust follows the recognition of FE trend, recognition of disgust is not 
reliably established until the age of 14 (Kolb et aI., 1992) in the study reported here 9-
10-year-olds failed to produce disgust FE very well. 
Children of both age groups have found production of fear FE difficult and this is in 
conflict with the recognition literature for fear FE which claims that recognition of 
this expression to be on par with surprise (Gross and Ballif, 1991). Literature on FEs 
emphasises that the functions of FEs are as tools for communication (Blair, 2003) or 
to express the emotion person is experiencing (Ekman, 1997). From either of these 
premises it is clear that individuals cannot produce FEs without actually feeling the 
emotion. This function of FE is not to be confused with the display rules. According 
to display rules individuals may be able to express the emotions they may not feel or 
display different emotion to the ones they feel. The primary assumption is it is harder 
to produce complex emotions without experiencing the emotion but with practice 
easier to disguise when experiencing the emotion. At the same time it is easier to 
display simple emotions such as happy without experiencing the emotion too 
intensely. So, when I say in the study that FE was produced without any context it 
means no explicit context was provided to the participants either by voice intonations, 
or prompts or actual emotion inducing stories. This means participants must be self 
inducing the emotion in order to produce a FE and the scores of happy and surprise 
indicate that these are rather straight forward emotions to induce and produce FEs for 
on demand. 
Children of both age groups presumably found it difficult to self-induce the emotions 
of fear. This was evidenced by the intensity of the fear FE being quite low in 
comparison to other FEs. 
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10.2.5.4 Story labels 
All participants made some mistakes so the total score of 12 was not achieved by any 
participant. Both groups were best at labelling the sad emotion for the character in the 
story. 9-10-year-olds performance for fear emotion was next best which is in line with 
previous research (Widen and Russell, 2003). Accurate labelling of happy and 
surprise was on par for 9-1O-year-olds and just like Reichenbach and Masters, (1983), 
in this experiment the older children misjudged happy more than 6-7-year-olds. The 
other similarity with the literature is how the anger emotion was more often 
misjudged as sad (Reichenbach and Masters, 1983); in the experiment reported here 
children generally labelled both sad and angry story conditions as 'sad', resulting in 
very low scores for the angry FE. 
Both groups were poor in labelling the angry emotion, 6-7 -year-olds being poor 
particularly worst at identifying the emotion of the character in the story as angry and 
the maximum score on average was 0.25 out of 2. There are 2 angry scenarios, out of 
these only 3 participants from the 6-7 -year-olds group were able to label one of these 
scenarios accurately. All the participants in the younger age group got the other story 
on angry wrong. The story that 6-7-year-olds struggled with most was (story 2 -
Appendix 1) where a toy is broken and the child is expected to be angry with his 
friend. However, younger children labelled the emotion here as sad. Anger in general 
was misjudged as sad by both groups. Sad is an internal emotion affecting only the 
self (Blair, 2003), whereas angry is a relational emotion. This highlights that this 
group of younger children were more comfortable in the emotion affecting self than 
expressing or feeling relational emotion. Reichenbach and Master, (1983) also 
reported that anger from context was often misjudged to be sad and one of the reasons 
given by the authors was the existence of as disparity in the conceptualisation of 
emotion in terms of perceptual cues and context. The other reason given by 
Reichenbach and Masters, (1983) was the fact that display ntles and cultural values 
have an impact. States such as anger are more likely to be disguised and part of 
socialisation may be learning not to display anger or to disguise it as other emotions 
such as sadness. The consequence of such training would be (a) to misread when 
anger is displayed behaviourally as something else and (b) an assumption that many 
contexts that should induce states of anger will actually fail to do so because the 
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assumption is the person has 'risen above' it. The FEs that seems to undergo this 
socialisation effect the most are the negative ones such as anger, fear, disgust and sad 
(Reichenbach and Masters, 1983). In my stories sad does not seem to have such an 
effect and children in general seem capable of identifying sad correctly from the 
context. Performance for anger seems to suffer however. This should be a good 
indication of how indoctrinated social beings are and how typically developing 
individuals learn these social rules and apply them automatically. 
One option was to change the angry stories so as to make the angry emotion more 
obvious in the vignettes, this had three implications. One, the obvious ethical 
constraints particularly because I was drawing participants from a vulnerable 
population. Second, I was wary of making the stories so outlandish so that they do not 
remotely represent reaI.life and thus children saw them more as fairy tales and were 
unable to relate to them on a personal level. Finally, the main aim of the study was to 
investigate FE production in children with autism particularly those with HF A who 
are in mainstream education. Autism, as mentioned several times before, is a social 
disorder with deficits in communication, interaction and imitation. HF A children may 
not have the knowledge, experience or practice of such elaborate display rules and 
socialisation and may not be affected in the same way as with children. And if they do 
demonstrate the same pattern of accuracy it will mean that HFA children are as 
knowledgeable as Me in display rules and socialisation. 
On the whole, it was decided that since the aim of context is to facilitate FE 
production it would be best to leave the actual vignettes as they were but to change 
the instructions slightly. It was important that participants knew they could only 
choose one emotion label for the character. 
The performance of 9-1 O-year-olds labelling of disgust confirms the impact of display 
rules and socialisation values yet again. The stories eliciting disgust emotions are very 
direct and children as young as six were able to correctly identify it 66 % of the time. 
Perhaps 9-10-year-olds have learnt to restrain explicit expression of disgust or 
disguise it with other emotion such as surprise. As a result more misjudgements for 
disgust were made by 9-10-year-olds than by 6-7-year-olds. 
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Anecdotal verbal evidence during feedback after the completion of the test 
enlightened me to the fact that children's understanding of some FE labels may be 
different to what was expected of them. When asked what did they understand by 
'disgust' numerous participants, especially the younger children, gave scenarios 
which actually described anger, particularly anger directed towards them by an adult. 
This resulted in a change in procedure to request that participants read FE labels aloud 
allowing me to check with them if they understood each label. This was particularly 
useful for fear and disgust after the FE on demand task was completed and before 
embarking on context condition. 
] 0.2.5.5 FE production with context 
Once the emotion of the character in the story was correctly identified, this was 
considered as the context being correctly identified. The aim was to investigate if this 
impacted on FE production in children 6-10 years of age, especially in terms of clarity 
and intensity. The FE produced with context is very interesting and prompts re-
evaluations of both on FE production in general as well as the impact of context. 
When FE was produced on demand FEs such as happy, sad, angry and surprise were 
of good quality (taking clarity, intensity and accuracy into consideration). It was 
assumed that participants self induced emotions to produce these FE on demand either 
using FE as a tool to communicate the emotion demanded or to show the emotion by 
experiencing it first. In either case since further prompts and clues were not provided 
production is assumed to be by self induction and there was no age difference. 
When context was provided the results indicate a significant age difference. This 
could be interpreted to suggest that all FE production improved with context but on 
the contrary children behaved differently for different FEs with context. 
The 9-1 O-year-olds were significantly better than the 6-7-year-olds in their production 
of angry FE with context. When there was no context the performance (clarity, 
intensity) of both age groups was exactly the same for anger; provision of context 
instead of facilitating production had a negative impact on the performance of 6-7-
year-olds. The data for 6-7 -year-olds labelling and production of angry FE within 
context shows that inaccurate labelling not only led to inaccurate production 
(resulting in zero score for production of anger FE) but also reduced the intensity with 
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which such FEs were produced even when the labelling was accurate. The 
performance with context was significantly worse than the no explicit context 
condition. With self induction children could produce FEs, which scored high for 
intensity and clarity, but when context was provided (a) anger got misjudged to sad 
(perhaps due to display rules Reichenbach and Masters, 1983) and (b) a reduction was 
seen in the intensity and clarity of FE. Reichenbach and Masters, (1983) stated that 
the most likely emotions that undergo such socialisation effects seem to be negative 
ones such as anger. In the present study this was certainly the case. Display rules 
along with social and cultural values induced by specific context, impacted on the 
labelling of the anger emotion and the respective FE production. FEs produced on 
demand demonstrated that children as young as 6 can produce anger FE and this is in 
accordance with the labelling literature (Widen and Russell, 2003) and recognition 
literature (Gosselin, 1995; Gross and Ballif, 1991), all claiming that children at that 
age can recognise and discriminate angerFEs. In the data reported here for anger FE 
produced it is clear that overarching 'display rules' nullify the two functions of FE 
(namely as tools to communicate and express emotions experienced). 
The performance for happy FE improved for 9-10-year-olds with scores reaching 
nearly ceiling limits (6.17 out of 7). This was in spite of the fact that older children 
made more misjudgements in labelling happy than 6-7-year-olds. Nonetheless, when 
happy was judged accurately by older children in the story condition it was produced 
with greater intensity and clarity. The improvements or the decrements were not 
significant which means context did not make significant impact on happy for either 
age group. 
Production of fear and disgust improved with context, with 6-7 -year-olds showing the 
most remarkable improvement in their production of disgust. These two FEs suffered 
the most without any context and the data showed that children struggled to self 
induce these two emotions in order to produce the appropriate FE with adequate 
clarity and intensity. The story condition definitely facilitated the production of these 
two FEs because when asked to produce FEs on demand, production of fear and 
disgust was significantly worst than the rest of FE produced and this was for both the 
age groups. However, when context was available performance for fear and disgust 
improved and these FEs were no longer significantly different to rest of FEs produced 
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in context. Analysis also revealed that for 6-7-year-olds disgust FE produced with 
context was significantly better than disgust FE produced on demand. This is in 
accordance with recognition literature which claimed disgust FE to be the most 
difficult to recognise (Kolb et aI., 1992) and that an increase in intensity facilitated 
recognition (Herba et aI., 2007). In other words, additional information facilitated the 
recognition of disgust and additional information in the form of context facilitated the 
production of disgust, especially for 6-7 -year-olds. 
The sad emotion was recognised most accurately in the stories presented, with the 9-
10-year-olds achieving perfect scores of 2 on average in the labelling task. However, 
labelling did not facilitate production of sad FE immensely and sad FE produced with 
context remains on par without context. 
The fear emotion, like sad, was labelled effectively but labelling did not facilitate 
production and production with context was similar to production without context 
with no significant difference for both groups. 
Surprise FE deteriorates with context again highlighting that positive FEs are easier to 
self induce, and showing a negative impact of context on production. In 6-7-year-olds 
production of the surprise FE with context was significantly worse than production on 
demand. For older children production of surprise FE with context also suffered 
marginal decrement but this difference was not significant. 
On the whole it can be concluded that FE production follows a similar path to 
recognition: happy is the easiest to produce, both with and without context, and 
disgust is the hardest, especially without any context. it has also been demonstrated 
that, context may not make a huge difference to producing FEs that are easy to 
produce, such as happy and sad, but that it definitely facilitates those FEs that are hard 
to self induce, such as fear and disgust. The story labelling task may be influenced to 
a certain extent by display rules and social values because these values are 
indoctrinated in individuals from a very early age. Anger shows the greatest influence 
of display rules and social perceptions and it is easier to produce anger with better 
clarity and intensity without any context than when a specific context is given. 
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Finally, it can be concluded that tasks developed to measure FE production work well. 
These tasks are able to demonstrate that despite all the confounding factors 
emphasised in the literature for investigating FE production (such as verbal ability, 
scoring, prosody, and context) it is possible to investigate production of FE. The 
method of scoring FE produced also has been demonstrated here to be more effective 
than simple dichotomous yes or no data, and successful in not only measuring if FEs 
are produced but also how clear and intense these are, which was made possible partly 
byFACS. 
10.3 Aim of experiment 2: Investigation of FE production in IIFA 
sample and matched controls (MC) 
In Experiment 1 I demonstrated that MC children aged 6-7 years and 9-10 years were 
able to successfully produce FE both on demand and in context. The data 
demonstrates that context facilitates production of emotions that are hard to self 
induce such as fear and disgust whereas FE like happy and sad can be produced 
without any context quite easily by self induction of emotion. When children are 
asked to label the emotion of the character in the story and think in terms of FEs, 
display rules and social values have been shown to influence performance. 
Having confirmed the above the study progressed to investigate the ability of the BFA 
sample and examine any group difference with a sample individually matched for IQ 
and chronological age (CA) in the following 
1. To investigate the ability to produce FE on demand. 
2. To investigate if context has any impact on production of FE. 
3. To investigate the ability to label emotions of the characters In emotion 
vignettes. 
10.3.1 Hypotheses 
1. My first prediction was that HF A children would be able to produce simple FEs 
such as happy and sad but would struggle with complex FEs such as disgust. 
2. My second prediction was that there would be no significant difference between 
the HF A sample and the MC in production of simple FEs such as happy and sad 
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but there will be a significant difference for complex FEs such as disgust. The 
general assumption in research is that individuals with autism have a deficit in FE 
recognition. It has been reported that toddlers can copy FE with explicit 
instructions but not implicitly. However, in Chapter 9 under investigation of 
inner-outer FR, I have reported that a HF A sample was able to execute holistic 
face processing at a level similar to MC. It is in light of this finding, as well as 
those reported by Wilson et aI., (in press) and Spezio et aI., (2007), that the first 
prediction is made. 
3. My final prediction was that there will be no significant group difference in the 
labelling of the six basic emotions. Literature highlights that individuals with 
autism are better at labelling emotions than recognising FEs, especially high-
functioning individuals (Oznoff et aI., 1990). 
Exploratory investigation was carried out to examine FE production within context 
and as such a prediction could not be made for this part of the investigation. 
10.3.2 Method 
J 0.3.2.1 Participant 
See chapter 6 for a dctailed account of rccruitment, inclusion and exclusion criteria 
and matching groups. 
JIFA and matched control sample 
Twenty-one HFA children aged 9 to 15 matched individually for both CA and IQ to 
twenty-one MC children were tested (see table 10.7). Actual age and IQ of each 
participant is in appendix 5. 
Table 10.7: Mean age and 10 for JIFA and Me 
Mean Age Mean FSIQ Mean VIQ Mean PIQ 
Matched controls (MC) 12.98 106.11 104.94 106.11 
HFA sample 13.11 105.94 106.11 104.64 
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10.3.2.2 Apparatus and material 
This was exactly same as in experiment 1 of FE production reported in this chapter. 
The ADI-R was used to administer semi-structured interviews to 7 out of 22 parents 
in order to confirm the autism diagnosis. 
The W ASI was used to measure verbal and non-verbal IQ to produce a full scale IQ 
for all participants in order to match each participant from HF A sample to MC. 
The CARS was administered as a questionnaire to screen participants for autism. 
10.3.2.3 Procedure 
This was exactly same as for the FE production experiment reported in this chapter. 
The CARS was administered first for screening participants for autism. The baseline 
task was administered first, followed by FE on demand, then labelling the emotion of 
the character in the story condition and finally asking participants to produce the FE 
that will best indicate the label provided. 
The W ASI was administered first to HF A and then to groups of MC and individuals 
who matched for CA and IQ were then tested for the FE study. 
10.3.2.4 Results 
Baseline tasks were coded on a categorical scale of yes or no. A minimum of 8 was 
required in order to participate in the study which was based on F ACS manual. Most 
of the HFA participants scored 100 %, but a few had a score of 9. Anecdotal verbal 
feedback suggested that they struggled with AU4 (upper forehead muscles). However, 
since on average at least 9 was achieved by everyone this was not analysed any 
further. The inter-rater reliability was evaluated using Cohen's Kappa and the score 
was 0.81 which means a substantial agreement between raters. 
Instructional . questions data were coded on a categorical yes no scale which 
demonstrated that all participants understood the instructions and followed them. 
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Inter-rater reliability was evaluated using Cohen's Kappa and the score of above 0.8 
showed significant agreement between the raters. This was not further analysed. 
10.3.2.4.1 FE on demand 
FE produced on demand without any prompts, clues or contexts were then coded 
using coding sheet 2, part 1 independently by both the raters on a Likert scale of 1 to 
7 with 1 for mild and low intensity and 7 for high clarity and intensity FE. 
The mean score for accurate FE produced on demand show that the MC were better 
than HFA sample for intensity and clarity (see table 10.8) 
TabJe 10.8: Mean score for FEs produced on demand by IIFA and Me, on the 
Likert scaJe of 1 to 7, 1 = mild and 7 = intense 
Group Happy Sad Angry Fear Surprise Disgust 
Mean sd Mean sd Mean sd Mean sd Mean sd Mean 
HFA 5.32 1.46 4.09 1.99 4.05 2.29 3.59 2.5 4.36 2.06 1.55 
MC 6.18 0.73 5.55. 0.73 5.77 1.41 4.27 2.33 5.95 0.99 4.23 
A 2 (HFA and Me) x 6 (FE: happy, sad, angry, fear, surprise and disgust) split plot 
ANDV A was conducted. The main effect of FE was significant (F = 24.89, p = 
0.001), demonstrating that happy and surprise were produced with higher clarity and 
intensity than fear and disgust to low intensity and clarity. The main effect of group 
was also highly significant (F = 11.6, P = 0.001) demonstrating that overall 
performance ofHFA group was significantly worse than MC. The interaction was not 
significant (F = 0.98, P = 0.32). The HF A sample was in general worse than MC with 
disgust FE showing the greatest difference between groups. 
The main effect of group was further analysed using independent sample t-test to 
examine the difference. Except for fear, all other FE produced by the HF A sample 
were significantly worse than MC (see table 10.9). The means show that HFA were as 
good as MC in the production of fear FE on demand but for the rest of the FE they 





Table 10.9: t-test and p values for significantly different FE between IIF A and 
MC 
t-test p values Significant difference between both groups for 
2.48 0.17 Happy FE 
3.20 0.003 Sad FE 
3.003 0.004 Angry FE 
3.26 0.002 Surprise FE 
2.21 0.03 Disgust FE 
The main effect of FE on demand was further analysed using paired sample t-test on 
split data. The results show that for MC production of fear and disgust was 
significantly worse to rest of the FE produced by them (see table 9.10). Other FEs 
produced, such as happy, sad, angry, and surprise, were not significantly different to 
each other within sample for MC. The results show that for BFA sample production 
of happy was significantly different to all FEs except surprise within sample; while 
disgust was significantly different to all other FEs produced within sample. The happy 
FE showed best production taking clarity and intensity into consideration (see table 
9.11) and disgust was the worse taking clarity and intensity into consideration. Other 
'FE produced by the HF A sample, such as sad, angry, fear and surprise, were not 
significantly different to each other within sample for HFA sample. 
Table 10.10: t-test and p values for significantly different FRs produced by MC 
(within sample) 
t test p values Significant difference 
Happy 4.28 0.001 With fear 
3.51 0.002 With disgust 
Sad 3.05 0.006 With fear 
2.44 0.02 With disgust 
Angry 3.33 0.003 With fear 
2.89 0.009 With disgust 
Surprise 3.31 0.003 With fear 
3.22 0.004 With disgust 
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Table 10.11: t-test and p values for significantly different FEs produced by BFA 
(within sample) 
t-test p values Significant difference 
Happy 3.15 0.005 with sad 
2.55 0.018 with angry 
3.38 0.003 with fear 
3.48 0.002 with disgust 
Sad 2.44 0.02 with disgust 
Angry 3.02 0.006 with disgust 
Fear 2.93 0.008 with disgust 
Surprise 2.09 0.49 with disgust 
The HFA sample was significantly worse in comparison to the Me when asked to 
produce FE on demand without any prompts or clues. All FEs except fear FE 
produced by the HF A sample was less expressive than Me taking clarity and intensity 
into consideration. 
When the FE within group is compared the HF A sample produced positive FE, i.e. 
happy and surprise, with greater clarity and intensity. Happy was otherwise 
significantly different to all the other FE produced by them. The data highlights that 
the HF A sample struggled the most in producing disgust FEs, scoring very low for 
clarity and intensity. This is also the case for fear FE. When FE within group is 
compared for Me their FE production for happy, sad, angry and surprise are similar 
for clarity and intensity and all these FEs are significantly different to fear and 
disgust. The mean score for fear and disgust was about 4.5 on a Likert scale of 1 to 7, 
which suggests that fear and disgust FEs produced on demand are or low clarity and 
intensity in comparison to other FEs. 
10.3.2.4.2 Story labels for emotion 
The mean scores for accurate labelling of the emotion for the character in the story 
condition show that the Me were similar to the HF A sample for all FEs in this 
condition (See table 10.12) 
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Table 10.12: Mean of scores for story labels by JlFA and Me based on a scale of 
o to 2 
Group Happy Sad Angry Surprise Fear Disgust 
Mean sd Mean sd Mean Sd Mean sd Mean sd Mean 
HFA 1.36 0.49 1.77 0.52 1.18 1.18 1.64 0.58 1.64 0.58 1.36 
Me 1.55 0.51 1.86 0.35 1.27 1.27 1.73 0.45 1.91 0.29 1.73 
A 2X6 split plot ANOV A was conducted to examine group difference. The main 
effect of group was marginally significant (F = 4.29, P = 0.04) but the main effect of 
FE was not significant (F = 1.17, p = 0.28) and the interaction was not significant (F = 
1.03, p = 0.31). This means performance for labelling of the six emotions within 
group is very similar and although the difference between HF A and Me is significant 
this significance is very marginal. The main effect of group was further analysed 
using independent sample t-test which showed that despite differences between means 
performance for fear was not significantly different between group (t = 1.96, p = 
0.056). The performance for disgust is also not significantly different (t = 1.77, p = 
0.08). . 
This meant that the HF A sample even though they were significantly worse than the 
Me in production of FE on demand, the labelling of characters' emotion did not show 
this difference to the same level of significance between groups. The mean accuracy 
scores show that Me were extremely good at labelling fear, with the scores reaching 
nearly ceiling limits. In comparison performance of HF A were poor for the fear 
emotion in the story. 
10.3.2.4.3 FE produced with context 
Participants were provided context for each FE, asked to label the emotion in the story 
and then produce the FE. The mean of scores for accurate FEs produced with context 
shows that FEs produced by the HF A sample was inferior to those of the Me for 
clarity and intensity. 
A 2X6 split plot ANOV A was conducted to analyse the difference. The main effect of 





significantly worse than the Me in producing FE when context was available. The 
main effect of FE was also significant (F = 13.48, p = 0.001), showing that some FEs 
were easier to produce, such as happy, whereas others were significantly difficult to 
produce, such as disgust and fear. The interaction was not significant (F = 1.16, p = 
0.28). 
Table 10.13: Mean of scores for FEs produced with context by IIFA and Me on 
the Likert scale of 1 to 7, 1 = mild and 7 = intense 
Group Happy Sad Angry Fear Surprise Disgust 
Mean sd Mean sd Mean sd Mean sd Mean sd Mean 
HFA 5.59 1.61 3.64 1.94 3.32 2.64 3.55 2.36 4.68 1.98 3.45 
Me 6.5 0.51 5.59 1.18 5.27 1.93 5.32 1.12 5.86 0.71 5.5 
The main effect of group was further analysed using independent sample t-test. The t-
test scores clearly indicate that the performance of the HF A sample for all FEs were 
significantly worse than theMe (see table 10.14). 
Table 10.14: t-test and p values for significantly inferior FEs produced with 
context by IIFA compared to Me 
t-test p values Significant difference between both groups for 
2.51 0.01 Happy FE 
4.-04 0.001 Sad FE 
2.8 0.008 Angry FE 
3.17 0.003 Fear FE 
2.63 0.01 Surprise FE 
3.23 0.002 Disgust FE 
The main effect of FE was further analysed using paired sample t-test on split data. 
For the Me the t-test and p value show that the happy FE was significantly different 
to all other FEs, reaching ceiling limits for clarity and intensity when context was 
. provided. The rest of the FEs were not significantly different to each other within 





Table 10.15: t test and p values for significantly different FE produced by Me 
within sample 
t test p values Significant difference between FEs 
4.004 0.001 Happy and sad FE 
2.98 0.007 Happy and angry FE 
5.13 0.001 Happy and surprise FE 
5.26 0.001 Happy and fear FE 
2.93 0.008 Happy and disgust FE 
The t-test and p value for the HF A sample when context was available shows that 
production of happy FE was significantly different to all other FEs except surprise 
and that surprise was significantly different to sad, angry and disgust FE. The mean 
scores indicate that production of Happy FE reached the maximum for clarity and 
intensity closely followed by surprise (see table 10.16). 
Table] 0.16: t-test and p values for significantly different FE produced with 
context by ifF A within sample 
t-test p Significant difference between FEs 
values 
3.82 0.001 Happy and sad 
3.61 0.002 Happy and angry 
3.42 0.003 Happy and fear 
4.08 0.001 Happy and disgust 
2.76 0.01 Sad and surprise 
2.83 0.01 Angry and surprise 
2.12 0.04 Surprise and disgust 
10.3.2.4.4 Comparison of FE with and without context 
The HFA sample's production ofFEs on demand when compared to FEs produced in 
context shows no significant difference, meaning FE production did not improve or 
deteriorate with context. 
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This same comparison for the MC that happy (t = 2.3, p = 0.03) and fear (t = 2.1, P = 
0.04) FE were significantly better when context was provided. When context was 
provided the mean for disgust FE increased by a similar amount as for happy FE and 
fear FE. This difference did not reach significance however, possibly due to the large 
standard deviation of this data set (See table 10.17) 





10.3.2.4.5 Correlation between IQ and production scores 
Following the rationale discussed in section 9.3.3.5 it was decided to investigate the 
correlation between FE production scores and IQ. The only correlation that was 
marginally significant (p = 0.045) was between story label scores of fear and IQ for 
HF A (See appendix 6). This is a positive correlation i.e. as the IQ scores increased the 
accuracy for story labels increased. Since this is very margina1Jy significant it will not 
be explored further. 
10.4 Discussion 
The baseline tasks were designed to check if participants can use the facial muscles 
necessary for FE production and if this is under the voluntary control of participants. 
All participants from both groups clearly demonstrated that they can use the facial 
muscles and that these muscles are completely under their voluntary control. An 
instruction questions task was designed to examine whether participants can 
understand instructions and carry them out. All participants successfully carried out 
all the instructions they were given thus proving that they were capable enough to 
understand the instructions and carry them out. From these two tasks it can be 
concluded that if the HF A sample is different to the MC it was not because their facial 
muscles were not functional, they could not control them or that they cannot 
understand and carry out instructions. 
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]0.4.] FE on demand 
One of the main focuses of the thesis was to explore if HF A children can produce 
FEs. Literature highlights that the autism population have a deficit in FE recognition 
and discrimination and that this persists into adulth~od at which stage even if 
accuracy is achieved at similar levels to MC the strategy used is atypical (Joseph and 
Tanaka, 2003; Klin et aI., 1999) or there is a speed accuracy trade-off (Behrmann et 
aI.,2006). 
To my knowledge, failure to adequately use FE, which is one of the cardinal features 
of autism according to the ICD-lO (WHO, 1994) and the DSM-IV (APA, 1994), has 
not been investigated from the perspective of FE production to date, especially in 
adolescents with HF A. The studies that have investigated to a limited extent FE 
production in population with autism have exclusively focused on toddlers, and 
examined their ability to imitate FEs either implicitly or explicitly (McIntosh et aI., 
2004; Rogers et aI., 2003.). 
The present study firstly investigated the ability of a HF A sample to produce FE on 
demand without any prompts, clues or explicit context. It compared this data with a 
sample matched on a one-to-one basis for CA and IQ. The HF A sample, when asked 
to produce FE on demand, was able to produce all the FEs albeit at a level 
significantly worse than Me. The first prediction was that HFA sample will be able to 
produce FEs such as happy and sad. Production of FE by autism population has not 
been investigatged to my knowledge hence it was not possible to predict the level of 
performance. The fact that HF A sample produced expression which scored above zero 
on average it can be assumed that first prediction was met. The performance was in 
fact, beyond the expectation of the prediction. In the FE recognition literature it has 
been established that children with autism can recognise expressions such as happy, 
sad, surprise, disgust (Gepner et aI., 2001). Production of FE is a new finding and 
adds to the literature of FE research. 
Happy FE was produced by the HF A sample with significantly more clarity and 
intensity than all the other FEs produced by them within sample, except surprise. The 
production of disgust FE by the HF A sample was significantly worse compared to all 
the other FEs produced by HF A. Developmental literature on FE recognition claims 
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that recognition of disgust is the hardest and it is achieved at a much later stage 
developmentally (Kolb et aI., 1992; De Sonneville et aI., 2002). Experiment 1 on FE 
production, which was carried out to establish baseline data, also reported that 
typically developing 6-10-year-olds are poor at production of disgust. The behaviour 
of the HFA sample for production of FE so far is in-line with previous research on FE 
recognition i.e. recognition of happy is reported to manifest earliest and is recognised 
most efficiently and recognition of disgust is most difficult and achieved at a much 
later developmental stage (Kolb et aI., 1992; Berba and Phillips, 2004). The same 
pattern was observed here for production of FE by HF A i.e. happy was easiest to 
produce and disgust was hardest without any context or clues. As stated earlier 
although the HF A sample produced FEs which on average scored above zero on the 
Likert scale they were significantly worse compared to MC in the production of all 
FEs except fear on demand. Both the groups produced fear FE with low intensity and 
clarity, with the BFA sample scoring on average less than MC but this difference was 
not significant. 
The second prediction was that HF A sample will produce happy and sad FEs at the 
same level as MC but will be significantly different from Me for complex emotions. 
The data presented here shows that although the HF A sample can produce all FEs 
they were significantly worse than MC in production of happy and sad FEs but were 
similar to MC in production of complex emotion, fear; resulting in rejection of second 
hypothesis. 
Recent research in FE recognition has successfully demonstrated that children with 
autism can recognise happy, sad (Gepner et aI., 2001) and fear (Spezio et aI., (2007) 
FEs at a level similar to controls. Adolescents with autism can imitate happy and 
angry FEs at a level same as controls with explicit instructions. Data presented here 
from FE production with explicit instructions shows that performance of the HF A 
sample for all FEs are significantly worse than for MC, bearing in mind that the 
control sample here are of same CA and IQ and are matched on one-to-one basis. This 
is a new finding enriching the present literature of FEs from a production perspective. 
A parsimonious conclusion can be that the HF A sample performs at a significantly 
lower level of accuracy compared to controls but uses a similar mechanism except for 
fear. 
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Reviewing the between-group and within-group data it can be concluded that HF A 
children can produce FEs. Nevertheless performance is significantly worse than Me 
even for simple FEs like happy and sad. In a typical population it has been 
demonstrated that infants as young as 7-month-olds can reliably discriminate happy 
and sad FEs. Recognition ability of happy FE develops at a very young age for 
typically developing infants (Nelson and Ludemann, 1987) and reaches adult level of 
expertise at age of 6 (Kolb et aI., 1992). Production of happy FE in children aged 3-5 
years has been reported to be superior to all the other basic expressions (Field and 
Walden, 1982). At present the maturity age for production of happy FE is not 
available in the literature so concrete claims cannot be made. However, it is clear that 
HF A children aged 9-15 have not reached the adult level of expertise for production 
of happy FE. Even if this is true, it is obvious that the HF A sample, like Me found 
production of happy FE the easiest task: It is evident from the results that the lIF A 
sample follows a similar behaviour pattern for happy, sad, angry and surprise; albeit 
significantly delayed. 
FE recognition literature clearly indicates that happy FE is recognised by autism 
samples with accuracy similar to that of MC (Spezio et aI., 2007). Hobson (1986) 
reported that children with autism were significantly worse than Me in matching 
emotion vocalisation and gestures to FEs. However, the study does not indicate 
performance of specific FEs which would have been beneficial because the literature 
clearly emphasises differential performance for each FE. Even when the overall HF A 
performance is significantly worst than controls it is possible that performance of 
specific FE is very similar to the controls. In fact, later research which has looked at 
specific FE recognition performance (Gepner et ai. 2001; Spezio et aI., 2007) has 
reported exactly this. Furthermore, research testing individuals with severe autism has 
not found the ability to recognise happy FEs (Celani et aI., 1999) primarily because of 
profound autism in these individuals is compounded with learning difficulty. In those 
cases it is difficult to separate if the deficit is because of autism or the learning 
difficulty. On the whole, the finding of happy FE production on demand by HFA 
sample reported here is in addition and in accordance with recent FE recognition 
literature. 
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The perfonnance for fear and disgust in the HF A sample is atypical. Production of 
fear FEs is on par with the MC whereas production of disgust FE is profoundly worse. 
Fear is a complex emotion and for HF A should be hard to produce; in contrast it is 
MC who perfonn poorly for fear FE. As stated in experiment 1 on FE production, the 
two expressions, fear and disgust, are difficult to produce without any explicit context 
or clues. The data of the MC in the present experiment is in-line with the 
developmental data for FE recognition (Kolb et al. 1992; De Sonne ville et al. 2002). 
For MC it is difficult to self induce fear and disgust emotions. From the data one can 
claim that HF A participants also find it difficult to self induce disgust emotions. 
Perfonnance for fear is also worse, although is not significantly different to MC or 
other FEs produced within group. One conclusion can be that the HF A sample, 
although significantly less expressive than MC, have similar behavioural pattern 
especially for fear emotion. This is contrary to the pattern of behaviour of individuals 
with autism in FR and FE recognition; where even when accuracy is achieved to 
similar level as MC the strategy used is atypical (Hobson et al. 1988) or there is a 
speed accuracy trade off (Behnnann et al. 2006). In the case of FE production, it 
appears that strategy used by the HFA sample is similar to MC, although performance 
is at a significantly lower level. Field and Walden (1982) tested 3-5-year-olds for 
production and discrimination of FEs. Children's ability to produce FEs was superior 
to their ability to discriminate. The ability to label emotions has also been claimed to 
be superior to recognition. If for typically developing children producing FE is easier 
than labelling, one can speculate that perhaps using a FE recognition paradigm which 
is the main tool of investigation in literature in case of an autism population is not the 
most suitable tool to investigate social deficits. However, it is evident from previous 
research in this field that the FE recognition paradigm has been the main tool because 
of confounding factors including difficulties in recording and scoring (Herba and 
Phillips, 2004), ethical constraints, arising due to filming children, and limited 
objectivity of scoring such video data. The investigations reported in this thesis 
highlight that production of FE is a more suitable paradigm for exploring deficit in 
social functioning. 
One assumption is made here in the absence of explicit context that participants are 
self inducing the emotions in order to produce the FEs. This assumption holds both 
for the sample groups. Since I did not test participants for self induction of emotion I 
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cannot claim with absolute certainty that participants self induce specific emotions in 
order to produce FEs. It is a speculation made based on evidence from FE recognition 
and social communication literature that in order to produce a FE, individuals are 
bound to experience the emotions albeit to a limited extent (Ekman 1997). 
10.4.2 Labelling emotion of the character in the story condition 
Secondly, a short scenario was presented each highlighting an emotion and the task 
was to label the emotion in the story and then produce the FE that would best display 
the emotion. It was thought that instead of providing the labels to participant, if they 
were asked to provide the labels then they would have to engage in the context 
situation cognitively, which may facilitate the induction of the emotion and further 
support production. It also gave me an opportunity to investigate the ability of the 
HF A samples to label emotions in context. 
There was no significant group difference in labelling the emotion in the story 
condition, so the final prediction proved correct. The literature demonstrates that 
individuals with autism are better at labelling emotions than recognising especially 
the individuals with high-functioning autism (Oznoff et al. 1990). This was certainly 
true in the present experiment. The MC were particularly good at labelling the fear 
emotion in the story condition and the score for fear was highest for this sample. All 
emotions labelled by HF A and MC were at a similar level to each other, showing that 
the HF A sample are really good at labelling emotions in the story. 
It can be concluded that as far as labelling emotions in story scenarios are concerned, 
HF A do not differ from matched control children. The impact of socialisation and 
display rules on labelling of emotions has been discussed under the previous 
experiment on FE production. For instance, the social norms dictate that the anger 
emotion is most likely to be disguised by the person experiencing the emotion and 
part of common socialisation may be learning not to display the anger emotion as well 
as learning not to be bothered by unimportant situations or disguise it, if the person is 
actually feeling angry (Reichenbach and Masters, 1983). As mentioned previously, 
the consequence of such training is that when a person should feel angry and the 
labelling of the emotion should be 'anger' it gets misjudged for some other emotion; 
most commonly sad. The data presented here indicates that HF A children conducting 
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themselves in mainstream schools in the UK are learning these socialisation skills and 
are able to apply them, albeit in simplistic scenarios under control conditions. It 
should be noted here that real life is far more complex than the experimental 
conditions created in this study as in real life single emotions do not present 
themselves in a simplistic manner, more often we come across complex emotions and 
or various combinations of simple emotions are presented. Also this study only tested 
very high functioning children with autism who, because they are in mainstream 
school, receive a lot of support and training in social skills thus impacting their 
knowledge and understanding of socialisation and display rules. A final point to note 
is that the participants tested here were on average of high verbal ability (VIQ = 100 
on average) and in the past verbal ability has been claimed to have an impact on 
labelling FE recognition ability (Ireson and Shields, 1982; Brown and Dunn, 1996). 
This can be confirmed here as participants with high verbal ability have been shown 
to be better at labelling the emotion. 
] 0.4.3 FE production with context 
Participants were asked to produce the FE that best displays the emotion they labelled 
in the story condition. HF A children were significantly worse than MC in production 
of all the FEs within context. This is a new finding and adds to the literature because 
HF A children 9-15 years of age have not previously been presented with context and 
asked to produce FEs. 
Context did not significantly improve the performance of HF A children in 
comparison to production FEs without context. Production of fear and disgust did 
improve but failed to reach significant levels of difference. This was probably due to 
the variance in the data both before and after context. 
Context improved the performance of MC for all FEs, of which happy, fear and 
disgust improved remarkably. Happy and fear FE improved significantly with context, 
production of disgust also improved immensely but failed to reach level of 
significance, perhaps because of the variance in the data. Production of fear and 
disgust, which was difficult without context improved with context, in the matched 
sample. The data for the MC is in line with the developmental data for FE recognition 
discussed previously. 
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The production of sad and angry FEs by the HFA sample deteriorated with context 
and went down by nearly one point on average on the Likert scale of 1 to 7. This was 
similar to the performance of typically developing children 6-10 years of age, where 
context lowered performance of sad and anger FEs. In the Me, performance for sad 
FE remained stable with context and production of angry FE improved very slightly, 
not a significant improvement. As discussed previously, explicit context actually 
moderates sad and anger behaviour (Reichenbach and Masters, 1983). On 
examination of the HF A data for sad and anger FEs, it can be concluded that context 
moderated the FE production in the HF A sample, just as in typically developing 
children 6- 10 years of age. MC, 11-15 years of age were less affected by context, 
especially for sad and angry FEs. Perhaps this is because their internal self moderation 
is effective even when self inducing FE and they are more aware of 'display rules' 
which are functional even when naturally inducing emotions. As a result they are 
more 'socially aware' of what is socially acceptable and do not produce the intense 
FE of sad and anger which they may later need to moderate to confirm what is 
socially acceptable. 
The HF A sample has an atypical behaviour pattern for the fear emotion. Context is 
supposed to make production of fear and disgust FEs easier in terms of accuracy, 
clarity and intensity but fails to do this in the HF A sample, especially for fear FE. 
Fear FE was difficult to produce on demand for HFA children, labelling of the fear 
emotion was on par with MC however, production within context did not improve 
significantly. Labelling improved production of disgust although this failed to reach 
levels of significance because of the variance in the data. Taking the data for fear FE 
and the behaviour for other FEs into consideration, it is clear that children with IIF A 






This final chapter summarises the findings of the thesis in two parts. It discusses 
individual and joint findings and themes from the experiments of inner outer FR and 
the two experiments of FE production and emotion labelling. 
Following a summary of results and how these affects hypotheses the main questions 
discussed will be as fOlloWS: 
1. What causes the high level of accuracy in inner face recognition? What causes the 
difference in performance when full and inner faces are interchangeably available 
during learning and recognition? Holistic face processing strategy in its entirety and 
the perceptual sameness caused due to the stimuli used will be considered. 
2. Why are children with autism poor fear facial expression production, whereas their 
ability to process faces holistically is spared?, The hypotheses for FR and FE 
impairments in autism presented in chapter 6 will be considered within the framework 
ofFR models in explaining the findings of the experiments. 
Inner-outer face effect and holistic face processing 
11.1 Summary of results 
The first part of this thesis investigated FR and holistic face processing in typically 
developing children 5 to 10 years of age. The inner outer face paradigm was used for 
this investigation and children were presented only the inner face both during learning 
and testing. 
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The results of the inner outer face effect show that 5-10-year-olds have no difficulty 
in processing inner face only information when this is available. There is no 
perceptual difference in the stimuli between learning and testing phase (experiment 1, 
chapter 9). In fact, the accuracy for inner face only recognition is exemplary and 
supersedes performance of all other conditions. This is a new finding as previous 
research has not tested FR from inner face only information. 
Adding or removing information from the stimuli initially presented for learning has 
some damaging effect on children's performance (experiment 1, chapter 9). Adding 
the outer face during the recognition phase d~teriorates the performance and the 
accuracy for inner to full face condition remained stable with age. This is a new 
finding as previous research has not presented inner face only information at the 
initial learning stage. Removing the outer face was not as detrimental to performance, 
and accuracy improved significantly with age for this condition. This finding is in 
accordance with previous research (Want et aI., 2003; Bonner and Burton, 2004). 
The inversion effect for inner face reported in this thesis is similar to the full face 
inversion effect reported previously (experiment 2, chapter 9). This is in accordance 
with previous research (Yin, 1969; Valentine, 1988). 
When children have full and inner face information for learning accuracy for full face 
was significantly better from the full face information (experiment 4, chapter 9). This 
is a new finding as previous research has not presented full and inner face together for 1 
learning. 
Older children are significantly faster than younger children in FR tasks (Experiment 
4, chapter 9). This is in accordance with previous research (Want et aI., 2003). 
11.2 Support for hypotheses 
The first hypothesis predicted that older children will be significantly better than 
younger children in all the conditions of this experiment. It is partly supported by the 
results of experiment 1, chapter 9. 
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My second hypothesis predicted that FR from inner face will be equivalent to FR 
from full face findings reported in the literature. This was not supported as FR from 
inner face only information was higher than that reported in the literature for full face 
(experiment I, chapter 9). 
My third hypothesis predicted that older children will be significantly better at the full 
to inner face recognition condition. This was supported by the results of experiment 1, 
chapter 9. 
My fourth hypothesis predicted that children will be significantly better at FR from 
upright inner face compared to inverted inner face. This was supported by results of 
experiment 2, chapter 9. 
My fifth hypothesis predicted that FR from full face and inner face will be equivalent 
for accuracy. This was not supported by the results of experiment 4, chapter 9 which 
showed opposite levels of performance for full and inner recognition. 
My final hypothesis predicted that older children will be significantly faster than 
younger children for the FR task, and this was supported by the results of experiment 
4, chapter 9. 
The 'encoding switch hypothesis' presented by Diamond and Carey, (1977) has been 
continuously challenged and the age of the 'switch' progressively lowered by FR 
research, firstly, to 9 years of age (Want et aI., 2003),'then to 7 years of age (Bonner 
and Burton, 2004), and finally to 4 years of age (De Heering et aI., 2007). Turati et aI., 
(2006) presented 1-3-day-old infants unfamiliar inner faces both in habituation and 
preference phases. One of the conclusions was that infants can discriminate faces on 
the basis of inner face only information, thus questioning the 'encoding switch' 
hypothesis. To my knowledge previous research investigating FR in children and 
employing the inner outer face paradigm has not used inner face only information 
during both learning and recognition phases in 5-10-year-olds. The experiments 
reported in this thesis found conclusive evidence of 5-1 O-year-olds recognising faces 
from the inner face only information. The accuracy levels indicate the ease with 
which participants performed this part of the task. The inversion effect confirms use 
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of holistic face processing of the inner face stimuli, thus further challenging the 
'encoding switch' hypothesis. 
11.3 What callses the high level ofaccllracy in iuner (ace recognition? What caWies 
the difference ;', performance when filII and inlier faces are illterchallgeablv 
available during learning and recognition? 
11.3.1 l\fethodological issues 
Turati et al., (2006) proposed a hypothesis to explain the inner-face processing 
efficiency in infants: the perceptual sameness hypothesis. The authors proposed that if 
infants are habituated to the full face and then preference is examined with only outer 
or only inner face, there is an alteration in perceptual appearance, consequently 
affecting recognition. It was concluded that tasks using such stimuli merely 
demonstrate an infant's inability to detect perceptual similarity, rather than testing FR 
ability. The finding of this thesis (experiment 1, chapter 9) confirms that inner FR 
ability in 5-1 O-year-olds is optimal when they see inner face both during learning and 
testing. One may conclude that children aged 5 to 10 year olds are good at inner face 
recognition because of perceptual similarity of the stimuli during learning and testing. 
This means poor performance by children younger than lOin past research on FR 
tasks could have been ameliorated to some extent by providing perceptually similar 
stimuli. It can further be concluded that perceptual difference between learning and 
testing is responsible, to a limited extent, for the difference in FR results between the 
outer, full and inner face conditions. Clearly, 5-1O-year-olds have no difficulty in ; 
processing the inner face when inner face only information is present both for 
learning and recognition phases. Diamond and Carey (1977) claimed that factors 
which affect perceptual change of any visual display must influence face perception. 
Bonner and Burton (2004) also highlight the importance of face stimuli used in 
research and its impact on the findings. Taken together, the high levels of accuracy in 
inner FR demonstrated in this thesis can be attributed to perceptual similarity between 
the learning and testing stimuli. This reduces the task demands and enhances the 
accuracy of performance. 
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· On the other hand, one may question if this result suggests that children executed 
feature-based processing because the inner faces presented during learning and testing 
were exactly the same stimuli. This doubt was discredited by the inversion effect 
observed for the inner face experiment (experiment 2, chapter 9). 
Previous research has demonstrated the classic inversion effect in 5-year-olds (Brace 
et aI., 2001). However, in that study full faces were used both for learning and 
recognition -and the faces were presented with context, in a story condition. The 
present study differed from Brace et aI., (2001) in two respects: firstly that only inner 
faces were presented both during learning and recognition and secondly that the 
design of the experiment was faces presented in isolation and not in context. 
Nonetheless, children as young as five years of age demonstrated the classic inversion 
effect, thus adding to the previous research and enriching the literature. Inversion 
effect has been a strong indicator of holistic processing as well as configural 
processing. The findings of this thesis provide evidence that 5-year-olds can process 
unfamiliar faces, executing holistic face processing strategies because they succumb 
to the inversion effect. All aspects of holistic processing will be considered 
comprehensively in the next section. At this stage we can conclude that holistic 
processing for inner face stimuli is partly demonstrated by the inversion effect. 
Perceptual similarity of stimuli is used to explain many of the existing results in the 
literature. This would mean that perceptual difference in stimuli would show a similar 
deterioration in performance for full to inner face and inner to full face conditions. 
However, the findings with 5-10-year-olds reveal that performance for the full to 
inner face condition follow a different pattern to that for the inner to full face 
condition. Typically developing 5-10-year-olds when they learn inner face and are 
asked to recognise full face make the least improvement. The performance of 7-8-
year-olds for this condition dipped even further, making their performance 
significantly worse than 9-10-year-olds. The fact is, both full to inner face and inner 
to full face conditions involve perceptual variance between learning and recognition. 
The simple question is: why should these two similar variances produce drastically 
different results? Perceptual similarity between two stimuli is insufficient to explain 
all the results obtained in this thesis for the inner outer face effect. In order to explain 
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the findings completely, holistic face processmg strategy In its entirety IS now 
considered. 
11.3.2 Holistic face processing strategy 
The inversion effect as a paradigm is frequently implemented to investigate holistic 
face processing and in those studies full face is mostly used as the stimulus (Diamond 
and Carey, 1986; Valentine and Bruce, 1988; Valentine 1988; Collishaw and Hole, 
2002). In this thesis the inversion effect for inner face is demonstrated in children as 
young as 5 years of age. This can be taken as evidence for holistic face processing and 
is in accordance with existing literature. 
Research investigating holistic face processing using a composite face paradigm 
(Mondloch et aI., 2007; De Herring et aI., 2007) or whole-part face paradigm (Tanaka 
and Farah, 1993) only considers glueing inner face parts together into a gestalt. 
Holistic face processing does not only mean glueing internal features together, it also 
means glueing the inner face to an external contour (Young et aI., 1987; Sinha and 
Poggio, 1996). This was reviewed in chapters 2 and 7. Studies investigating familiar 
FR report that if one familiar inner face and a different fainiliar outer face are put 
together the resulting stimulus is perceived as a novel face (Young et aI., 1987; Sinha 
and Poggio, 1996). Instead of cropped inner or outer faces Campbell, Walker, 
Benson, Wallace, Michelotti and Baron-Cohen, (1999) presented faces with either the 
inner or outer parts blurred. The authors concluded that when the outer face was 
available, either clear or blurred, it was processed automatically and affected the 
accuracy of participants in the FR task. The study claimed that outer face information 
continues to impact FR until 15 years of age. This means that the 'encoding switch' 
proposed age of 10 years was once again questioned and pushed to 15 years. 
The three conditions for investigating the inner outer face effect used in this thesis 
gave me the opportunity to examine holistic face processing of inner face and the 
effect of novel external contours. The data for the inner to full face condition showed 
that 5-10-year-olds cannot recognise a previously-seen inner face 30% of the time. It 
can be concluded that for unfamiliar faces if outer face is available only during 
testing, it gets glued to the previously learnt inner face and the stimulus perceived as a 
new face. This indicates that in unfamiliar face processing, the outer face acts as a 
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salient cue. If the outer face information is available it will in some respect interfere 
with the recognition performance. This is exactly the same as the finding reported by 
Campbell et al., (1999) for familiar faces i.e. information from outer face if available 
will be processed, and this thesis extends the finding to unfamiliar face stimuli. In 
conclusion, the data presented here indicates that 5-10-year-olds can execute an 
holistic face processing strategy, both in the case of glueing inner facial features 
together and glueing inner face with an external contour. 
The experiments reported under chapter 9 indicated that an holistic processing 
strategy in its entirety can only be inferred when not only inner face processing is 
tested but also when inner face and external contour glueing is tested. Without testing 
the glueing of inner face with external contour De Herring et aI., (2007) concluded 
that by 4 years of age children have mature holistic face processing ability. The two 
holistic face processing strategies discussed here have quite different impacts on the 
accuracy. Ability to glue inner face features together improves accuracy of FR. 
However, tendency to glue inner faces to external contours deteriorates the accuracy 
of FR. The finding from this research clearly demonstrates both types of the holistic 
face processing strategies operating in 5-1 O-year-olds. 
Experiment 4 (chapter 9) demonstrated that although 5-10-year-olds can recognise 
faces from inner face only information, they are better at assimilating information 
from full faces and are able to process full faces significantly faster. This suggests that 
for unfamiliar faces children up to 10 years of age prefer full face stimuli and are able 
to process these for recognition more efficiently. Considering all the inner outer face 
effect data it is clear that the entire holistic face processing strategy does not mature 
fully until 10 years of age. The 'encoding switch' hypothesis has been continuously 
challenged and age of 10 discredited with researchers reporting a progressive 
lowering of age. The research of this thesis shows that Carey and Diamond, (1977) 
were partially right. It is evident that for children outer face is a salient cue, enhancing 
performance in terms of both accuracy and speed. If information from full face or 
outer face is available, children tend to focus on them more, however, in the absence 
of outer face or full face 5-10-year-olds are perfectly capable of recognising faces 
from inner race only information. This is in accordance with previous research for 
familiar faces (Campbell et aI., 1999) where children were able to recognise familiar 
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faces from inner face information. The results highlight that seeing a face in more 
than one format does not enhance FR accuracy. The difference between processing 
familiar and unfamiliar faces previously observed is therefore not exclusively due to 
previous exposure to the familiar face with and without hair. 
The reaction time data highlight that younger children are significantly slower than 
older children for full FR and inner FR. This means that FR and holistic face 
processing is still developing and has not reached adult levels by the age of 4 or 6 as 
is claimed by previous research (De Heering et aI., 2007; Mondloch et aI., 2007) . 
Even when accuracy is achieved at adult level 5-7-year-olds take significantly longer 
than 9-1 O-year olds, signifying that the holistic processing strategy is still developing. 
11.4Inner-outer face effect in IIFA children 
11.4.1 Summary of results 
This thesis was also investigating holistic face processing strategy in IIF A children 
using the inner-outer face paradigm, with participants having inner face only 
information. It was also investigating the ability of HF A children to label and produce 
FEs and comparing this ability with matched controls. 
The results of the inner outer face study show that the HF A sample was not 
significantly different to matched controls. This is in accordance with previous 
research (Rondan et aI., 2003; Behrmann et aI., 2006; Wilson et aI., in press). I1F A 
children have no difficulty in processing inner face information and they are not 
significantly different to matched controls in this condition (experiment 2, chapter 9). 
The accuracy for inner face only information was exemplary and superseded 
performance for the other conditions, just like matched controls. This is a new finding 
as the previous research has not tested FR from inner face only information. 
Adding or removing information from the stimuli had the same damaging effect on 
the performance of the HF A sample and the matched controls (experiment 2, chapter 
9). Adding outer face deteriorated performance of the HF A sample to the same extent 
as the matched controls. This is a new finding, as previous research has not presented 
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inner face during learning and asked participants to recognise the same inner face 
with a novel external contour. The result reported in this thesis is in contrast to 
previous hypotheses regarding the superior local level processing and avoidance of 
global perception within an autism sample (Frith and Happe, 1994; Mottron and 
Burack, 2001). 
11.4.2 Support for hypotheses 
The first hypothesis predicted that the HF A sample will not be significantly different 
to the matched controls. This is supported by the results of experiment 2, chapter 9. 
The second hypothesis predicted that the HF A sample will be significantly less 
sensitive to inner face with novel contour and as a result the accuracy for inner to full 
face condition will be significantly better for the HF A sample. This was not 
supported, as the accuracy of the HFA sample and matched controls were very similar 
for the inner to full face condition. 
11.4.3 Holistic face processing is spared in "FA children 
Recent research has failed to find a significant difference between the accuracy of 
performance of children with autism and controls. This has been true especially with 
high-functioning individuals with autism and adults with autism (Behrmann et aI., 
2006; Wilson et aI., in press). Even the seminal study by Hobson et aI., (1988) which 
tested adults with autism for FR reported that performance for identity recognition 
was as good as the control sample. The authors concluded that the "autism sample can 
recognise something about identity but fail to process the feelings expressed in a face 
stimulus". In the present research, I come to the same conclusion: HF A children have 
no difficulty in recognising a person's identity in experimental conditions. The FE 
findings which establish a deficit in FE production are presented later. 
The HF A sample and matched controls were both significantly better in the inner to 
inner face condition than the other two conditions. This clearly reveals that the HF A 
sample participating in this experiment was able to process inner faces and use 
strategies that were similar to the matched controls. Moreover, the ability to process 
inner faces was at the same level as the matched controls. The first aim of this 
experiment was to ascertain if HF A sample participating in the FE production task 
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could process inner face only information. It can confidently be concluded that the 
HF A sample can proficiently process inner face only information. This is a new 
finding which adds to the literature available so far, as in previous research inner face 
has not been presented for learning. 
It is frequently reported that individuals with autism are very good at local level 
processing and are not influenced by the global theme or meaning (Frith and Happe, 
1994; Mottron and Burack, 2001). The famous embedded figure task has been used to 
demonstrate this local bias (Shah and Frith, 1983). The weak central coherence 
hypothesis is centred on this assumption and research reviewed by Frith and Happe, 
(1994) confirm this assumption. Superior local level processing and avoiding global 
perception was also suggested by Mottron and Burack, (2001). In this thesis the 
second prediction (experiment 3, chapter 9) was based on this principle that the HF A 
sample would be significantly less sensitive to the effect of novel external contours on 
inner face processing. However, there was no significant difference between the 
performance of the HF A sample and the matched controls for the inner to full face 
condition. The HF A sample participating in this experiment was as sensitive to the 
novel external contours as the matched controls. This is· an indication that HF A 
children were processing face stimuli at a global level for identity and not using 
feature based processing. Conceivably, this was because HF A children in this 
experiment had developed alternative processing strategy by the age of 9-15 years. 
The accuracy measurement failed to pick up any subtle differences in FR mechanisms 
used by HF A children who are in mainstream school and are receiving intense 
training and support in order to negotiate their social world. Nonetheless, the finding 
in this experiment is that both groups were equally poor at recognising inner faces 
when inner faces were presented within novel contours. The results of FR indicates 
that contrary to assumptions of the WCC theory and superior local level processing 
theory HF A individuals can bind together stimuli such as face stimuli, are influenced 
as much as MC by global theme and do not exclusively operate local level processing 
when recognising faces. 
It is evident that HF A children execute an holistic face processing strategy and are 
affected by both aspects of holistic face processing. As stated previously, holistic face 
processing of inner face only information enhances FR in a typical population and the 
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results for the HF A sample demonstrated the same effect exists with the autism 
population. Holistic face processing resulting in glueing external contour to inner 
face deteriorates FR in a typical population and the results of the HFA sample 
demonstrated the same effect. 
In conclusion, the inner-outer face effect investigated with HFA children who were 
individualIy matched for CA and IQ confirms that in experimental conditions children 
with autism can process faces for identity at the same level as controls. Furthermore, 
this is not achieved using piecemeal or feature based processing and children with 
autism are as sensitive to global information as the typical population. However, this 
research was only recording accuracy for the autism sample and previous research 
using reaction time measures, eye tracking methods and Spezio et aI., 's (2007) novel 
'bubbles' design has demonstrated that the strategy used by children with autism is 
atypical. It should also be noted that the FR task was a very simple task where only 
one face was presented at a time with no other distractions. Real life situations are 
very different as demonstrated by Riby et aI., (2008). Children with autism were 
significantly poorer than matched controls in detecting face stimuli and their interest 
wasn't held by the face stimulus for long after detection. Juxtaposing these two 
findings it can be inferred that children with autism are capable of holistic face 
processing in simplistic experimental conditions. When rich stimuli are presented the 
ability to execute holistic processing using alternative strategies deteriorates 
significantly. 
11.5 FE production and labelling in IIFA children 
11.5.1 Summary of results 
Children from both the groups demonstrated that they can use all the relevant facial 
muscles required for FE production and these muscles are under complete voluntary 
control of the individual. 
The results of the FE production on demand task show that the HF A sample was able 
to produce the six basic FEs on demand. This is a new finding as previous research 
has not tested HF A children for production of FEs and it adds to the literature of FE 
research. 
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Secondly, the results show that the HF A sample was significantly worse than the 
matched controls in production of all FEs on demand except for fear. Although both 
the groups produced fear FE with low intensity and clarity, the HFA sample scored 
less on average than the matched controls, but this difference failed to reach 
significance. This is a new finding as previous research has not tested HFA children 
for production of FEs on demand. This is in accordance with the FE recognition 
literature (Week and Hobson, 1987; Celani et al., 1999; Spezio et al., 2007) as well as 
implicit imitation literature (McIntosh et al., 2006). 
Thirdly, the results show that the HF A sample was significantly worse than matched 
controls in production of all FEs within context. Performance of the matched controls 
for fear improved significantly within context. The HF A sample, however, failed to 
improve their performance for fear FE production within context. This is a new 
finding as previous research has not tested HF A children for FE production within 
context. This is also in accordance with the FE recognition and implicit imitation 
literature. 
Finally, the results show that there was no significant difference between groups in 
labelling emotions in the story condition. This is in accordance with previous research 
(Oznoff et al., 1990). 
11.5.2 Support for hypotheses 
The first hypothesis predicted that the HF A sample will produce happy and sad FEs as 
a minimum. The results of the FE production on demand task (experiment 2, chapter 
11) were beyond the prediction of the first hypothesis. For the HF A sample 
production of happy FE was best and production of disgust was the worst 
significantly in terms of clarity and intensity. 
The second hypothesis predicted that the HF A sample will produce happy and sad 
FEs at the same level as matched controls but will be significantly different to 
matched controls for complex emotions. The results of experiment 2, chapter 11 show 
that HFA children's production of simple FEs such as happy and sad were 
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significantly worse and production of complex FE such as fear was same as the 
matched controls, resulting in rejection of the second hypothesis. 
The final hypothesis predicted that the HFA sample will not be significantly different 
to matched controls in labelling of emotions and was supported by the results of 
experiment 2, chapter 11. 
FE recognition literature in typically developing children clearly states that happy FE 
is the easiest to recognise and develops first while disgust FE is the hardest to 
recognise and emerges quite late developmentally (De Sonneville et aI., 2002). HF A 
children show a similar pattern of behaviour for FE production: happy is easiest to 
produce with and without context and disgust is the hardest to produce especially 
without context. When HF A children are asked to produce FEs on demand the pattern 
of behaviour for happy, sad, angry, surprise and disgust are similar to the matched 
controls, albeit at a significantly lower level. The production of fear FE by the HF A 
sample is atypical, with the production being the same as the matched controls when 
there is no context and production being significantly poorer when there is context. 
The findings of this thesis as regards fear FE will be discussed later on. 
Disgust FE produced by the HF A sample improved with context, whereas sad and 
angry FEs appear to be negatively affected by context, however none of these reached 
levels of significant difference compared to production on demand. The performance 
for fear FE did not improve with context at all. Matched controls' performance within 
context improved significantly for happy and fear FEs. Performance for disgust FE 
improved remarkably but failed to reach significance because of variance in the data. 
Whv are children with alltism poor {ear facial expressioll production, whereas their 
ability to process faces holistically ;.'1 spared? 
11.6 Dissociation between FR and FE production mechanisms 
The results of the HF A sample reported here argues against a generalised failure to 
process faces and points towards a dissociation between mechanism for face 
processing for identity and FE production. The cognitive models of face processing 
discussed in chapters 1-4 make this distinction very obvious. The findings are in 
212 
accordance with previous research FE recognition literature (Hefter, Manoach and 
Barton, 2005; Teunisse and de Gelder, 1994) and the finding extends the literature to 
the production of FEs. By deduction it can be claimed that identity recognition, FE 
recognition and FE production are all dissociable in the autism population. This is 
consistent with the models of FR that propose divergent processing streams for the 
perception of FE and facial identity (Bruce and Young, 1986). The results of the 
studies reported here suggest that the processing deficit in HF A individuals can affect 
the divergent streams independently and variably rather than a major assault upstream 
affecting everything. The results of the inner outer face effect can be an indication of 
more downstream impairments because the children executed both aspects of holistic 
face processing. Alternatively, they indicate that HFA children 9-15 years of age have 
developed alternative strategies which enable them to process faces for identity at the 
same level as the matched controls. Neurophysiological evidence backs the latter 
argument. Baron-Cohen et aI., (1999)' reported that individuals with autism put a 
greater processing load on the temporal lobe structures instead of using the amygdala. 
It should be noted that in contrast researchers (Herba et aI., 2006) have demonstrated 
the impact of FE on FR processing with typical children, thus challenging Bruce and 
Young's, (1986) model. Juxtaposing such claims and the result of studies reported in 
this thesis, it is evident that the face processing and facial expression processing 
systems, although divergent, operate in continuous feedback and feed-forward loop. 
Thus the modules which Bruce and Young, (1986) claimed to exist when processing 
face stimuli, certainly do not operate in complete isolation, rather in continuous 
interaction with each other. 
The results of this thesis are even more consistent with the model of a distributed 
neural system for face perception (Haxby et aI., 2000). This model proposes a core 
system which is hierarchical and an extended system which is interactive both within 
itself and with the core system. According to this model FR is handled by the core 
system and FE more by the extended system. If that is the case then in HF A children it 
would appear that the core system is operating at a level similar to typical population. 
In HF A children deficits in FE labelling and FE recognition are not a generalised 
deficit, rather a differential level of performance for different FEs. Firstly, in the 
typical population it has been demonstrated that performance for all FEs are not 
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uniform. Children behave differently for different FEs (Gosselin, 1995; Camras and 
Allison, 1985) with performance for happy maturing earliest and disgust emerging 
much later in life (Kolb et aI., 1992). This is the same in HF A children who perform 
differently for different FEs and the findings of this thesis regarding FE extend this 
conceptualisation to the HF A population. This would imply dissociation between the 
six basic FEs, which will be covered in the next section. 
Previous research has demonstrated the FR and FE recognition are dissociable in 
autism population (Hefter et aI., 2005; Hobson et aI., 1988; Teunisse and de Gelder, 
1994). The results presented here suggest that face processing for identity is 
dissociable to production of FEs. For HFA the identity processing is functioning at a 
level similar to the matched controls for faces presented in experimental conditions. 
This leads to the conclusion that maybe holistic face processing is spared in HF A 
children. Alternatively, HFA children may have developed alternative strategies to 
process faces for identity. This dissociation is a new finding in autism population and 
extends the present literature. 
11.7 Rationale for impairment in Fear processing and FE production 
As mentioned earlier production of happy, sad, angry, surprise and disgust follows a 
pattern of behaviour which is very similar to the matched controls, nonetheless at a 
significantly lower level. This is in accordance with the FE recognition literature 
(Week and Hobson, 1987; Celani et aI., 1999; Spezio et aI., 2007; Klin et aI., 2002). 
Production of fear FE is atypical and needs further consideration. The amygdala is 
responsible for fear perception and processing and hypoactivation of the amygdala in 
autism sample was reported by Baron-Cohen et aI., (1999). Dawson et aI., (2004) 
tested 3-4-year-olds with autism and reported that early brain responses to fear FE 
were slower to matched controls. In addition the study demonstrated both delay in 
processing and abnormal scalp topography, indicating a compromise in speed and 
cortical area of processing. As stated in chapter 6 the amygdala theory (Baron-Cohen 
et aI., 2000) argues the idea that individuals with autism use an alternative neural 
system for processing FEs because the amygdala is not functioning. This leads to 
atypical performance for FE recognition. Non-function of the amygdala 
predominantly means failure to process fear leading to impaired fear perception. 
Research in neuroscience has reliably and consistently linked the amygdala to fear 
214 
processing and it is the only emotion linked to one specific brain area (Phan, Wager, 
Taylor and Liberzon, 2002). Behavioural and neurophysiological research has already 
established the vital role of the amygdala in fear processing and the effect of 
amygdala impairments in individuals with autism (presented in details in chapters 4 
and 6). The amygdala theory of autism uses data from animal model, from amygdala 
lesion patients and from Asperger syndrome individuals, and infers that fear 
perception is impaired in autism. Juxtaposing previous literature with the results of 
this thesis it can be concluded that an impairment of amygdala also impacts on 
production of fear FE. 
The second possible primary reason for the impaired fear FE production is 'lack of 
experience'. Campos, Frankel and Camras, (2004) claimed that emotion regulation is 
a two stage process; one, generation of the emotion and second, management or 
mismanagement of the generated emotion. According to the authors, development of 
emotion regulation is influenced by factors such as development of language and 
internalisation of social signals. Additionally, management of the generated emotion 
is, to a certain extent, influenced by social and cultural proscriptions and is actually 
learnt at a very early age from observation and interaction. Internalisation of social 
signals is in essence learnt from the primary carer by continuous observation and 
interaction. Camras, Oster, Campos and Bakeman, (2003) report that infants do not 
produce discrete negative emotions such as anger, fear and sad in the early stages of 
life and this is gradually learnt from social biofeedback. Social biofeedback refers to 
the process wherein the parent selectively exaggerates and mirrors the infant's 
expressions to help the infant shape their ability to produce discrete negative 
emotions. This hypothesi~ is supported by research which reports that maternal 
depression influences a child's perception of the sad emotion (de Haan, Belsky, Reid, 
Volein and Johnson, 2004) and children who are physically abused are hyper sensitive 
to anger perception (Pollack and Kistler, 2002). 
If the developmental pathway for negative emotion recognition, understanding, 
labelling and production, is through learning from the primary caregiver, then how 
does this affect children with autism? Children with autism are known to be 
exceptionally poor at joint attention, gaze following and shared attention from a very 
early age (WHO, 1994) and do not orient to faces (Dawson et aI., 1998). Osterling 
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and Dawson, (1994) examined first birthday party home videotapes of children later 
diagnosed with autism. They found that in addition to impairment in shared attention, 
l-year-olds attended less to people and failed to orient when their names were called. 
This suggests that children with autism fail to observe the primary caregiver and learn 
about negative emotions and FEs from social biofeedback, consequently not acquiring 
the discrete categories of all negative emotions and FEs. This in tum impacts the 
emotion regulation mechanism, finally affecting production of negative FEs. The 
results reported here suggest that production of negative emotions is impaired in HF A 
children, which is compounded even more for fear FE. 
The final possible reason for impairment of fear FE is also related to a 'lack of 
experience', this time impacting on cortical specialisation. 'Social intelligence', as 
discussed in chapter 6, is our ability to 'read other minds' and negotiate our way 
successfully through the social world. Specific brain areas, namely the amygdala, 
OFC and STG have been demonstrated to be the site of social intelligence (Brothers, 
1990; Baron-Cohen et al., 1999). Grossman and Johnson, (2007) claim that for the 
social intelligence neural circuits to develop and function at an expertise level, 
experience is mandatory. Boraston et al. (2008) similarly indicate that experience and 
expertise would hinder performance. Experience right from the time of birth is vital in 
joint attention and processing of faces, eye gaze, emotions, biological motions and the 
impact of human actions on objects. This line of argument accentuates the role of 
experience, by stating that it causes the generalised brain areas involved in common 
processing during infancy to specialise and fine tuned cortical regions involved in 
processing only social stimuli finally emerge. The authors also speculated the impact 
of experience with 'imitation' and 'reading other minds' on cortical specialisation, but 
due to lack of experimental evidence this could not be used to substantiate specific 
cortical specialisation. The cortical specialisation is crucial for the individual to 
function at the expertise level for faces and with experience these neural structures 
become more differentiated and specialised in their response properties. In the case of 
HF A adults it is already proved that the social intelligence neural circuit does not 
activate when performing emotion labelling tasks and as a result the performance is 
significantly worse compared to controls (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999). Instead, a 
greater processing load is placed on temporal lobe structures such as the STG. Taken 
together this is direct evidence of failure of cortical specialisation due to lack of 
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experience with faces, eye gaze, joint attention, shared attention, biological motion at 
in individuals with autism. As a result alternative neural systems are used and a 
greater processing load is placed on alternative brain areas in autism population. 
These alternative neural circuits may be able to process and handle gross functions 
such as identity recognition, positive FEs recognition and labelling positive emotions. 
However, when it comes to complex stimuli such as negative FE recognition and 
production of FEs, these distributed cortical processing areas fail to function 
effectively. The cumulative effect of not learning discrete categories of FEs in early 
childhood and the lack of cortical specialisation results in a failure to produce FEs at a 
level similar to matched controls. 
The experience-expectant and activity-dependent model proposed by Nelson, (2001) 
draws attention to the role of experience at a critical period for FR to develop. The 
role of experience in the development of expertise level face processing ability was 
also emphasised by Pascalis et aI., (2002 and 2005) and Geldart et aI., (2002). In 
conclusion for the face processing mechanism to develop and finally reach adult level 
of expertise experience is essential at the critical period. Shultz et aI., (2005) infer that 
children with autism do not naturaIJy orient to faces, participate in joint attention, 
shared attention or gaze following and the final result is failure of cortical 
specialisation and inability to process finer aspects of face stimuli. 
t 1.8 I mplications of this thesis 
The results of inner outer experiments reported here suggests that typically 
developing children as young as 5 years old are susceptible to glueing face parts 
together and perceiving face as a whole. HF A children aged 11 to 15 demonstrated 
the same behaviour. This contradicts the wee but is inline with experience-expectant 
face processing theory. 
The results of this thesis indicate that HF A children attending main stream schools 
have a good understanding of emotions and display rules for emotions. They are able 
to use concepts of display rules and ,moderate their FEs for sad and angry which 
indicates that they understand the social norms of not displaying what one is feeling 
or rising above the situation. 
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This thesis however, only recorded accuracy response for most tasks which do not 
always elicit the difference in performance between typical and atypical populations. 
The inner outer face effect experiments reported here are ideal for testing holistic face 
processing. In future if the same experiments are carried out and reaction times as 
well as accuracy are recorded, it could illustrate quantitative differences in 
development and speed accuracy trade-offs both in typically developing children and 
children with autism. The results reported in this thesis highlight that HF A children of 
9-15 years of age do not have any deficit in identity processing in experimental 
conditions when one face is processed at a time. However, they may have developed 
an alternative strategy to perform the task at the same level as the matched controls. In 
future younger, children with autism should be tested in order to infer the 
developmental pathway for FR and to further investigate the development of 
alternative strategies. The inner outer face effect designed to test participants in this 
thesis is simple and child friendly with minimal task demands. It would be an 
excellent paradigm to test younger children with autism and note accuracy and the 
reaction time data. 
The experiments reported here did not investigate FE recognition ability. Future 
research exploring production of FE may consider investigating FE recognition in 
tandem in order to compare and correlate the recognition and production ability of 
individuals with autism. 
F ACS coding system takes into account the whole face and facial movement of 
multiple face areas in order to code for each of the six basic expressions. This thesis 
demonstrates that F ACS is very effective in coding FEs. However, additional 
information such as only upper or lower face movement especially if testing autism 
population should also be recorded. This will enable the researchers to test the 
assumptions that autism population have defective gaze detection system and they 
tend to process mouth area more than eye region. Information of upper and lower face 
parts used to produce FEs was not coded separately in this research. However, such 
information would further reinforce theories such as social motivation and 
experience-expectant theory and future research should consider coding such 
information. 
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Face processing literature in autism population indicates that they use alternative 
strategies to accomplish face processing tasks (Klin et aI., 2002; Joseph and Tanaka, 
2003; Baron-Cohen et aI., 1999). Eye tracking methods in the recent past have been 
used to demonstrate an atypical scanning pattern in the autism population (Klin et aI., 
2002; Riby et aI., 2008). In future if eye tracking is used in conjunction with inner-
outer face effect tasks then conclusive evidence of holistic' face processing can be 
inferred. 
Research with the autism population always involves comparing the performance of 
the autism sample with typical population. It is imperative that the diagnosis of autism 
is made either by using ICD-lO:DCR-lO or ADI-R or ADOS. The present system in 
Britain is that a diagnosis for clinical purposes is reached by a multi-disciplinary team 
of psychiatrist, community paediatrician, teachers, educational psychologists and 
other professionals. Charman, (2006) vouched for clinical diagnosis reached by such a 
multi-disciplinary team and its validity. Nonetheless, it is possible that children 
diagnosed for clinical purposes may not meet the stringent criteria of the diagnosis for 
research purposes. Also, for the purposes of matching, both full scale IQ and CA has 
been used in the present research and each IIF A child was individually matched. This 
has been very useful as it is allows comparison of data and examination of the 
differences caused primarily because of autism. 
Future research investigating production of FEs may consider providing context and 
the FE labels, in order to explore participants' behaviour for production of FE and not 
how the 'character' in the story feels. This will allow us to examine the real 
differences in emotion between the autism population and matched controls as well as 
investigate the individuals' own feelings and expressions. Anecdotal feedback, 
specifically from children with autism in the FE production experiment, informed me 
that they failed to see the birthday party story as a 'surprise' scenario. Individuals 
with autism reported anxiety and disliking to the thought of someone 'in their own 
space' i.e. at their house. The present research did not examine difficulty in 
perspective taking and its impact on FEs and cannot comment on this. As individuals 
with autism have a deficit in perspective taking and theory of mind, story condition 
perhaps acts a confounding factor. A core element of production of FE is 
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communication of the feeling and as the individual with autism has no desire to 
communicate or share, this may pose a challenge to FE production research. 
Present research also did not record gender and actual age of participant. Only the age 
range such as 6 to 7 year olds was recorded for the inner outer FR investigation. This 
meant gender differences or impact of age could not be investigated here. Future 
research may consider recording more participant details such as gender and exact age 
on the date of testing. 
Finally, Baron-Cohen et aI., (1999) had recorded tMRI as the participants performed 
the 'mind in the eye' task and reported the alternative neural systems used for a FE 
recognition task. ERP or tMRI recording while participants are producing FEs may 
give us a better understanding of the role of the amygdala in FE production as well as 
support the investigation of whether alternative neural systems are executed for FE 
production. 
11.9 Concluding remarks 
HF A children attending mainstream schools have the ability to process inner face for 
identity, execute holistic face processing and label the six basic emotions at the same 
level as matched controls. This indicates that for identity processing IIFA children do 
not use local level processing or piecemeal processing and do not see faces as 
collection of features, rather a complex configuration where the relation between the 
features is important as the features themselves. Production of facial expressions is 
significantly worse taking clarity and intensity into consideration. The pattern of 
behaviour for happy, sad, angry, surprise and disgust FE production is similar to 
matched controls and replicates the pattern of FE recognition. Children with autism 
have an atypical perception of the fear emotion and fail to use context to improve 
production of fear FEs. This is in complete accordance with existing literature on FE 
recognition and the neurophysiological literature on abnonnality of amygdala in 
autism. Furthennore, it is evident that experience with faces, gaze direction, joint 
attention and shared attention are the comer stones for the development of 
individual's understanding of negative emotions. The results of the studies reported 
here reinforce the hypothesis of amygdala impainnent in autism and indicate that 
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alternative neural structures can only compensate for dysfunction of the amygdala to a 
. limited extent. It also reinforces the recent claims that children with autism can 
process faces for identity (Wilson et aI., in press). However, they fail to achieve the 
expertise in order to deal with complex aspects of the face stimulus. 
The results of this thesis demonstrate that children 5-10 years of age can process inner 
faces if this is the only information available and can do so with as much efficiency as 
processing outer faces. This challenges the existing notion that typically developing 
young children cannot process inner face information and when they do process inner 
faces it is done on a featural basis. However for identity recognition, 5-10-year-olds 
prefer full face when this information is available and accuracy with full face is 
achieved much faster. The accuracy and speed of face processing continues to 
improve with age at least until 10 years, thus challenging the notion that holistic face 





Short stories for the emotion labelling task 
1. John wanted a Harry Potter Lego set since he saw the first movie. His mother 
finally bought him the set for his seventh birthday. 
How does John feel? 
2. Tom had a Thomas the Tank engine train set since he was very young. One 
day his friend Joe comes to play with him after school and breaks the engine 
and a track. This means Tom will not be able to play with the train set again. 
How does Tom feci? ____ _ 
3. Sam dad buys him a blue BMX bicycle because Sam has done really well in 
school that year. Blue is Sam's favourite colour and he thinks it is the coolest 
bike ever. 
How does Sam feci? ______ _ 
4. Josh has star chart at home and gets a treat when he collects 15 stars. One 
morning he refuses to get up and swears at his mother. His mother tells him 
over breakfast that he will loose 3 stars and he will not get any treat that week. 
How does Josh feel? ______ _ 
5. Matthew goes swimming two days a week at his local swimming pool. One 
day as he is swimming in the big pool he finds something floating if front him. 
222 
When he takes a closer look he sees that is a piece of poo. He jumps out of the 
pool immediately. 
How does Matthew feel? 
6. Sarah does not like spiders and creepy crawlies. For a 'show and tell' Roz 
brings in her pet spider in a glass box which is hairy, black and huge. The 
spider is let out accidentally and everyone is asked to look for it. 
How does Sarah feel? ______ _ 
7. Helen has a pet hamster Fluffy that she spends a lot of time with and plays 
with her a lot. One morning she finds Fluffy dead in the cage. 
How does Helen feel? ______ _ 
8. It was John's tenth birthday, he comes home and as he walks through the front 
door he finds all his friends wearing party hats and they shout 'HAPPY 
BIRTI-IDA Y JOHN'. 
How does John feel? _______ _ 
9. Jack sees a brown paper box at the bottom of the stairs in his house. He thinks 
that the box is empty and kicks it gently and a kitten jumps out of the box. 
How does Jack feel? _______ _ 
10. Mary gets an apple for her break; she takes it out and bites into it. But the 
apple was rotten from inside and tasted awful. Mary spits out the apple. 
How does Mary feel? _______ _ 
11. Libby and Salina are best friends spending a lot of time together at school and 
over weekends doing all the things they both enjoy. Libby also helps Salina at 
times with her home work. One day Libby tells Salina that she is moving to 
another town. 
How docs Salina feel? _____ _ 
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12. David does not like being alone in the dark. One evening he was playing in his 
room and all the lights suddenly went out. David called out for his mum but no 
one answered. 
How does David feel? 
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Appendix 2 
Stories to be rated by teachers 
You are requested to read each story and then write how the emotion the character in 
the story would feel. You need to choose one emotion from the following 
HAPPY SAD FEAR ANGER' SURPRISE DISGUST 
1 John wanted a Harry Potter Lego set since he saw the first Harry Potter movie. 
His mother finally bought him the set for his seventh birthday. John feels 
2 Tom had a Thomas the Tank engine train set since he was very young. One day 
his friend Joe comes to play with him and breaks a track and the main engine. 
Tom will not be able to play with the train set again. Tom feels 
-------
3 Sam's dad buys him a blue BMX bicycle because Sam has done rcally well in 
school that year. Blue is Sam's favourite colour and he thinks it is the coolest bike 
ever. Sam feels ______ _ 
4 Josh has star chart at home for good behaviour and gets a treat when he collects 
15 stars. One morning he refuses to get up and swears at his mother. His mother 
tells him he will loose 3 stars and will not get any treat that week. Josh feels 
5 Matthew goes swimming two days a week at his local swimming pool. One day 
as he is swimming in the big pool he finds something floating if front him. When 
he takes a closer look he sees that is a piece of poo. He jumps out of the pool 
immediately and feels ______ _ 
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6 Sarah does not like spiders and creepy crawlies. For a 'show and tell' Roz brings 
in her pet spider in a glass box which is hairy, black and huge. The spider is let out 
accidentally and everyone is asked to look for it. Sarah feels ______ _ 
7 Helen has a pet hamster Fluffy that she spends a lot of time with and plays with 
her a lot. One morning she finds Fluffy dead in the cage. Helen feels 
8 It was John's tenth birthday; he comes home from school with his mum thinking 
that the house is empty. He goes into the lounge and a puppy jumps he walks 
through the front door he finds all his friends wearing party hats and they shout 
'HAPPY BIRTHDAY JOHN'. John feels ______ _ 
9 Jack sees a brown paper box at the bottom of the stairs in his house. lIe thinks 
that the box is empty and kicks it gently and a kitten jumps out of the box. Jack 
feels _______ _ 
10 Mary gets an apple for her break; she takes it out and bites into it. But the apple 
was rotten from inside and tasted awful. Mary spits out the apple feeling 
11 Libby and Salina are best friends spending a lot of time together at school and 
over weekends doing all the things they both enjoy. Libby also helps Salina at 
times with her home work. One day Libby tells Salina that she is moving to 
another town. Salina feels ______ _ 
12 David does not like being alon~ in the dark. One evening he was playing in his 
room and all the lights suddenly went out. David called out for his mum but no 
one answered. He felt _______ _ 
For the following statements please delete the appropriate: 
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1. All the scenarios above are simple and easy for children 6 years of age and 
above to understand YESINO. 
If no then please specify which story will children find difficult (put the number of 
the corresponding scenario/s) ___ _ 
Please suggest ways in which these scenarios can be made more children friendly 
2. All the words used in the stories above are familiar for children 6 years of age 
and above YESINO 
If no then please specify which word(s) children will find difficult 
If possible please suggest alternative words that the children 6 years of age would 
be familiar to 
3. Any other comments 
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Appendix 3 
Data coding sheet 




Appendix 4 Data coding sheet 1 
Participant no. : 
PART 1 
Facial expression production on demand: Please label the expressions and rate 
them 
1 = mild, 7 = exaggerated 
1. Expression demanded -
Expression produced -
Rate the expression produced on a scale of 1 to 7 
1 2 3 4 
2. expression demanded -
Expression produced -
5 6 7 
Rate the expression produced on a scale of 1 to 7 
2 3 
3. expression demanded -
Expression produced -
4 5 6 7 
Rate the expression produced on a scale of 1 to 7 
1 2 3 45 67 
4. Expression demanded -
Expression produced -
Rate the expression produced on a scale of 1 to 7 




Rate the expression produced on a scale of 1 to 7 
1 2 
6. Expression demanded -
Expression produced -
3 4 5 
Rate the expression produced on a scale of 1 to 7 
6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Other facial movement demanded: Please label the facial movement 
demanded and then rate 
1. Facial movement demanded-
Facial movement produced - Yes/No 
2. Facial movement demanded -
Facial movement produced - Yes/ No 
3. Facial movement demanded-
Facial movement produced - Yes / No 
PART 2 
Facial expression in story compression condition: Please label the spontaneous and 
explicit facial expression produced and the expression label provided by children 
1. Any spontaneous facial expression produced - yes/no 
Label spontaneous facial expression -
happy sad fear anger disgust surprise 
Expression label provided by the child -
Correct label - Happy 
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If correct then rate the explicit expression on a scale of 1 to 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Any spontaneous facial expression produced - yes/no 
Label spontaneous facial expression -
happy sad fear anger disgust surpnse 
Expression label provided by the child -
Correct label - Angry 
If correct then rate the explicit expression on a scale of 1 to 7 
1 2 3 4 5 67 
3. Any spontaneous facial expression produced - yes/no 
Label spontaneous facial expression -
Happy sad fear anger disgust surprise 
Expression label provided by the child -
Correct label - disgust 
If correct then rate the explicit expression on a scale of 1 to 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
4. Any spontaneous facial expression produced - yes/no 
, Label spontaneous facial expression -
happy sad fear anger disgust surprise 
Expression label provided by the child -
Correct label- Fear 
If correct then rate the explicit expression on a scale of 1 to 7 
7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Any spontaneous facial expression produced - yes/no 
Label spontaneous facial expression -
happy sad fear anger disgust surprise 
; 
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Expression label provided by the child -
Correct label - Happy 
If correct then rate the explicit expression on a scale of I to 7 
I 2 3 '4 5 6 
6. Any spontaneous facial expression produced - yes/no 
Label spontaneous facial expression -
happy sad fear anger disgust surprise 
Expression label provided by the child -
Correct label - Surprise 
7 
If correct then rate the explicit expression on a scale of I to 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
7. Any spontaneous facial expression produced - yes/no 
Label spontaneous facial expression -
happy sad fear anger disgust surprise 
Expression label provided by the child -
Correct label - Sad 
If correct then rate the explicit expression on a scale of I to 7 
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. Any spontaneous facial expression produced - yes/no 
Label spontaneous facial expression -
happy sad fear anger disgust surprise 
Expression label provided by the child -
Correct label - Angry 
If correct then rate the explicit expression on a scale of 1 to 7 
2 3 4 5 6 
9. Any spontaneous facial expression produced - yes/no 





happy sad fear anger disgust surprise 
Expression label provided by the child -
Correct label - Disgust 
If correct then rate the explicit expression on a scale of 1 to 7 
I 2 3 4 5 6 
10. Any spontaneous facial expression produced - yes/no 
Label spontaneous facial expression -
happy sad fear anger disgust surprise 
Expression label provided by the child -
Correct label- Fear 
If correct then rate the explicit expression on a scale of 1 to 7 
1 2 3' 4 5 6 7 
11. Any spontaneous facial expression produced - yes/no 
Label spontaneous facial expression -
happy sad fear anger disgust surprise 
Expression label provided by the child -
Correct label - Surprise 
If correct then rate the explicit expression on a scale of 1 to 7 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. Any spontaneous facial expression produced - yes/no 
Label spontaneous facial expression -
happy sad fear anger disgust surprise 
Expression label provided by the child -
Correct label - Sad 
If correct then rate the explicit expression on a scale of 1 to 7 




Age and IQ ofHFA and Me participants for inner outer research 
Participant FSIQ VIQ PIQ Ag~ 
HFA 85 89 84 11.2 
HFA 89 97 85 14.9 
HFA 91 95 90 11.5 
HFA 93 86 103 14.7 
HFA 97 86 109 15 
HFA 98 103 93 12.1 
HFA 101 102 99 15 
BFA 104 103 103 13.3 
BFA 104 98 108 13.2 
BFA 105 96 114 11.2 
BFA 108 125 91 13.7 
HFA 114 115 109 10.5 
HFA 116 121 106 15.5 
HFA 117 108 124 13.10 
HFA 118 118 115 12.7 
HFA 129 135 117 12.1 
BFA 132 127 129 13.3 
Me 84 85 86 11.10 
Me 98 94 101 14.6 
Me 89 106 ·77 11.6 
Me 95 87 104 14.5 
Me 94 87 103 15 
Me 97 98 95 12.8 
Me 103 89 117 14.4 
Me 105 95 113 12.6 
Me 105 106 103 13.6 
Me III 108 III 11.4 
Me 109 105 114 12.3 
Me 113 114 110 10.5 
Me 112 113 108 15 
Me 117 118 111 13.2 
Me 120 109 128 12 
Me 124 139 104 12.7 
Me 128 131 119 13.4 
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Appendix 6 
Table .1 Correlation between FR scores and TO for BFA and 1\1C 
HF A Pearson's r P value Me Pearson's r P value 
Full to inner face and IQ 0.259 0.315 0.258 0.317 
Inner to full face and IQ -0.22 0.397 0.15 0.565 
Inner to inner face and IQ 0.406 0.105 0.404 0.108 
Table .2 Correlations between FE on demand scores and IO for IIFA 
andMC 
On demand HFA Pearson's r P value Me Pearson's r P value 
Happy 0.1 0.657 0.176 0.433 
Sad 
-0.17 0.426 0.117 0.605 
Angry 0.301 0.174 -0.144 0.522 
surprise 0.356 0.104 . -0.507 0.801 
Fear 0.094 0.677 0.067 0.768 
Disgust 
-0.053 0.815 -0.097 0.667 
Table .3 Correlation between FE with context scores and 10 for IIFA 
andMC 
With context HFA Pearson's r P value Me Pearson's r P value 
Happy 0.106 0.639 0.114 0.613 
Sad 
-0.402 0.064 0.069 0.759 
Angry 0.097 0.667 0.121 0.591 
Surprise -0.158 0.481 -0.077 0.735 
Fear 0.015 0.948 0.046 0.839 
Disgust 
-0.06 0.791 0.164 0.465 
Table .4 Correlation between story label scores and 10 for IIFA and 
IVIC 
Story labels HF A Pearson's r P value Me Pearson's r P value 
Happy 0.245 0.271 -0.404 0.062 
Sad -0.035 0.878 0.02 0.931 
Angry 0.012 0.958 0.182 0.418 
Surprise 
-0.222 0.321 0.248 0.265 
Fear 
-0.431 0.045* 0.297 0.18 
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